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Abstract
Effective diabetes management provided in primary care has the potential to reduce
hospitalizations and mortality. To improve diabetes management, a Diabetes
Management Incentive (DMI) was introduced by the Ontario government for family
physicians practicing in patient enrolment models. This thesis has three main objectives:
1) review the literature on the association between financial incentives for diabetes care
and diabetes-related hospitalizations and mortality; 2) and 3) examine the impact of DMI
on: diabetes-related services, diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in Ontario. A review of the literature on the
incentives revealed inconsistent findings. The impact of DMI was assessed using
longitudinal administrative data from the ICES, and analyzed using multivariable
difference-in-difference linear regression models. The results showed that DMI was
associated with an increase in the provision of diabetes-related services, but had no effect
on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk.

Keywords
Diabetes management, financial incentives, pay-for-performance, primary care,
hospitalization, cost, mortality risk, health administrative data, Ontario

ii

Acknowledgments
I would like to first thank my supervisor, Dr. Sisira Sarma, for his great mentorship and
support throughout the completion of this thesis project. Thank you for the knowledge
that you have shared with me, your encouragement, guidance, and your prompt responses
to my questions. I would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Amardeep
Thind and Dr. Gregory Zaric, for their invaluable feedback, expertise, and perspective on
how to improve this project. Thank you Dr. Saadia Hameed, from the Department of
Family Medicine, for responding to my queries regarding the diabetes management
billing codes.
I would like to extend my gratitude to the staff and faculty at the Department of
Epidemiology and Biostatistics for their support, and knowledge I obtained from the first
year course work. I was also fortunate enough to work alongside a group of intelligent
researchers and students from Dr. Sarma’s research team who encouraged me, and lent a
hand when needed during this thesis; my sincere thanks go to Michael Hong, Dr. Nibene
Habib Some, and Mary Aderayo Bamimore. I would also like to acknowledge my peers
and cohort for providing invaluable advice, support, and motivation.
This study was supported by ICES, which is funded by an annual grant from the Ontario
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). The opinions, results and
conclusions reported in this paper are those of the authors and are independent from the
funding sources. No endorsement by ICES or the Ontario MOHLTC is intended or
should be inferred. I would like to express my gratitude to the ICES staff for allowing me
to access the data and for being extremely kind while I was on-site. Thank you Lihua Li
for playing a significant role in assisting me with the data access and for clarifying any
doubts I had regarding the data.
I would also like to acknowledge the Western Graduate Research Scholarship and the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research operating grant MOP–130354 (SARMA et al.),
Early Researcher Award by the Ontario Ministry of Research and Innovation (SARMA)
for their financial support.

iii

Finally, my sincere and heartfelt gratitude goes to my parents, Thavam and Suriyakala,
my sister Sinthiya, and my grandmother Kamaladevi. Words cannot express how grateful
I am for everything you have done and sacrificed for me. Thank you so much for your
continuous support, encouragement, unconditional love, and most importantly for
believing in me during this academic milestone. I would also like to thank God for
providing me countless blessings, strength, and the power to believe in myself.

iv

Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ v
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xi
List of Boxes ..................................................................................................................... xii
List of Appendices ........................................................................................................... xiii
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... xiv
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Diabetes Mellitus .................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Diabetes and Hospitalizations ................................................................................. 3
1.3 Diabetes Diagnosis and Management ..................................................................... 3
1.4 Ontario’s Primary Health Care and Reform ........................................................... 4
1.5 Financial Incentives ................................................................................................ 5
1.5.1

Gaps in the Literature Regarding the Impact of Financial Incentives
for Diabetes Care ........................................................................................ 7

1.6 Research Objectives ................................................................................................ 7
1.7 Thesis Overview ..................................................................................................... 8
References .................................................................................................................... 10
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 17
2 The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes Care and
Hospitalizations and Mortality: A Review of the Literature........................................ 17
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 17

v

2.2 Methods................................................................................................................. 19
2.2.1

Search Strategy and Study Selection ........................................................ 19

2.3 Results ................................................................................................................... 21
2.3.1

Main Search Results ................................................................................. 21

2.3.2

The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes Care and
Diabetes-related Hospitalizations and Diabetes-related Hospitalization
Costs.......................................................................................................... 22

2.3.3

The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes Care and
Mortality ................................................................................................... 26

2.4 Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................. 28
2.5 Figures................................................................................................................... 33
References .................................................................................................................... 35
Appendices ................................................................................................................... 42
Appendix A2.1: Literature Search Tables ............................................................ 42
Appendix A2.2: Literature Review Tables ........................................................... 44
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 60
3 The Impact of the Diabetes Management Incentive on Diabetes-related Services in
Ontario ......................................................................................................................... 60
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 60
3.2 Methods................................................................................................................. 64
3.2.1

Data Sources ............................................................................................. 64

3.2.2

Study Population ....................................................................................... 65

3.2.3

Variables ................................................................................................... 67

3.2.4

Statistical Analysis .................................................................................... 68
3.2.4.1 Main Analysis ............................................................................. 68
3.2.4.2 Subgroup Analysis...................................................................... 71
3.2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................... 72

vi

3.3 Results ................................................................................................................... 73
3.3.1

Descriptive Results ................................................................................... 73

3.3.2

Regression Results .................................................................................... 74

3.3.3

Results from the Subgroup Analysis......................................................... 75

3.3.4

Results from the Sensitivity Analysis ....................................................... 76

3.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................. 76
3.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 81
3.6 Tables and Figures ................................................................................................ 82
References .................................................................................................................... 96
Appendices ................................................................................................................. 105
Appendix A3.1: Information on the DMI and DMA .......................................... 105
Appendix A3.2: DMA Fee Code Billings Compared at Baseline and Final
Year ......................................................................................................... 107
Appendix A3.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model ......................... 108
Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 111
4 The Impact of the Diabetes Management Incentive on Hospitalizations and
Mortality Risk in Ontario ........................................................................................... 111
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 111
4.2 Methods............................................................................................................... 115
4.2.1

Data Sources ........................................................................................... 115

4.2.2

Study Population ..................................................................................... 117

4.2.3

Variables ................................................................................................. 118

4.2.4

Statistical Analysis .................................................................................. 120
4.2.4.1 Main Analysis ........................................................................... 120
4.2.4.2 Subgroup Analysis.................................................................... 123
4.2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................. 124

vii

4.3 Results ................................................................................................................. 124
4.3.1

Descriptive Results ................................................................................. 124

4.3.2

Regression Results .................................................................................. 126

4.3.3

Results from the Subgroup Analysis....................................................... 128

4.3.4

Results from the Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................... 128

4.4 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 129
4.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 134
4.6 Tables and Figures .............................................................................................. 136
References .................................................................................................................. 164
Appendices ................................................................................................................. 175
Appendix A4.1: ICD-10 Codes for Diabetes-related Hospitalizations ............... 175
Appendix A4.2: Hospitalizations, Hospitalization Costs, and MRS Compared
at Baseline and Final Year ...................................................................... 176
Appendix A4.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model ......................... 178
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 181
5 Conclusions and Future Research .............................................................................. 181
5.1 Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................. 181
5.2 Future Research .................................................................................................. 184
References .................................................................................................................. 185
Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................ 188

viii

List of Tables
Table 2.1: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for the diabetes-related
hospitalizations, and hospitalization costs ........................................................................ 42
Table 2.2: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for mortality ....................... 43
Table 2.3: Summary of papers that assessed the relationship between financial incentives
for diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs............. 44
Table 2.4: Summary of papers that assessed the relationship between financial incentives
for diabetes care and mortality .......................................................................................... 55
Table 3.1: Physicians’ eligibility for the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) as of
2006................................................................................................................................... 82
Table 3.2: Number of patients in each study group in the balanced and unbalanced panels
for fiscal years 2002 to 2008 ............................................................................................. 84
Table 3.3: Patient- and physician-level characteristics by study group before DMI was
introduced ......................................................................................................................... 85
Table 3.4: Patient- and physician-level characteristics by study group after DMI was
introduced ......................................................................................................................... 88
Table 3.5: Estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by
patient’s physician ............................................................................................................ 92
Table 3.6: Estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by
patient’s physician in the two subgroups .......................................................................... 94
Table 3.7: Additional information on the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) and
Diabetic Management Assessment (DMA) fee code ...................................................... 105
Table 3.8: DMA fee code billings compared between comparison and DMI group at
baseline and final fiscal year ........................................................................................... 107
ix

Table 3.9: The estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed
by patient’s physician compared between the Linear Probability Model (LPM) versus a
Logit model ..................................................................................................................... 108
Table 4.1: The number of patients hospitalized for diabetes-related complications and the
total number of patients from the main study population (i.e. Balanced panel) ............. 138
Table 4.2: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS by study
group before DMI was introduced .................................................................................. 140
Table 4.3: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS by study
group after DMI was introduced ..................................................................................... 142
Table 4.4: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term
complications .................................................................................................................. 147
Table 4.5: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term
complications .................................................................................................................. 151
Table 4.6: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related shortterm and long-term complications .................................................................................. 155
Table 4.7: Estimated impact of DMI on MRS ................................................................ 159
Table 4.8: Estimated impact of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized for diabetesrelated complications, and on MRS in the two subgroups.............................................. 162
Table 4.9: The ICD-10 codes for hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term and
long-term complications ................................................................................................. 175
Table 4.10: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS compared
between comparison and DMI group at baseline and final fiscal year ........................... 176
Table 4.11: The estimated impact of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized for
diabetes-related short-term complications compared between the Linear Probability
Model (LPM) versus a Logit model................................................................................ 178
x

List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the introduction of Q040 DMI and K030 DMA fee codes in
Ontario ................................................................................................................................ 9
Figure 2.1: The literature search screening for the relationship between financial
incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs
........................................................................................................................................... 33
Figure 2.2: The literature search screening for the relationship between financial
incentives for diabetes care and mortality ........................................................................ 34
Figure 3.1: Flow chart for the selection of study population ............................................ 83
Figure 3.2: a) Average number of DMA fee codes billed for patients by patient’s
physician; b) Proportion of patients with three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s
physician per year ............................................................................................................. 91
Figure 3.3: Sample diabetes patient care flow sheet from April 2006............................ 106
Figure 4.1: a) and b) Average number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term
and long-term complications respectively in patients; c) and d) Proportion of patients
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications respectively 144
Figure 4.2: a) and b) Average hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and
long-term complications respectively in patients ........................................................... 145
Figure 4.3: Average Mortality Risk Score (MRS) in patients ........................................ 146

xi

List of Boxes
Box 4.1: Methods used to calculate the diabetes-related hospitalization costs .............. 136
Box 4.2: Method used to calculate the MRS .................................................................. 137

xii

List of Appendices
Appendix A2.1: Literature Search Tables ........................................................................ 42
Appendix A2.2: Literature Review Tables ....................................................................... 44
Appendix A3.1: Information on the DMI and DMA ...................................................... 105
Appendix A3.2: DMA Fee Code Billings Compared at Baseline and Final Year ......... 107
Appendix A3.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model ..................................... 108
Appendix A4.1: ICD-10 Codes for Diabetes-related Hospitalizations ........................... 175
Appendix A4.2: Hospitalizations, Hospitalization Costs, and MRS Compared at
Baseline and Final Year ............................................................................................. 176
Appendix A4.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model ..................................... 178

xiii

List of Abbreviations
2hPG:

2-hour plasma glucose

95% CI:

95% Confidence Interval

ACG:

Adjusted Clinical Group

ACSC:

Ambulatory Care Sensitive Condition

ADG:

Aggregated Diagnosis Group

!:

Beta coefficient

BC:

British Columbia

CAD:

Canadian dollars

CAPE:

Client Agency Program Enrolment

CIHI:

Canadian Institute for Health Information

CMG:

Canadian Medical Graduate

CPDB:

Corporate Provider Database

CPWC:

Cost Per Weighted Case

DA:

Dissemination Area

DAD:

Discharge Abstract Database

DID:

Difference-in-difference

DMA:

Diabetic Management Assessment

DMI:

Diabetes Management Incentive

FFS:

Fee-for-service
xiv

FP:

Family physician

FPG:

Fasting plasma glucose

HbA1C:

Glycated hemoglobin

HCQI:

Healthcare Quality Indicator

HR:

Hazard Ratio

ICD-9:

9th revision of the International Classification of Diseases

ICD-10:

10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases

IKN:

ICES key number

IMG:

International Medical Graduate

IPDB:

ICES Physician Database

IRR:

Incident Rate Ratio

LHIN:

Local Health Integration Network

LPM:

Linear Probability Model

MOHLTC:

Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care

MRS:

Mortality Risk Score

NT:

New Taiwan

ODD:

Ontario Diabetes Dataset

OECD:

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OGTT:

Oral glucose tolerance test

OHIP:

Ontario Health Insurance Plan

xv

OLS:

Ordinary Least Squares

P4P:

Pay-for-Performance

P4Pa:

Pay-for-Participation

P4C:

Pay-for-Compliance

PCCF:

Postal Code Conversion File

PEM:

Patient Enrolment Model

PG:

Plasma glucose

Q1:

Quintile 1

Q5:

Quintile 5

QOF:

Quality and Outcomes Framework

RIW:

Resource Intensity Weight

RPDB:

Registered Persons Database

SDS:

Same Day Surgery

UK:

United Kingdom

US:

United States

USD:

United States dollar

WHO:

World Health Organization

xvi

1

Chapter 1

1

Introduction

1.1 Diabetes Mellitus
Diabetes mellitus, commonly referred to as diabetes, is a chronic disease that affects
millions of people worldwide today.1,2 The World Health Organization (WHO) defines
diabetes as a disease in which the pancreas does not produce adequate amount of insulin
in one’s body, or when the body cannot effectively use the insulin produced.3 Insulin is a
hormone produced from the pancreas to regulate the body’s blood sugar. The insulin
helps transfer the extra sugar from the blood into cells of the body to be used for
energy.3,4 Diabetes is often characterized by chronic hyperglycemia or high blood
sugar.3,5 There are three common types of diabetes. Type 1 diabetes, commonly
developed during childhood or adolescence, is when there is a deficiency of insulin
produced in the body.3,6 This occurs when the immune system mistakenly destroys the
beta-cells that stores and releases insulin.3,5 A risk factor for type 1 diabetes is having a
family history of this disease; however, research on the exact risk factors of this type of
diabetes is still ongoing.7 Type 2 diabetes, the most common type, is when the body does
not effectively use the insulin released or the body does not produce enough insulin.3,5
Type 2 mostly develops later in life such as during adulthood and in the old age.3,5,6
There are a number of risk factors for type 2 diabetes such as family history, age of 40
years and older, overweight, and members of certain racial/ethnic backgrounds (e.g.
African American).7–9 Lastly, gestational diabetes develops during pregnancy, and it is
when the glucose levels are above normal, but lower than the threshold level for
diabetes.3,10
Diabetes places a substantial burden worldwide, and the WHO estimated it to be the
seventh leading cause of death in 2016.3 Globally, the estimated number of adults with
diabetes increased from 108 million in 1980 to 422 million in 2014.11 Specifically in
Canada, over the past decade the prevalence of diabetes had doubled.10 Statistics Canada
reported that in 2017, over 2.2 million Canadians aged 12 and older are living with
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diabetes, of which 965,100 patients were from Ontario.12 Based on 2013-2014 data,
approximately 200,000 Canadians were newly diagnosed with diabetes.13 Consequently,
diabetes presents a significant economic burden on the healthcare system both in Canada
and worldwide.10 The estimated global cost of diabetes for the year 2015 was $1.31
trillion (United States dollar [USD]).14 As for Canada, in 2010, the total cost of diabetes
was estimated to be $12.2 billion (in 2005 Canadian dollars).15 In 2018, Diabetes Canada
reported the estimated direct cost of diabetes to the healthcare system was $3.6 billion.16
The direct cost includes cost of direct and cardiovascular-related hospitalizations, general
practitioners, specialists, and medications.10,15
Many individuals diagnosed with diabetes develop a number of diabetes-related shortterm and/or long-term complications over time.10 Diabetes-related short-term
complications include diabetic ketoacidosis, hypoglycemia, and hyperosmolar
hyperglycemic state.17,18 Over the long-term, specific complications such as retinopathy
associated with potential blindness, neuropathy with the risk of amputations and foot
ulcers, and nephropathy with a risk of renal failure can be developed.5,10 Diabetic patients
are also at risk of cancer, psychiatric illnesses, cognitive decline, heart failure,
cardiovascular, cerebrovascular, and peripheral vascular diseases.5,10,19 Diabetes-related
complications can lead to hospitalizations, premature death, and reduce an individual’s
life expectancy by 5 to 15 years.10,20 In 2008-2009, one in ten deaths in Canadian adults
aged 20 years and older were attributed to diabetes.20,21
Currently there is no cure to diabetes, however, appropriate management of the disease
can reduce the incidence of diabetes-related complications while reducing mortality and
morbidity.22 For type 2 diabetes, lifestyle interventions such as modifying food intake
and physical activity levels are crucial.19 Diabetic patients generally receive a
standardized diabetes education regarding the dietary intervention, and the significance of
physical activity.19 A patient’s weight can be reduced through these interventions, thus
improving glycemic control and reducing cardiovascular risk factors.19 Patients
unsuccessful with lifestyle modifications, or whom are predicted to be unsuccessful at
diagnosis, are directed towards medications and insulin therapy.19
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1.2 Diabetes and Hospitalizations
Diabetic patients are frequently admitted and readmitted to the hospital due to their acute
and chronic complications.18,23 In Canada, compared to individuals without diabetes,
diabetic patients are more than three times as likely to be hospitalized with heart disease,
over 12 times for end-stage renal disease, and over 20 times for non-traumatic lower limb
amputations.21 However, effective diabetes management at primary care can potentially
reduce diabetes-related complications and hospitalizations.24–26 Therefore, diabetes is
listed as an ambulatory care sensitive condition (ACSC).1,18,24,27–29 An ACSC is a health
condition where accessibility to, and effective management at primary care can reduce
hospitalizations.1,18,24,27,28 For instance, certain conditions such as diabetic ketoacidosis,
and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state require immediate hospital admissions, however,
with adequate primary care many of these hospitalizations can be prevented.18

1.3 Diabetes Diagnosis and Management
Based on the Diabetes Canada (previously known as Canadian Diabetes Association)
Clinical Practice Guidelines from 2018, diabetes is diagnosed through venous samples
and laboratory methods.30 It is assessed using diagnostic tests that examine the following:
fasting plasma glucose level (FPG), 2-hour plasma glucose levels (2hPG) from a 75g oral
glucose tolerance test (OGTT), glycated hemoglobin (HbA1C) levels, or random plasma
glucose (PG) levels. A patient is diagnosed with diabetes when they have a FPG ≥ 7.0
mmol/L, or 2hPG in a 75 g OGTT ≥ 11.1 mmol/L, or HbA1C in adults ≥ 6.5% or
random PG ≥ 11.1 mmol/L.30
Diabetes Canada reports that approximately 80% of care for diabetic patients takes place
at the primary care level, and that the diabetes care should be provided using a chronic
care model. This model is used to provide care to patients with chronic diseases, and
includes strategies to improve the quality of health services provided to patients and their
health status.30 The chronic care model consists of the following six elements: 1) delivery
systems design - systematic changes are made to the primary care practices and health
systems to improve patient care, 2) self-management support - focuses on the patient
taking an active role in their care by self-monitoring and/or help make decisions, 3)
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decision support - provide physicians with the best practice information to date to help
make decisions, 4) clinical information systems – assists with organizing population and
patient data to provide more efficient care (e.g. electronic medical records), 5)
community - social and environmental factors such as food security that affects the
patient’s heath, and 6) health systems - providing support to diabetes care from a health
care system perspective which includes services and strategies to help improve health
outcomes.30 Providing financial incentives to physicians to compensate for spending
adequate time with diabetic patients for the effective disease management is also part of
the health systems support.30
Diabetes management is a multifactorial approach which involves an interprofessional
team of physicians and requires patients to be heavily involved in the care. Diabetes
Canada has additionally noted some crucial tests that patients must take as part of the
diabetes care. These tests include the HbA1C blood tests, nerve damage tests, monitoring
blood pressure, urine tests, foot examinations, blood tests to check cholesterol and other
fat levels, eye examinations, and reviewing blood glucose monitoring records from
home.31 Following Diabetes Canada’s recommendations and having a FP who provides
effective care can help manage diabetes.

1.4 Ontario’s Primary Health Care and Reform
In Canada, primary care services are provided by FPs and general medical practitioners
who diagnose and treat patient’s illnesses and injuries.32 Services provided at primary
care includes prevention and treatment of diseases, providing referrals to other levels of
care (e.g. specialist care), health promotion, primary mental health care, basic emergency
services, and rehabilitation services.32
In the late 90s and early 2000’s, the primary health care sector was confronted with a
number of challenges internationally.33,34 Some of the common challenges were
maldistribution of physicians, gaps between the recommended care and those provided to
patients, patient and provider dissatisfaction, and poor access to care.33,35 In Ontario, the
most populous province in Canada, primary care was historically delivered mostly by
solo and small-group practices that were managed and owned by physicians.35 Physicians
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are paid by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC).35
Traditionally, FPs were paid by the fee-for-service (FFS) payment, where physicians
billed every service provided to the patients.36 Although FFS payments motivated
physicians to provide services, there were some concerns such as physicians were more
likely to provide shorter consultations, physicians tend to have a disincentive to prevent
illnesses, services may be overprovided or prescriptions may be written when it was not
necessary, and the increased costs to the healthcare sytem.36,37
In response to the challenges and to increase the emphasis on chronic disease prevention
and management, policy-makers in Canada and other countries initiated primary care
reform which included a number of changes such as implementing new models of
reimbursement, new governance structure, various pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives,
interdisciplinary teams and electronic health records.33,35 The primary care reform in
Ontario began in the early 2000s. During 2002 to 2007, a number of primary care
organizational and funding models (Patient Enrolment Models; PEMs) were introduced,
and each model had its unique characteristics to suit the physician and patient needs.35
Physicians and patients were able to voluntarily enroll into these models. The newly
developed models attracted many physicians as they were promised to obtain increased
income, and improved infrastructures (e.g. electronic medical records in some practices).
In addition, physicians enrolled to these models were reimbursed through blended
payments such as capitation (fixed payment per patient per annum adjusted for age and
gender), FFS, salary, and P4P incentives for preventive care and chronic disease
management.35

1.5 Financial Incentives
Financial incentives, such as P4P, are provided to physicians, in addition to their existing
base payments, as rewards for meeting specific outcomes or performance targets (e.g.
improving preventive care provided to specific patients).38,39 Financial incentives can
influence FP’s behaviour and motivate them to deliver a higher quality of care to their
patients.18 Financial incentives have been introduced in numerous countries such as the
United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Taiwan, United States, and Australia to improve disease
management at primary care.18,28,38,40,41
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On April 1, 2006, the MOHLTC introduced the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI)
in Ontario.38 The DMI is a $60 annual payment per patient to FPs for documenting and
providing ongoing care to diabetic patients in accordance with the Diabetes Canada’s
Clinical Practice Guidelines.38,42 Physicians must document the Diabetes Canada’s
required elements that have been completed for the patient over the past 12 months.
Documentation can be done using a flow sheet and must be stored in the patient’s
record.38,42,43 The elements that must be recorded are: “a) lipids, cholesterol, HbA1C,
blood pressure, weight and body mass index, and medication dosage; b) discussion and
offer of preventive measures including vascular protection, influenza and pneumococcal
vaccination; c) health promotion counselling and patient self-management support; d)
record albumin to creatinine ratio; e) discussion and provide referral for dilated eye
examination; and f) foot and neurologic examination”.44,45
To claim the DMI, FPs are required to submit the Q040 fee code for their diabetic patient
once per year.38,42,43,46 As of October 1, 2015, FPs are only eligible to bill this incentive if
they have submitted at least three K030 fee codes for their patient within the same 12month period.45,47 The K030 billing code, introduced on April 2002, is the Diabetic
Management Assessment (DMA) fee code for providing diabetes-related services other
than insulin therapy support to patients.44,48 The K030 can be billed a maximum four
times per patient over a 12-month period, and receive $39.20 each time it is billed.45
There were a few changes in the value of the DMI and DMA since their introduction,
therefore, a timeline mapping these changes are presented in Figure 1.1.49
When the DMI was first introduced, FPs enrolled in specific PEMs were eligible to bill
the incentive for their enrolled patients. The specific PEMs include: Family Health
Networks, Family Health Groups, Family Health Organizations, Comprehensive Care
Models, Group Health Centre, St. Joseph’s Health Centre, Primary Care Networks,
Health Service Organizations, Rural and Northern Physician Group Agreement, and
South Eastern Ontario Academic Medical Organization.38,50 FPs practicing in the
traditional FFS, and non-enrolled patients in the above PEMs were ineligible for DMI.
However, as of April 1, 2009, all FPs were eligible to bill the DMI for all patients with
diabetes.38,43,46
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1.5.1

Gaps in the Literature Regarding the Impact of Financial
Incentives for Diabetes Care

Financial incentives for diabetes care are implemented in many countries to improve the
provision of services for diabetic patients and effective management of diabetes. It is
important to understand the impact of these incentives on long-term patient outcomes
such as hospitalizations and mortality. This will inform the effectiveness of these
incentives in improving patient health. Furthermore, understanding the impact of these
incentives on hospitalization costs is also vital, as hospitalization costs accounts for the
largest portion of the estimated direct cost of diabetes.10,51 A number of published papers
have assessed the relationship between incentives for diabetes care and hospitalizations,
hospitalization costs, or mortality. Thus, a literature review summarizing these findings is
warranted in order to understand this relationship.
To date, there is a lack of studies that have focused on the impact of DMI in Ontario. One
study in Ontario observed improvements in prescribing performance measures for
diabetes care after physicians enrolled into either of the two new PEMs: Family Health
Groups and Family Health Networks.42 The authors briefly mention that some of the
observed improvements may be due to the DMI.42 Another study in Ontario which
directly focused on the DMI found that, physicians participating in the Family Health
Organization model were more responsive to the DMI compared to physicians in the
Family Health Group model.38 However, to date, it is unknown if the introduction of
DMI is associated with increased diabetes-related services, and decreased diabetesrelated hospitalizations, associated costs, and mortality risk in diabetic patients in
Ontario. It is important to assess the above relationships, in order to inform health
researchers and policy makers the effectiveness of this incentive.

1.6 Research Objectives
This thesis has three main objectives:
1. Perform a literature review on the relationship between financial incentives for
diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization
costs, and mortality.
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2. Examine the impact of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients diagnosed
with diabetes in Ontario.
3. Examine the impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in patients diagnosed with diabetes in
Ontario.
Objectives 2 and 3 are examined using longitudinal data spanning from April 1st, 2002 to
March 31st, 2009. Data were accessed from several administrative databases housed at
ICES. These two objectives will be examined by comparing diabetic patients enrolled to
FPs practicing in PEMs eligible for DMI (DMI group) to patients affiliated to FPs
practicing in the traditional FFS (comparison group).

1.7 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of the existing literature that assessed the
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality (Objective 1). Chapter 3 examines
Objective 2 using four multivariable linear regression models with the difference-indifference (DID) approach. Findings from these models are presented and discussed in
this chapter. Chapter 4 examines Objective 3 using a similar methodological approach as
Chapter 3, and the results are presented and discussed. Chapter 5 provides a summary of
the main findings from the three studies. It also includes the areas where potential future
research can be performed to gain further insights into the impact of DMI.

9

Figure 1.1: Timeline of the introduction of Q040 DMI and K030 DMA fee codes in Ontario
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Chapter 2

2

The Relationship between Financial Incentives for
Diabetes Care and Hospitalizations and Mortality: A
Review of the Literature

2.1 Introduction
Diabetes mellitus in adults aged 18 and over is affecting millions of individuals
worldwide today. In 2017, it was estimated that about 451 million individuals had
diabetes between the ages 18 and 99 worldwide.1 Diabetes can damage one’s blood
vessels, nerves, and organs if not managed appropriately.2 In 2016, approximately 1.6
million deaths were caused by diabetes, and the World Health Organization (WHO)
estimated diabetes to be the seventh leading cause of death that year.3 Diabetes also
places a substantial economic burden: the total healthcare expenditure for diabetes
worldwide was estimated to reach 850 billion United States dollar (USD) for those aged
18 to 99 years in 2017.1
Individuals with diabetes often develop diabetes-related short-term complications such as
diabetic ketoacidosis and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state, and long-term
complications such as kidney failure, non-traumatic limb amputation, and heart attack.2
These complications can lead to diabetes-related hospitalizations and premature death.2,4
In Canada, hospitalization costs is the leading source of direct health care costs for
diabetes.2 Appropriate treatment and management of diabetes at primary care can
potentially reduce the risk of hospitalizations, and mortality.5–7 At the primary care level,
the family physician (FP) can: monitor the disease, order necessary tests, prescribe
appropriate medications to prevent acute complications, refer the patient to appropriate
specialists to deal with the diabetes-related complications, and offer advice regarding
lifestyle modifications.8,9 Therefore, diabetes is considered an ambulatory care sensitive
condition (ACSC).5,10–12 An ACSC is a condition in which hospitalizations for that
condition can be avoided with adequate access to effective primary care.5,9,10,13
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There are several ways effective diabetes management at the primary care setting can
potentially reduce hospitalizations and associated hospital costs. First, better diabetes
management at primary care settings can reduce the likelihood of being admitted to the
hospital and/or emergency admissions.8,9,14 Second, better disease management can
potentially result in healthier patients. Therefore, if they do get admitted, then they are
more likely to have fewer complications, and a shorter length of stay which can lower the
hospital costs.8 Third, in the event of a hospitalization, family practices that focus on
better disease management will likely provide follow-up care following the hospital
discharge.8 Therefore, this may reduce the risk of readmissions and associated hospital
costs. In a similar manner, primary care also plays an important role in reducing patient’s
risk of mortality from chronic conditions. This is often due to the interventions provided
at the early stages of the disease.7 With effective primary care, diseases can be diagnosed
early, and risk factors can be identified and potentially modified in some instances.15–17
Effective management of diabetes in primary care can reduce the risk of mortality in
patients from causes such as stroke, ischemic heart disease, and chronic kidney disease.15
To improve chronic disease management at primary care and patient outcomes, many
countries around the world introduced financial incentives such as the pay-forperformance (P4P) incentive schemes. These incentives reward FPs for the achievement
of quality-of-care processes (e.g. periodic glycated hemoglobin [HbA1C] testing for
diabetic patients, completing recommended laboratory tests, and etc.), and some for
obtaining improved intermediate outcomes (e.g. cholesterol control in diabetic
patients).18,19 A number of studies that examined the relationship between P4P incentives
for diabetes and diabetes-related services, or the quality of care provided to patients had
observed a positive relationship.14,19–21 However, some studies have also found the effect
of these incentives to decline over time20,22, or have no effect on the provision of
diabetes-related services.23,24
It is also important to assess if these incentives led to improvements in patient outcomes
(i.e. hospitalizations, mortality), and hospitalization costs for diabetes. Existing
systematic reviews in this research area have mostly focused on the impact of P4P
incentives for disease management on quality of care or on intermediate outcomes.25–28 A
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few reviews included papers that assessed the effect of these incentives on patient
outcomes or costs10,29–31, however, they either solely focused on one P4P scheme (the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) from the United Kingdom (UK)), or assessed
all types of P4P incentives. There was a lack of reviews that focused exclusively on P4P
incentives for diabetes care and hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality.
Therefore, the purpose of this literature review is to examine the impact of financial
incentives for diabetes care on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related
hospitalization costs, and mortality. This review paper includes articles on hospitalization
for ACSCs (includes both type 1 and type 2 diabetes) as part of the diabetes-related
hospitalization and associated cost measures.

2.2 Methods
This literature review focuses on two issues: (i) the effect of financial incentives for
diabetes care on diabetes-related hospitalizations and associated costs, and (ii) the effect
of financial incentives for diabetes care on mortality. A literature search was performed
to identify relevant published studies that examined (i), and (ii).

2.2.1

Search Strategy and Study Selection

A search strategy was used to identify related published studies on the relationship
between financial incentives for diabetes care and (i) diabetes-related hospitalizations or
diabetes-related hospitalization costs and (ii) mortality. Four research databases were
used to conduct the search: MEDLINE using the Ovid interface, EMBASE, Scopus, and
Web of Science. Specific keywords, and subject headings were used to identify a list of
articles related to the research area of interest. First, the research topic was divided into
four broad concepts, and then keywords and subject headings that addressed each concept
were identified and used. The four broad concepts and a keyword used from each concept
in the search are presented: avoidable hospitalizations (e.g. ‘avoidable hospital*’),
diabetes management (e.g. ‘diabetes care’), primary care settings (e.g. ‘family
physician*’), and financial incentive (e.g. ‘primary care incentive’, ‘pay-forperformance*’). The second part of the search (ii) which looked at mortality was
performed using the same keywords except replacing the keywords that covered the
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hospitalizations concept with the keywords for mortality (e.g. ‘mortality*’). Following
this, the keywords were combined together using AND/OR to enter a final search
statement for parts (i) and (ii) separately into the database. An example of the search
performed in the MEDLINE-Ovid database is presented in Appendix A2.1 (Table 2.1 for
part (i) and Table 2.2 for part (ii)). Reference lists of studies based on the inclusion and
exclusion criteria were subsequently searched to identify any additional articles. The final
search was performed on November 2017.
Articles identified from the literature search were screened by title and abstract to
identify relevant papers for the current review based on an inclusion and exclusion
criteria (indicated below). Following this, the remaining articles were full-text reviewed
for an in-depth screening. All articles were screened and reviewed independently by one
reviewer. The inclusion criteria were: studies that focused on financial incentives that
were provided to FPs or primary care physicians or general practitioners for diabetes
management with an outcome measure for part (i) of diabetes-related hospitalizations,
avoidable hospitalizations, hospitalizations for ACSCs, or hospitalization costs, and for
(ii) mortality, mortality risk, mortality rate, or mortality score; and studies must be
published in English language. Published reviews that met the above criteria were also
included. Studies were excluded if they were: not related to the research topic (i.e.
exposure measure of the study was not related to the financial incentives for diabetes
care, and/or the outcome variable did not measure hospitalizations or hospitalization
costs or mortality as indicated in the inclusion criteria), duplicate articles, and lastly
relevant but not primary research articles or systematic reviews (e.g. editorials,
commentaries).
Data were extracted from the final set of studies that were included in this review. The
information abstracted were the author and year of publication, the exposure measure(s)
or financial incentives assessed, the country or region of study, the outcome(s) measured,
study design, study population, confounders controlled for (if any), statistical analysis
techniques used, main study findings, and the strengths and/or limitations.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1

Main Search Results

The literature search on the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care
and diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs identified 430 articles.
After screening the articles by title and abstract and removing duplicates, there were 19
relevant articles left, however, the full-text screening led to 16 articles. Following this,
reference tracking was conducted on the remaining papers, and four additional articles
were found. Finally, 20 articles were included for data extraction (Figure 2.1). From the
20 articles, 14 articles assessed the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes
care and diabetes-related hospitalizations; five articles assessed the relationship of the
incentives on both hospitalizations and associated costs; and one article looked at
hospitalization costs. Details of the studies can be found in Appendix A2.2 (Table 2.3).
There were variations in the financial incentives for diabetes care that were studied in the
literature. These incentives differed based on their design and context, however, a large
number of studies focused on the P4P program implemented in the UK called the QOF
which covered a number of chronic diseases including diabetes18, and the Taiwan’s P4P
program that also covered diabetes.14 Both P4P programs were implemented at a largescale national-level, with the UK’s QOF implemented in all practices in all four countries
of the UK when it was first introduced. In addition, the studies were conducted in a
number of countries that included Italy (! = 3)11,13,32, Canada (! = 1)9, Taiwan (! =
7)14,20,22,33–36, UK (! = 5)5,8,18,31,37, and United States (US) ! = 3 .19,23,38 It is also
worth to mention that these articles did not have the same outcome measure. Some of the
hospitalization or hospitalization cost outcome measures were avoidable hospitalizations,
hospitalizations for ACSCs, hospitalization for diabetic ACSCs, hospitalizations for
diabetes-related complications, and hospitalization for all-causes. A few studies looked at
emergency hospital admissions. However, all studies did include hospitalizations or
emergency admissions that were due to diabetes.
The literature search on the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care
and mortality identified 421 articles. After the abstract-title screening and removing
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duplicates, nine articles were left. Finally, the full-text screening led to only including
seven articles, and no additional articles were included after reference tracking (Figure
2.2). The details of the articles included can be found in Appendix A2.2 (Table 2.4). The
articles here either focused on the QOF P4P program or the Taiwan’s P4P program for
diabetes. Therefore, the studies were only conducted in the UK (! = 5)15,31,39–41 and in
Taiwan ! = 2 .33,42 There were variations to how mortality was measured with some
measuring all-cause mortality, cause-specific mortality (includes diabetes), mortality
reduction per 100,000 individuals or where one study41 used a score to measure mortality
reduction.

2.3.2

The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes
Care and Diabetes-related Hospitalizations and Diabetesrelated Hospitalization Costs

Diabetes-related hospitalizations. There were nineteen articles that evaluated the
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related
hospitalizations. These studies assessed this relationship using a variety of study designs,
including comparing patients enrolled to a P4P program by their FPs who participated in
the financial incentive scheme to a comparison patient group, and comparing the
outcomes before and after the incentive was introduced. A number of studies found that
P4P incentives for diabetes care led to a reduction in diabetes-related
hospitalizations.5,10,11,13,14,18–20,22,31–34,36,37 Four of those studies were performed in the UK
assessing the QOF incentive scheme.5,18,31,37 Dusheiko et al. (2011)5 investigated crosssectional and longitudinal associations between the quality of diabetes management and
unplanned emergency hospital admissions due to short-term diabetes complications in
England following the introduction of QOF. They found that the proportion of diabetic
patients who achieved good glycemic control increased from 51.4% to 59.3% during the
study period.5 Cross-sectional findings revealed that a higher proportion of patients with
good or moderate glycemic control was significantly associated with a decreased rate of
unplanned emergency admissions for all short-term diabetic complications (p < 0.01),
and for acute (p < 0.01) and nonspecific hyperglycemic complications (p < 0.01).5
Similar findings were observed longitudinally. One limitation of this study was that, the
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authors did not have data for certain quality measures prior to QOF; therefore, the authors
were unable to assess the direct impact of QOF on emergency admissions.5
In Taiwan, six studies found P4P to be associated with reduced diabetes-related
hospitalizations.14,20,22,33,34,36 One cross-sectional study that compared patients with
diabetes enrolled in the P4P program (intervention group) to those who were never
enrolled to P4P (comparison group), found that the net effect of the P4P program was a
decrease in admissions by 2.7 admissions per 100 enrolled patients per year (p = 0.003).14
Cheng et al. (2012)20 also had an intervention and comparison group, but instead used
longitudinal data. They found that the net effect of the P4P program was fewer
hospitalizations (Difference-in-difference (DID) Coefficient: -0.01). In addition, they
observed the effect to be larger when comparing patients who were continuously enrolled
in the program throughout the study period to their respective comparison group.20 This
study used propensity score matching to alleviate potential selection bias based on
observables; however, unmeasured factors could have affected the study findings. In
Hawaii, one study19 found no significant difference in the all-cause hospitalization rates
between diabetic patients who visited a P4P-participating physician and those who visited
a non-P4P-participating physician during one year.19 In contrast, patients who saw a P4Pparticipating physician for three consecutive years were significantly less likely to be
hospitalized compared to their non-participating counterparts (Incident Rate Ratio [IRR]:
0.75; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.61 to 0.93; p < 0.01).19
In the Emilia Romagna region of Italy, there were three forms of incentive mechanisms
implemented to improve care for patients with chronic diseases: P4P program, Pay-forParticipation (P4Pa), and Pay-for-Compliance (P4C). In the P4P program, FPs are paid
based on their achievement of specific targets; in the P4Pa FPs are paid based on the
number of patients with specific chronic conditions under their care; and in the P4C
scheme, FPs are paid based on the number of collaborative activities they participated in
(e.g. attended diabetes audit meetings).11,13 In addition to these incentives, there was also
a lower-powered incentive scheme introduced in 2003 in the same region named the
Diabetes Management Program. FPs can receive the associated incentives that came with
enrolling into this program if they complete the required activities. FPs were
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compensated for delivering care to diabetic patients, and for coordinating with the local
Healthcare Districts and secondary care facilities.32 Three articles11,13,32 and one review
paper10 found some of the financial incentives in Italy to have a statistically significant
negative effect on diabetes-related hospitalizations. A study by Fiorentini et al. (2011)11
revealed that only P4P (Coefficient (logit scale): -0.02; p ≤ 0.05) and P4C (Coefficient
(logit scale): -0.04; p ≤ 0.10) programs influenced the probability of inappropriate
hospitalizations (defined as hospitalizations for 27 medical diagnostic-related groups that
were identified by the Emilia-Romagna region as at risk of inappropriateness in primary
care).11 In contrast, P4Pa had a significant effect only when the authors separately
analysed the impact of this incentive on admissions due to acute diabetes complications
(comas) in a subpopulation of type 2 diabetic patients. The authors rationalized that P4Pa
was linked with management of specific chronic conditions (e.g. diabetes), therefore, the
program’s effects will likely be loosely measured in the general population.
In contrast, a few studies found financial incentives to have no effect on diabetes-related
hospitalizations9,13,23,37,38, while one study found an increase in emergency visits.35 One
study that observed a non-significant finding was a study from Italy.13 This study found
that from the two forms of incentives (P4Pa and P4C), P4C received by FPs for diabetes
care did not have a significant effect on the probability of hyperglycemic emergency
admissions for diabetic patients (Coefficient (logit scale) = -0.04).13 Similarly, two
studies from the US also observed financial incentives to have no effect on
hospitalizations.23,38 In contrast, one study that assessed the diabetic P4P program in
Taiwan found that, emergency visits due to diabetic hypoglycemia was significantly
higher after P4P implementation in patients enrolled into P4P compared to before.35
Two of the studies that were included in this review used an ecological study design to
assess the impact of the incentives on diabetes-related hospitalizations.9,37 One of the
studies was by Bottle et al. (2008)37 from England. The authors found that in patients
aged 59 years and younger, there was a statistically non-significant association between
quality of care scores for diabetes care from the QOF P4P scheme (total points awarded
to family practices based on their achievement on specific indicators that are part of the
QOF [e.g. points given based on proportion of diabetic patients with blood pressure ≤
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145/85 mmHg]) and hospital admissions for diabetes.37 However, they found a negative
association between the QOF quality of care scores for diabetes care and hospital
admissions in patients 60 years and older. An important note is that this study did not
directly assess the impact of QOF on hospital admissions for diabetes, but assessed
quality of primary care using QOF data on hospital admissions. The other study was
conducted in Canada, which examined whether the policy changes at primary care in
2003 improved the rate of diabetes-related hospitalizations in two provinces of Canada:
British Columbia (BC) and Alberta.9 Financial incentives for diabetes management were
introduced to FPs in BC only in 2003. Findings from the study revealed that the post2003 period had no effect on the hospitalization rate in both provinces.9
Diabetes-related hospitalization costs. Six studies evaluated the relationship between
financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalization costs. Three of
these studies were conducted in Taiwan,14,20,36 of which two were longitudinal20,36 and
one was cross-sectional.14 All three studies found that the P4P program was associated
with lower hospitalization costs in diabetic patients. A longitudinal study by Cheng et al.
(2012)20, however, found that lower expenses for diabetes-related hospitalizations was
evident only when patients who continuously stayed in the P4P program throughout the
study period were compared to their respective comparison group of patients who were
never enrolled. Over time, the net difference increased from -3,106 New Taiwan (NT)
dollars in 2006 (approximately -$111 Canadian dollars [CAD] in 2006) to -5,099 NT
dollars in 2009 (approximately -$167 CAD in 2009) per patient (p < 0.001).20 The
remaining three studies were conducted in the UK.5,8,18 Two of the studies that examined
the impact on hospital costs were performed after the QOF was introduced in the UK in
2004.5,18 One study that used QOF data reported that on average in 2006/07, a family
practice that had 5% more patients with moderate glycemic control over poor glycemic
control would have reduced the hospital costs for short-term diabetes complications by an
estimated £771 ($1,204 CAD).5 The other study found that during the 2010/11 financial
year, the estimated reduction in admissions for incentivized ACSCs due to the QOF
introduction was 8%.18 This was equivalent to a reduction of 53,000 emergency
admissions in England, thus resulting an estimated annual cost saving of £92.5m ($147 m
CAD).18 It is important to note that the findings on hospitalization costs from the two
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studies were estimated reduction in costs rather than an analysis on the impact of P4P on
hospitalization costs. In contrast, the third UK study investigated the relationship between
the quality of disease management at primary care for ten chronic diseases (e.g. diabetes)
using QOF data and hospital costs, and found a statistically significant reduction in
hospital costs only for stroke care.8

2.3.3

The Relationship between Financial Incentives for Diabetes
Care and Mortality

Seven studies investigated the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care
and mortality. The findings from these studies were inconsistent as three studies reported
a reduction in mortality33,39,42 while four studies found no effect.15,31,40,41 Two of the three
studies that reported a reduction in mortality were from Taiwan.33,42 For example, Lin et
al. (2016)33 found that the risk of all-cause mortality was lower in type 2 diabetic patients
in the full P4P participation group compared to their control group (Hazard Ratio [HR]:
0.41; 95% CI: 0.74 to 0.84); also in the partial participation group compared to their
corresponding control group (HR: 0.77; 95% CI: 0.74 to 0.81).33 The full P4P
participation group were patients with a full enrollment to the program and had complete
annual evaluation records that included a management plan, examinations, biochemical
tests, and the patient’s medical history. The partial participation group had at least one
physician’s claim data in the program, and either did not have complete annual
evaluation records or the physician’s claims were discontinued during the study’s followup period.33 Although patient and physician characteristics were controlled for in this
study, other unmeasured factors such as patient’s education could have affected this
association. In the UK, one study found that based on the 2004 QOF contract, as the
primary care performance (for chronic diseases including diabetes) improved from precontract (2003) to achievement of target levels for full incentive payment, additional 11
lives were estimated to be saved per 100,000 population per annum (lower-upper
estimates: 7-16).39 However, between 2005 and 2006, the additional mortality reduction
dropped to zero.39 Additionally, the authors found that if all eligible patients were treated
over and above the set target levels for full incentive payment, then for the 2004 QOF
contract an additional 56 lives (lower-upper estimates: 29-81) per 100,000 population per
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annum would have been saved.39 Disease areas with the largest estimated mortality
reductions were heart disease, diabetes, and primary hypertension.39 A major limitation in
this study was that it was difficult to state that the improvement in performance seen in
FPs was solely due to the QOF.39
Several studies found that financial incentives have no effect on mortality based on the
evaluation of QOF in the UK.15,31,40,41 One study found that there was a weak correlation
between the clinical QOF point score and the Public Health Impact score.41 In the QOF,
family practises were awarded points based on the proportion of patients who achieved
specific targets for the QOF clinical indicators. These points are later converted into
payments.18 The clinical QOF point scores measured the family practice’s level of
achievement for those clinical indicators.41 The Public Health Impact score measured the
estimated mortality reduction per 100,000 registered patients per annum.41 The authors
concluded that the financial awards from the QOF are not directly aligned with mortality
reduction for preventable chronic diseases in family practices.41 Likewise, a systematic
review that examined if the QOF improved care and outcomes for patients with long-term
conditions found no clear effect on mortality.31
Two other studies that found no effect differed from the above studies as an ecological
study design was used to assess the relationship. Ryan et al. (2016)15 used country-level
data comparing UK to other high-income countries, and found QOF was not significantly
associated with age, and sex-adjusted population mortality for chronic diseases covered
by the QOF including diabetes (-3.68 per 100,000 population; 95% CI: -8.16 to 0.80).15
The second study, Kontopantelis et al. (2015)40, used data collected at the lowest
available geographic level named the “lower layer super output area”, found no
statistically significant relationship between primary care practice’s performance on QOF
indicators, and all-cause or cause-specific mortality rates for six chronic conditions
including diabetes after controlling for area and population-level characteristics.40 In
other words, the primary care performance incentivized by the QOF scheme did not seem
to reduce mortality in the population. Overall, specific limitations in some of these
studies such as the use of an ecological study design and/or presence of unmeasured
confounders may have led to the contradictory findings.
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2.4 Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of this review was to identify relevant literature and understand the
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related
hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, and mortality. This literature
review identified 20 articles on the association between financial incentives for diabetes
care and diabetes-related hospitalizations or hospitalization costs, and seven articles on
the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and mortality. Studies
identified were from several countries including Canada, UK, US, Italy, and Taiwan. To
date, the literature assessing the effectiveness of these incentives in reducing diabetesrelated hospitalizations have produced conflicting results. The majority of the papers
found that the incentives were associated with reduced diabetes-related hospitalizations,
however, a few articles observed no effect, while one found an increase in diabetesrelated emergency visits. The potential reason behind the increase in the diabetes-related
emergency visits in this study could be due to, the Taiwan P4P program’s aim to have the
patient’s HbA1C < 7%, and this intensive glycemic control plan can increase the risk of
emergency visits for hypoglycemia.35 As for the effects of financial incentives for
diabetes care on hospitalization costs and mortality, mixed findings were also
documented.
There are a couple of potential explanations as to why such discrepancies were found in
the literature. First, the differences could be due to the institutional context and design of
the financial incentives. This review included studies that evaluated a number of diverse
incentives, with the QOF being the largest P4P program.30,31 The QOF, introduced in
April 2004, pays up to 25% of the FP’s income, and their payment under QOF was linked
to their performance on more than 100 clinical and organisational quality indicators
including for diabetes.18 The diabetes-related indicators that are included in this scheme
covers process of care measures (e.g. record of foot examination) and intermediate
outcomes (e.g. control of HbA1C levels, cholesterol, blood pressure).5,43 For the clinical
indicators, family practices earned points based on their level of achievement for each
clinical indicator, and then these points are converted to payments for each family
practice after adjusting for list size and disease prevalence.18 During the first year, the
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incentives for an indicator ranged from £75 (approximately $179 CAD in 2004) to
£4,200 ($10,014 CAD in 2004) for an average practice. By the second year the incentives
increased by 68%.18 In contrast, smaller incentives were introduced in some areas such as
in BC in 2003 where FPs received $75 (increased to $125 later) per year per patient for
providing disease management for diabetes patients and following British Columbia’s
Clinical Practice Guidelines.44,45 Therefore, these differences may have affected the
patient outcomes and hospitalization costs differently. Second, the differences in the
study design or setting may also contribute to the different conclusions. Some studies
included in this review were cross-sectional; thus, it is difficult to infer a temporal
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and the outcomes. Some of
these cross-sectional studies found the incentives to have an association with the
outcomes, while in some longitudinal studies such associations disappeared. Differences
in the setting of the study also plays a role as the health care systems, policy initiatives
already introduced, and policy or system changes that simultaneously occurred in the
country during the study conduction differs in each setting and can affect the results.
Additionally, some of the studies adopted an ecological perspective such as
Kontopantelis et al. (2015)40 and Laberge & Pefoya (2016)9. Findings from these
ecological studies may not be applicable to individual-level outcomes. Lastly, the
discrepancies in the literature may have also been due to the specific limitations found in
some of the individual studies included in this review such as unmeasured confounding,
selection bias, and smaller sample size.
Although some of the individual studies had its own limitations (e.g. unmeasured
confounding); several of the included studies still had their own strengths such as
assessing the relationships using longitudinal data, having before-and-after comparisons,
or having a valid comparison group. A number of studies that assessed Taiwan’s P4P
program for diabetes did have all three strengths. However, selection bias was an issue,
since in Taiwan, FPs voluntarily participated in the P4P program and patients enrolled to
the program were selected by their physicians.14,20,34 To alleviate this bias, some studies
used propensity score matching to make the intervention and comparison groups
comparable in terms of the observable characteristics. Other studies outside of Taiwan
such as the one by Harrison et al. (2014)18 in England compared the outcomes before and
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after the financial incentives were introduced to assess if the incentives resulted any
changes. Harrison et al. (2014)18 also adjusted for the underlying trends in the admission
rates to get a conservative estimate of the QOF’s impact.
Similar to this literature review, existing systematic reviews regarding P4P incentives in
general have also observed conflicting findings.29,30,46 For instance, Mendelson et al.
(2017)30 reported that a number of studies found positive outcomes associated with P4P,
but inconsistent findings were also present, and it was difficult to confidently indicate
that the changes in the outcomes were solely due to P4P. Gillam et al. (2012)29 also
indicated the presence of conflicting findings in the literature, and reported that some
modest reductions in hospital admissions and mortality were found. In contrast, one
systematic review which focused on the QOF found that the P4P program did slow down
the increase in emergency admissions, however, there was no effect on mortality.31
Another systematic review, Gibson et al. (2013)10, which included one paper on
financial incentives for diabetes care, also found that the incentives was associated with
fewer diabetes-related hospitalizations.10 Although the current review observed
inconsistent findings similar to previous systematic reviews, the findings from this
review provides knowledge on the relationship between P4P incentives for diabetes care
and patient outcomes and hospitalization costs exclusively. This differs from existing
reviews which either focused on the QOF P4P scheme alone, or had reviewed all types of
P4P incentives together (e.g. including cancer screening, smoking cessation).
As for the policy implications, the effect of financial incentives for diabetes care on
patient outcomes and hospitalization costs is unclear in the existing literature. There is no
strong evidence that consistently shows these incentives to improve patient outcomes
(hospitalizations and mortality) and diabetes-related hospitalization costs. The diverse
designs of the incentives and the setting of the studies play a large role for this. It can also
be that physician financial incentives alone cannot produce the desired improvements,
and combining these incentives with other methods may promote better long-term health
to patients. In addition, some of these incentives may be unintentionally disadvantageous
to certain patients. For instance, in Taiwan, patients with more comorbidities or severe
conditions were less likely to be enrolled into the P4P program.47,48 Therefore, this group
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of patients may be less likely to receive adequate diabetes care or management compared
to other patients, as the FPs may not focus on them as much as those in the P4P program.
Similarly, in the UK, there is exception reporting within the QOF. Exception reporting is
when certain patients are excluded for specific or all incentivized targets from the QOF,
if the physician judges it to be inappropriate for the patient based on a set criteria agreed
for exception reporting.39,49,50 Practices will not be penalized financially for missing
targets for these patients, as they will not be included when calculating the proportion of
patients who achieved the target level for the specific QOF indicator.39,49,50 However, it
has been reported that exception reporting is increasingly found in patients with multiple
chronic health problems, individuals with mental illnesses, and those living in deprived
areas.49–51 Since these patients are being missed from the P4P incentives, it is possible
that the true effect of these incentives in improving patient outcomes and costs are
ambiguous.
There are some strengths of this literature review. First, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first literature review that assessed the impact of financial incentives for
diabetes care on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality.
Existing systematic reviews had either focused only on the QOF, or summarized findings
from P4P incentives in general rather than diabetes specific. Second, studies conducted in
a wide range of countries were included in this review to be more informed on the use
and impact of these incentives around the world.
This literature review also had a couple of limitations. The main limitation of this review
was that the evidence mostly came from observational studies; no randomized trials were
available to be included in this review. Therefore, it is difficult to infer if the outcomes
observed were due to the P4P incentives or not. Furthermore, the evidence was affected
by the limitations found in the specific individual studies included in this review, and the
heterogeneity in the study population, study design, study setting, nature of financial
incentives examined, and the outcomes measured. Although, it was advantageous to
include studies from a diverse range of countries, findings from such studies cannot be
easily generalized to the Canadian context. Moreover, some of the studies included from
the UK did not directly measure the impact of the P4P scheme on diabetes-related
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hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality. These studies used QOF data to
evaluate quality of diabetes management in primary care on patient outcomes or
hospitalization costs, and were conducted after the QOF scheme was introduced.
However, these studies did provide some knowledge on the effect of the QOF’s
indicators and/or scores on patient outcomes and hospitalization costs. Another limitation
was that the articles were screened and reviewed by one reviewer, and this may have
impacted the selection and assessment of the studies in this review. Lastly, findings from
this review may not be informative to policy makers due to the lack of consistency of
financial incentives linked to improved patient health outcomes.
Based on the available evidence from observational studies and systematic reviews, the
relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related
hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, and mortality is unclear. Existing
literature on this topic has produced conflicting findings. In addition, there is a lack of
literature on the impact of financial incentives for diabetes care on hospitalizations costs
and mortality, with most of the existing studies performed in the UK and Taiwan.
Therefore, future research should assess the above relationship in other countries over the
long-term to potentially get a better understanding of the impact of these incentives.
Moreover, it is also important to determine ways to revise the existing incentives so that
improvements in the patient outcomes can be observed in the future.
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2.5 Figures

Figure 2.1: The literature search screening for the relationship between financial
incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization
costs
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Figure 2.2: The literature search screening for the relationship between financial
incentives for diabetes care and mortality
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Appendices
Appendix A2.1: Literature Search Tables
Table 2.1: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for the diabetes-related
hospitalizations, and hospitalization costs
#
1

Searches
avoidable hospital* OR preventable hospital* OR unplanned
hospital* OR ambulatory care sensitive*

Results
1941

10

-Final search statement for the concept “avoidable
hospitalization”
primary health care/ OR "continuity of patient care"/
General Practitioners/
physicians, family/ OR physicians, primary care/
general practice/ OR family practice/
Physician Incentive Plans/
Fee-for-Service Plans/
Family Doctor* OR Family Physician* OR Family Practice OR
General Practice OR Primary medical care OR Primary health
care delivery OR Primary health care OR Primary healthcare
OR Family medicine or General practi* OR Primary care
physician* OR Primary care
Primary care incentive OR Financial incentive* OR Financial
Awards OR Fee for service OR pay for performance* OR payfor-performance* OR pay-for-performance incentive*
2 OR 3 OR 4 OR 5 OR 8

11

-Final search statement for the concept “primary care settings”
6 OR 7 OR 9

13666

12

-Final search statement for the concept “financial incentive”
diabetes management OR diabetes care

10354

13

-Final search statement for the concept “diabetes management”
1 OR 12

12278

14

-Search statement to find results related to diabetes care or
hospitalizations
10 AND 11 AND 13

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9

-Final search statement for the entire search on Ovid
-Comments added describing the specific sections of the search are italicized
* Truncations used to broaden the search

86064
6245
18957
73998
2192
3302
259508

12131
277604

125
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Table 2.2: Literature search performed in MEDLINE-Ovid for mortality
#

Searches

Results

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

86097
6248
18965
74010
2192
3307
259611

9

primary health care/ OR "continuity of patient care"/
General Practitioners/
physicians, family/ OR physicians, primary care/
general practice/ OR family practice/
Physician Incentive Plans/
Fee-for-Service Plans/
Family Doctor* OR Family Physician* OR Family Practice
OR General Practice OR Primary medical care OR Primary
health care delivery OR Primary health care OR Primary
healthcare OR Family medicine or General practi* OR
Primary care physician* OR Primary care
Primary care incentive OR Financial incentive* OR Financial
Awards OR Fee for service OR pay for performance* OR payfor-performance* OR pay-for-performance incentive*
1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 7

10

-Final search statement for the concept “primary care
settings”
5 or 6 or 8

13680

11

-Final search statement for the concept “financial incentive”
diabetes management OR diabetes care

10359

12
13
14
15

-Final search statement for the concept “diabetes
management”
Mortality/
Death/
mortality* OR death* OR risk of mortality OR risk of death
12 OR 13 OR 14

41662
16984
1372862
1372862

16

-Final search statement for the concept “mortality”
11 OR 15

1382541

17

-Search statement to find results related to diabetes care or
mortality
9 AND 10 AND 16

8

12145
277706

-Final search statement for the entire search on Ovid
-Comments added describing the specific sections of the search are italicized
* Truncations used to broaden the search

164
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Appendix A2.2: Literature Review Tables
Table 2.3: Summary of papers that assessed the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetesrelated hospitalizations and hospitalization costs
Author &
Year

Exposure
Variable(s)

Outcome
Variable(s)

Bottle et al.
(2008)

• Quality of
primary care
using QOF
(P4P) scores in
England

• Hospital
admissions for
diabetes (i.e.
total diabetes
admission rate
and ketoacidosis
admission rate)

Methods
•
•
•
•

•

Bruni et al.
(2009)

•

P4Pa and P4C
incentives in
EmiliaRomagna
region of Italy

•

Hyperglycaemic
admissions
linked with
ketoacidosis and
hyperosmolar
nonketotic coma

•
•
•
•

Cross-sectional and
ecological
QOF data – April 2004 to
March 2005
Population: Individual with
diabetes registered in family
practices
Confounders/Covariates:
neighbourhood SES,
prevalence of diabetes, QOF
scores, age- and sex-adjusted
admissions rate
Analysis: Analysis at
primary care trust level,
calculated directly
standardized rates for each
primary care trust,
standardized admission
ratios, regression for total
and ketoacidosis admissions
Cross-sectional study
Population: Type 2 diabetics
above the age of 35
Confounders: Patientphysician-, and district level
confounders
Analyses: Multilevel logit

Study Findings
• Weak, but significant negative
association between total
QOF scores for glycemic
control and hospital
admissions for ages 60 and
over (both total and
ketoacidosis)
• Non-significant associations
for patients younger than 60.
• Neighborhood SES had a
strong association with
hospital admissions.

•

•

Significant association
between outcome and one set
of incentives received for
diabetes care
Larger share of diabetesrelated payment is associated
with lower probability of

Strengths/
Limitations
• Large study
• Cross-sectional
• No patient-level
data

•

•
•

Adjusted for GP,
patient, and
district level
factors
Multilevel
modelling
Cross-sectional
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Chen et al.
(2010)

• P4P status (P4P
participating
vs. non-P4Pparticipating
physician) in
Hawaii
• Receipt of
QOC (Yes vs.
No)

• Receipt of QOC
for 1 year
(Patients who
had claims for at
least 2 A1C tests
and 1 LDL
cholesterol test)
• Hospitalization
rates (all-causes)

•
•

•

•

Chen et al.
(2016a)

• Patient
enrollment into
P4P for
diabetes care in
Taiwan
• Time dummy
variables
• Interaction
terms of the
two

• Number of
essential
exams/tests
patients received
• COC index
• Hospitalization
for diabetesrelated
conditions

•
•

•

•
•

model with 3 hierarchal level
(patient, GP, district), uses
IGLS algorithm with 1st order
marginal quasi likelihood
procedure
Longitudinal (January 1,
1999 to December 31, 2006)
Population: Diabetes
patients aged between 18 to
75 who saw P4P or non-P4P
physicians
Confounders: Age, sex,
comorbidity index, number
of PCPs seen, visit to an
endocrinologist, insulin
dependence, year
Analysis: Univariate
analyses, multivariate
models, random-effects logit
model, random-effects
negative binomial models.
Natural experiment and
longitudinal study design
Population: Type 2 diabetes
patients age 18 years and
older (MCC vs. non-MCC
patients)
Intervention: patients
enrolled into P4P in 2005;
Comparison: patients never
enrolled into P4P
Confounders: Patient, and
provider characteristics
Analysis: DID, GEE models,
logarithmic and logit link
functions

•

hyperglycaemic emergency
admissions
P4Pa coefficient is significant
while P4C coefficient is not

•

data
Patient
comorbidity not
controlled for

• Patients with P4P physician
were significantly more likely
to receive QOC
• Patients who received QOC
were significantly less likely
to be hospitalized
• During one year, there was no
significant difference in
hospitalization rates for
patients who consulted P4Pphysicans compared to those
who did not consult them
• Patients who consulted P4P
physician for 3 consecutive
years were significantly less
likely to be hospitalized

• Longitudinal
study
• Attempted to
control for
confounding
• Another DM
program
introduced
shortly after P4P
• Did not compare
trends for prevs. post-P4P

• P4P led to increase in number
of exams, improved COC
between patients and
physicians, & significant
reduction in the likelihood of
having a hospital admission,
and ED visit
• Similar findings for MCC vs.
non-MCC
• Effects reduced after second
year of P4P

• Attempted to
control for
confounding
• Longitudinal
study
• Not
generalizable
due to unique
healthcare
system
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Cheng et
al. (2012)

• P4P program
for diabetes
care in Taiwan

• Number of
essential
exams/tests,
health care use
(i.e. diabetesrelated
hospitalizations;
physician visits),
health care
expenses (i.e.
diabetes-related
hospitalizations,
physician visits)

•
•
•
•

•
•

•

Cheng et
al. (2015)

• Trends and
factors in
Taiwan’s
healthcare
system

• Healthcare use
and costs of
services such as
physician visits,
hospital
admissions,
antidiabetic drug
prescriptions

•
•

•

Natural experiment and
longitudinal design
2004 to 2009 – 6-year data
Population: Diabetes
patients over the age of 18
Intervention group: Patients
enrolled in P4P in 2005;
Comparison: Patients from
same physicians but not
enrolled in P4P
All participants matched set
and consecutive participants
matched set
Confounders: Patient’s sex,
age, DCSI score, CIC count,
hospital location, hospital
accreditation
Analysis: DID method,
GEE, poisson distribution,
negative binomial
distribution, log link function
with gamma distribution,
bootstrap for standard errors

• All participants matched
set: Positive and statistical
significant difference between
both groups, difference
decreased over time for
exams. P4P had significant
positive effect on visits but
difference declined over time.
Net effect of P4P on
hospitalizations suggest fewer
hospitalizations over time and
marginally significant. No
difference in hospitalization
expenses
• Consecutive participants
matched set: Similar
findings. However,
magnitude of the effect on
hospitalizations were larger.
Lower hospital expenses
reported in intervention group
than the comparison group
and the net difference
increased over time.

• Longitudinal
study
• DID between
intervention and
comparison

Repeated cross-sectional
study analyzed for 2000,
2005, 2010
Population: Type 2 diabetes
patients aged 20 years and
above matched to nondiabetes individuals; P4P vs.
non-P4P
Confounders: Patient
characteristics, time, disease
severity, policy intervention,
and care seeking pattern

• 2000 to 2005 total healthcare
costs increased for diabetes
and non-diabetes patients, but
from 2005 to 2010 a greater
decrease in costs for diabetes
than non-diabetes
• Completeness of tests and
adherence to medications
increased over time
• P4P enrollment associated
with lower risk of admissions,
and total medical costs

• Comparison
group
• Causality cannot
be inferred
• Repeated crosssectional study
• No biochemical
data to confirm
patient’s disease
diagnosis
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Chien et al.
(2012)

• Hudson Health
plan’s P4P for
diabetes care in
New York

• Diabetes care
processes (i.e.
HbA1C, blood
pressure),
outcomes (i.e.
HbA1C <9)
• Emergency
department
visit/admission
and inpatient
care for diabetes

•

Analysis: DID, GLM with
negative binomial
distribution, GLM with loglink and gamma distribution,
trend analyses, logistic
models

• Diabetes duration, NHI
registration locations, P4P
program, care seeking pattern
were correlated with diabetes
management and costs

•

Two quasi experimental and
one cross-sectional analyses
First Analysis: Compare
between the Hudson plan and
non-Hudson Medicaid plan
2003 to 2007 data
Second Analysis: Patients
continuously enrolled in P4P
for 6 months or more
Third: Cross-sectional survey
Population: Diabetes
patients from the Hudson
Health plan
Confounders: Second
Analysis: Patient
characteristics
Analysis: (First) DID, GEE
with binomial family and
logistic link; (Second)
interrupted-time series,
logistic regression models
with clustering

• No significant difference in
process of care and outcome
measures between two groups
• Younger adults and those
with comorbidities had
greater odds for ED visit or
hospitalization for diabetes &
reduced odds of receiving
recommended care

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

• Attempted to
control for
confounding
• Had comparison
group
• Missing data
issue
• Not
generalizable
due to unique
P4P

48

Dusheiko
et al.
(2011a)

Dusheiko
et al.
(2011b)

• Quality of DM
in family
practises
measured using
QOF (P4P)
clinical
indicators in
England

• Quality of
disease
management
for 10 diseases
(i.e. diabetes)
in general
practice using
QOF (P4P)
data in England

• Unplanned
hospital
admissions for
short-term
diabetic
complications
(i.e. due to poor
short-term
glycemic control,
acute
hyperglycemia,
nonspecific
hyperglycemia,
and
hypoglycemia)

•

• Hospital costs:
total, emergency
admissions,
elective
admissions, and
outpatient visits

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Cross-sectional and
longitudinal analysis;
ecological
QOF incentive scheme data
for 2004/2005 to 2006/2007
Population: Diabetic
patients from English family
practices
Confounders: low income
scheme index, population
(i.e. income, education) and
practice characteristics
Analysis: Unit of analysis at
family practice level, random
effects multiple regression
count data, fixed-effects
count data multiple
regression

• Cross-sectional: High
proportion of patients with
good or moderate measure of
glycemic control significantly
linked to lower rates for all
admissions. No significant
association for hypoglycemic
admissions
• Longitudinal: Increase in
proportion of patients with
good and moderate glycemic
control was significantly
associated with lower
admissions especially for
acute and nonspecific
hyperglycemia
• No significant difference
between good and moderate
control on admissions

• Cross-sectional
and longitudinal
• Controlled for
practice and
population
covariates
• No individuallevel data

Cross-sectional and panel
data methods - 2004/5 to
2007/8
Population: Patients
registered in English general
practice
Confounders: Individual,
small area needs, indicators
of supply variables
Analysis: OLS models using
practice cluster and robust
standard errors, other cross
section and panel data
models

• Only the quality measure for
stroke care was statistically
significant
• The aggregate quality
measure of weighting all 10
diseases together showed a
negative significant result
• 10 separate models on
hospital costs showed that the
quality measures for asthma,
CHD, diabetes,
hypothyroidism were
negative and significantly
associated to expenditure
• Stroke care had consistent
results of lowering hospital
costs

• Controlled for
some
confounding
• Uses crosssection and
panel data
methods
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Fiorentini
et al.
(2011)

•

Financial
incentives in
EmiliaRomagna
region of Italy
(i.e. P4P, P4Pa,
P4C)

•

Avoidable
hospitalizations
using two
indicators: 27
medical DRGs
and ACSCs

•
•
•
•

Forbes et
al. (2017)*

Gibson et
al. (2013)

• UK’s QOF

• Primary health
care resourcing
(i.e. payment
incentives,
amount of
primary health
care provided)

• Processes and
outcomes of care
• Includes
holistic and
personalised
care,
mortality,
service use
and etc.

•
•
•

• Diabetes-related
hospitalizations

•
•

•

•

•
•

Cross-sectional study using
2005 dataset
Population: Patients aged 18
and 74 years
Confounders: Patient-,
physician-, and district level
confounders
Analysis: Multilevel
modeling, 3-level logit model,
intraclass correlation
coefficients

•

•

Systematic review
Empirical quantitative reports
Includes RCTs and
longitudinal studies
Studies that controlled
longitudinal trends, beforeafter analysis, systematic
reviews
Search performed on
electronic databases for
studies published between
2004 to May 2016
Systematic review
Databases: EconLit, Medline,
Google scholar
Published articles – 2002 to
2012
Confounders: Adjusted for
individual level, population
health risk or community
level factors

•
•

•

P4Pa did not have a
significant effect, but P4P and
P4C affected the probability
of avoidable admissions using
27 DRGs
P4Pa is only significant when
conducted with a
subpopulation of type 2
diabetes patients and using
admissions via acute
complications for diabetes as
the outcome variable

•
•
•

Attempted to
control for
confounding
Cross-sectional
data
Not generalizable
due to variance
of incentives

• Three systematic reviews and
five primary studies
• Studies were rated as good
quality
• Results: Modest slowing in
the increase in admissions
and consultation rates,
improvements in certain
diabetes outcomes, no
significant effect on mortality

• First review to
assess these
outcomes for
QOF for longterm diseases
• Qualitative
research not
included
• Other factors
may have
confounded the
relationship

Ten studies included
All except one showed
significant association
between level of primary
health care resourcing and
outcome
Economic incentives provided
to PCPs to improve care for
diabetes patients decreased
the probability of
hospitalization

• Adjusted certain
confounders
• Lack of studies
looking at
financial
incentives
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Harrison et
al. (2014)

• Quality and
Outcomes
framework
(QOF P4P) in
the England

• Admissions for
ACSCs.
Compared it with
non-incentivized
ACSCs and nonACSCs

•
•
•

•

Huang et
al. (2016)

• Diabetes P4P
program in
Taiwan

• Number of
recommended
exams, rate of
attending
diabetes visits,
and
hospitalization
rate due to
diabetes-related
ACSCs

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Longitudinal study – April 1
to March 31 (1998/9 to
2010/11)
Population: Patients
registered with family
practice in England
Controlled for trends in
admission rates between
incentivized ACSCs and the
other comparison groups
Analyses: clustering, used
inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation for admission
rates, used trend adjusted
rates, interrupted time series
for supplementary analysis
Longitudinal study
Follow-up between 1 to 5
years during the study period
of 2003 to 2011
Patients with MCC vs. those
without
Intervention: Patients newly
enrolled to P4P from 2004 to
2007; Comparison: Patients
never enrolled in P4P
Population: Type 2 diabetic
patients age 20 years and
older
Confounders: Healthcare
provider and patient
characteristics
Analysis: DID, GEE models,
poisson distribution, and
sensitivity analysis was
conducted

•

•

•

Incentivized ACSC had a
lower trend-adjusted
admission rate than nonincentivized and non-ACSC.
As years go by the rate
difference became larger
After the introduction of
QOF, admission rate for
incentivized ACSC decreased
at a rate of 3.6%/year
Overall, moderate & sustained
reduction in emergency
admissions for incentivized
ACSCs

• Longitudinal
study
• Controlled for
trends in the
admission rate
• Several other
policy changes
occurred at the
same time
• No control group
as all family
practices used
incentives

• Non-MCC: P4P had
significant positive net effect
for number of exams and
number of visits.
Hospitalizations increased for
non-P4P but P4P had lesser
admissions.
• MCC: P4P had significant
positive effect on number of
exams and visits. P4P had
fewer admissions through
study and was significant
effect. P4P’s effect was
stronger in MCC patients.

• Nationally
representative
data
• Longitudinal
• Results may not
be generalizable
due to
differences in
healthcare
systems and P4P
in Taiwan

51

Iezzi et al.
(2014)

Laberge &
Pefoyo
(2016)

• DM program
with financial
incentives in
EmiliaRomagna
region of Italy

•

Primary care
policy changes
introduced in
2003 (i.e.
Financial
incentives in
BC, while in
AL they
transformed
primary care
and provided
funding for
PCNs)

• Diabetic
avoidable
hospitalizations
(i.e. diabetic
ACSCs)
• Admissions for
short-term and
long-term
diabetes
complications

•

Annual age-sex
standardized rate
of diabetes
hospitalizations
per 100 patients

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

•
•

• Financial incentives have a
negative and statistical
significant effect on three
dependent variables (i.e. total
admissions, long-term and
short-term complications)
• Patients with PCPs who has
higher share of income from
this DM program are less
likely to be admitted for
diabetes-related avoidable
hospitalizations

Longitudinal using panel data
2003 to 2005
Population: Type 2 diabetes
diagnosed patients
Physician groups: never vs.
always incentivized
Confounders: Physician
level, and district level
variables
Analysis: Poisson regression,
NB model, LR test, Hausman
specification test, fixed and
random effect models
Longitudinal study using
ecological perspective
Used administrative health
databases and physician
billing claims from April 1,
1996 to March 31, 2010
Population: Individuals
< 75 years old with diabetes
at index date of each year in
AL and BC
Confounders: Age, sex, and
trends of hospitalizations
rates over time
Analyses: Age-sex
standardized, data was set as
time-series and were
analyzed using fixed-effects
regression model

•
•
•

Increased hospitalizations
over time but at a slower pace
(i.e. decreased rate over time)
Decrease in rate before and
after 2003
No significant effect of post
2003 on outcome à reform
introduced in 2003 does not
have a significant effect on
the decrease in hospitalization
rate

• Longitudinal
study
• Attempted to
control for
confounding
• Robustness
check
• No preintervention data
• Does not provide
effects over the
long-run

•
•
•

Longitudinal
study
Use of fixedeffects model
Patient
characteristics
not controlled for
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Lee et al.
(2010)

• P4P program
for diabetes
care in Taiwan

•

Number of
exams/tests
conducted each
year, diabetesrelated physician
visits, hospital
admissions, and
health care
expenses to NHI

•
•
•

•

•

Lin et al.
(2016)*

• P4P program in
Taiwan

• Hospitalizations
for diabetic
complications,
and all-cause
mortality

•
•

•

•

•
•

Natural experimental design
Comparing 2005 vs. 2006
Population: With ICD-9-CM
codes 250 or A181 between
2004 to 2006; also filled
diabetes prescription claims
for 3 months each year
Intervention group:
enrolled in P4P in 2006;
Comparison: Patients with
diabetes who never joined
P4P
Analyses: DID regression,
Poisson distribution, negative
binomial distribution, normal
distribution in regression
models, and GEE
Retrospective cohort design;
longitudinal
Patients included from
January 2002 to December
2006 and observed to end of
2012
Population: Diabetes
patients above 30 and first
diagnosed with Type 2
diabetes
Two sets: Full P4P
participation and Partial
participation; each group
with a control group matched
Confounders:
Characteristics of patient,
provider, and the cohort
Analysis: Multivariable Cox
regression

•

•
•

•

Increase in average number of
exams/tests and physicians
visits in both groups, but more
in intervention group
Intervention group had fewer
diabetes-related
hospitalizations
Expenses for diabetes-related
inpatient services decreased
for intervention and increased
for comparison group
P4P improved service use,
physician follow-up, and was
associated with lower hospital
admissions and
hospitalization costs

• A comparison
group included
• Pre- versus postP4P analyses
• Selection bias
due to voluntary
enrollment
• Cross-sectional
study

• Full participation of DM P4P
had a significant lower risk of
being hospitalized for
complications compared to
controls
• Hazard ratio for all-cause
mortality was lower for those
in full and partial P4P
programs versus controls

• Large
nationwide
diabetes
population
• Longitudinal
• Other factors
may affect
relationship
• Unclear if death
was due to
diabetes because
of the lack of
data
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Peterson et
al. (2017)

• Extending the
CareFirst’s
commercial
medical home
program
(includes
financial
incentives) to
Medicare FFS
patients in the
United States

• All-cause and
ACSC
hospitalizations,
ED visits,
quality of care
process
measures, cost
spending

•
•
•

•
•

•

Longitudinal – 1-year
baseline and 2.5-years
intervention period
Population: Medicare
patients
Intervention: 14 panels
(primary care practitioners
participating in a unit)
selected to participate in the
expansion program;
Comparison: 42 panels
participating in the
commercial but not the
expansion program
Confounders: Patient
characteristics
Analysis: DID with
multivariate linear
regressions, accounted for
patient and panel level
clustering
Separate analysis conducted
for high-risk patients

• Intervention group was
associated with significant
reduction in the probability of
receiving all 4 recommended
diabetes processes of care;
this was not seen for high-risk
group
• For all other outcomes, the
intervention group and the
high-risk group was not
significantly associated with
any outcome changes
• Reduction in all-cause
hospitalizations seen in
intervention group when
compared to baseline,
however, similar trends seen
in the comparison group

• Controlled
certain variables
• Intervention vs.
comparison
groups
• Not
experimental
• Generalizability
concern
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Retrospective longitudinal
• Hazard ratio for emergency
• Longitudinal
care was higher in patients in
study
Population: New onset of
P4P (regular and irregular
Type 2 diabetes patients
• Attempted to
treatment) compared to not
(2001 – 2009)
control for
enrolled in P4P
confounding
•
(1) P4P (i.e. regular &
• Diabetic hypoglycaemia
irregular treatment) vs. non• Not
emergency visits were
P4P; (2) Before and After
generalizable
significantly higher after P4P
effects of P4P
due to unique
than before
healthcare
•
Confounders: Patient age &
system
gender, premium based
monthly salary, residence,
catastrophic illness status,
comorbidity, DCSI, level of
healthcare organization,
ownership of organization,
hospital annual service
volume and physician annual
service volume for diabetes
patients
•
Analysis: Chi-square, and
cox proportional hazards
model
P4P, Pay-for-performance; P4Pa, Pay-for-participation; P4C, Pay-for-compliance; DRGs, Diagnostic related groups; ACSC, Ambulatory Care Sensitive
Conditions; GP, general practitioner; BC, British Columbia; AL, Alberta; PCN, Primary Care Networks; NHI, National Health Insurance; ICD-9-CM
International Classification of Diseases Ninth Revision Clinical Modification; DID, Difference-in-Differences; GEE, General Estimated Equations; QOF, Quality
and Outcomes Framework; ACSC, Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions; PCP, Primary care physician; vs, versus; QOC, Quality of care; A1C, glycated
hemoglobin ; LDL, low-density lipoprotein; DCSI, Diabetes Complication Severity Index; CIC, Chronic illness with complexity; DM, Diabetes management;
OLS, Ordinary Least Squares; CHD, Chronic Heart Disease; MCC, Multiple Chronic Condition; COC, Continuity of Care; ED, Emergency Department; NHI,
National Health Insurance; GLM, Generalized Linear Models; UK, United Kingdom; RCT, Randomized Controlled Trial; FFS, Fee-for-service.
*Lin et al. (2016) and Forbes et al. (2017) studies consist both hospitalization and mortality outcomes data, thus is included in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
Yu et al.
(2014)

• Taiwan’s P4P
for diabetes
care

• Emergency care
for diabetic
hypoglycaemia

•
•

55

Table 2.4: Summary of papers that assessed the relationship between financial incentives for diabetes care and mortality
Author &
Year
Ashworth et
al. (2013)

Exposure
Variable(s)

Outcome
Variable(s)

• Practice (i.e.
QOF indicators)
and population
predictors of the
PHI in England

• PHI score,
maximum
potential PHI
score, and PHI%
performance
score

Methods
•
•
•

•

•

Chen et al.
(2016b)

• P4P program in
Taiwan

• All-cause
mortality

•
•
•

•

Study Findings

Strengths/
Limitations

Cross-sectional – 2009/2010
Population: 8136 general
practises in England
PHI score is the estimated
mortality reduction. It’s
constructed from 20 QOF
clinical indicators, mortality
reduction estimates,
comorbidity correction factor,
prevalence calculations
Analysis: Univariate and
multivariate analyses, twolevel multilevel regression
models, clustered at primary
care trust level
Sensitivity analysis
undertaken using 11 QOF
indicators with RCT evidence
of mortality reduction.

• Based on the performance of
the 20 QOF indicators, the
estimated mean reduction in
mortality rate was 258.9 lives
per 100,000 registered
patients per annum
• PHI score weakly correlated
with total QOF score and
clinical QOF score
• PHI% score moderately
correlated with total and
clinical QOF scores
• Overall, weak correlation
between PHI and QOF
scores, implying that the
financial rewards of the QOF
are not reducing mortality

• New metric
produced in
England
• Cross-sectional
study
• PHI measures
impact of QOFrelated activity
instead of the
P4P itself

Retrospective, longitudinal
cohort study
Population: Type 2 diabetes
patients diagnosed prior to
December 31, 2003
Intervention group: patients
18 years and older enrolled
newly in P4P in 2004;
Comparison: Patients not in
P4P using PSM
Confounders: demographic,
utilization, clinical

• After an average of 5.13 years
of follow-up, the cumulative
survival rate was higher for
P4P group than non-P4P
• Unadjusted analysis, but with
PSM indicates mortality rate
significantly lower in P4P
group vs. non-P4P group.
When adjusted for covariates,
there was no difference in
mortality between P4P and
non-P4P

• Longitudinal
study
• Accounted for
selection bias
• Some relevant
variables were
not controlled
for in the PSM
• Cause of death
unknown
• Mortality rates
were not
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•

Fleetcroft et
al. (2010)

• P4P contract
(QOF) in
England
focusing on 25
clinical
indicators

• Population
mortality
reduction per
100,000

•
•

•
•
•

parameters
Analysis: Chi-squared and tt-tests, log-rank test, timedependent Cox regression
model, competing risk
adjusted cox regression, GEE

• P4P group had significantly
higher physician visits,
exams, hypoglycemic drug
use, insulin and statin uses vs.
non-P4P

compared
between before
and after P4P

Cross-sectional and
modelling study
2003 and 2005 data were
used for baseline
performance for 2004 P4P
and 2006 revision of P4P
Population: English
population
Adjusted variables:
Comorbidity, pre-existing
trends
Analysis: Mid estimate –
Health gains between
indicators were additive and
reduced by a factor of
20.4/29.3 to adjust for
comorbidity, Higher
estimate- Similar method but
comorbidity ignored, Lower
estimate – Highest indicator
for each health domain used
and accounted for
comorbidity.

• Reduced mortality was found
in 25 out of 80 indicators in
2004 and 2006 P4P (includes
diabetes indicators)
• 2004 - additional 11 lives
saved per 100,000/ year when
performance improved from
pre contract to level of targets
for full incentive payment
• 2006 - no additional
mortality reduction
• Disease domains with largest
reduction in mortality are
heart disease, diabetes, and
hypertension

• Compared
baseline
performance
• Comorbidity
accounted for
• Difficult to
indicate
causation
• Some baseline
data obtained
from large
databases while
others from
small studies
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Forbes et al.
(2017)*

• UK’s QOF

• Processes and
outcomes of care
• Includes holistic
and personalised
care, mortality,
service use and
etc.

•
•
•
•

•

Kontopantelis
et al. (2015)

• Practice’s
performance on
QOF indicators
in England

• All-cause and
cause-specific
premature
mortality for
QOF-linked
conditions (i.e.
diabetes, heart
failure, and etc.)

•
•
•

•

Systematic review
Empirical quantitative
reports
Includes RCTs and
longitudinal studies
Studies that controlled
longitudinal trends, beforeafter analysis, systematic
reviews
Search performed on
electronic databases for
studies published between
2004 to May 2016

• Three systematic reviews and
five primary studies
• Studies were rated as good
quality
• Results: Modest slowing in
the increase in admissions
and consultation rates,
improvements in certain
diabetes outcomes, no
significant effect on mortality

• First review to
assess these
outcomes for
QOF for longterm diseases
• Qualitative
research not
included
• Other factors
may have
confounded the
relationship

Longitudinal spatial study
Population: Focus on the
England population
Confounders: Area and
population characteristics,
2010 deprivation, urban
versus rural, ethnicity, and
morbidity load. Age and sexstandardized outcomes.
Analysis: Multiple linear
regression models with
spatial weighted estimation.
Additional sensitivity
analyses performed.

• All-cause and cause-specific
mortality rates decreased over
time
• No statistical significant
relationship between
practice’s performance on
QOF indicators and all-cause
and cause-specific mortality
rates

• Longitudinal
study
• Population-level
data
• Potential
underestimation
of deaths
• Unmeasured
confounding
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Lin et al.
(2016)*

• P4P program in
Taiwan

• Hospitalizations
for diabetic
complications,
and all-cause
mortality

•
•
•
•

•
•
Ryan et al.
(2016)

• QOF P4P
program in the
UK

• Age- and sexadjusted
mortality per
100,000 for QOF
disease areas (i.e.
diabetes)
composite
outcome
• Secondary:
Age- and sexadjusted
mortality for
IHD, cancer, and
non-targeted
QOF conditions

•
•

•
•

•

Retrospective cohort design;
longitudinal
January 2002 to December
2006 and observed to end of
2012
Population: Diabetes
patients above 30 and first
diagnosed with Type 2
Two sets: Full P4P
participation and Partial
participation; each group
with a control group matched
Confounders:
Characteristics of patient,
provider, and the cohort
Analysis: Multivariable Cox
regression

• Full participation of DM P4P
had a significant lower risk
of being hospitalized for
complications compared to
controls
• Hazard ratio for all-cause
mortality was lower for those
in full and partial P4P
programs versus controls

• Large
nationwide
diabetes
population
• Longitudinal
• Other factors
may affect
relationship
• Unclear if death
was due to
diabetes because
of the lack of
data

Longitudinal – 1994 to 2010
data
Comparison: 27 countries
with high-income
epidemiological profile
without large-scale P4P.
Population: UK and
comparison countries
Analysis: DID, linear
regression, root meansquared prediction error ratio
test, non-parametric
permutation test, parametric
t-tests
Sensitivity Analysis:
Synthetic comparison groups
were developed due to the
violation of parallel trends
assumption

• Before start of QOF, UK had
the highest age and sexstandardized mortality than
the combined comparison
countries for composite, IHD,
cancer; but lower for death
not related to QOF
• However, mortality for UK
and synthetic comparison was
identical
• QOF was not significantly
associated with mortality for
composite, IHD, cancer or
non-target diseases, when
compared to synthetic
comparison

• Cross-national
study
• Longitudinal
study
• Coding
differences in
practices &
systems
• Lack of
individual-level
data
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P4P, Pay-for-performance; QOF, Quality and Outcomes Framework; DM, Diabetes Management; UK, United Kingdom; IHD, Ischaemic Heart Disease; DID,
Difference-in-Differences; PHI, Public Health Impact; RCT, Randomized Controlled Trial; PSM, Propensity Score Matching; CCI, Charlson Comorbidity Index;
DCSI, Diabetes Complication Severity Index; GEE, General Estimated Equations; vs, versus.
* Lin et al. (2016) and Forbes et al. (2017) studies consist both hospitalization and mortality outcomes data, thus is included in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
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Chapter 3

3

The Impact of the Diabetes Management Incentive on
Diabetes-related Services in Ontario

3.1 Introduction
Diabetes mellitus is a chronic disease that affects millions of individuals worldwide.1 The
number of individuals with this disease increased from 108 million in 1980 to
approximately 422 million in 2014.1 In Canada, over 2.2 million individuals aged 12 and
over were diagnosed with diabetes in 2017, of which 965,100 individuals were from the
province of Ontario.2 Moreover, Diabetes Canada estimated the prevalence of diabetes
(type 1 and type 2 diagnosed) to increase to about 4.8 million by 2029.3,4 This was
estimated using the Canadian Diabetes Cost Model which provided the projections on the
prevalence of diabetes in Canada using national data from the National Diabetes
Surveillance System and Statistics Canada’s medium population projection.4 Diabetes
places a substantial economic burden on the Canadian healthcare system. The direct cost
of diabetes to the healthcare system was an estimated $3.6 billion in 2018, and it is
expected to rise to $4.7 billion by 2028.5
Patients diagnosed with diabetes often develop diabetes-related complications such as
kidney failure, retinopathy, heart attack, and stroke.6 These complications can be lifethreatening, leading to hospitalizations, and reduce life expectancy by five to fifteen
years.6 Currently, there is no cure to diabetes. However, appropriate diabetes
management, treatment, and monitoring can potentially reduce the incidence of diabetesrelated complications, and improve patient’s morbidity and mortality risk over the longterm.7,8 Previous literature documented that effective diabetes management in primary
care settings can potentially reduce complications associated with diabetes.7,9,10 This is
because, patients who have access to a family physician (FP) who provides effective
diabetes management will: order required tests, follow-up with patients regarding their
test results, and support patients with managing their disease (e.g. recommend lifestyle
modifications).9
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In order to strengthen primary care such as improve its access, and increase emphasis on
chronic disease management, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-term Care
(MOHLTC) initiated primary care reform in the early 2000s. New primary care Patient
Enrolment Models (PEMs) were introduced as an integral part of the primary care reform
initiatives. Physicians practicing in these new models were reimbursed via blended feefor-service (FFS) or blended capitation payments combined with various pay-forperformance (P4P) incentives. Prior to the primary care reform, most FPs were solely
paid by the traditional FFS. Following the reform, the majority of the FPs switched to
either blended FFS or blended capitation models. Participation in these models were
voluntary for physicians and patients.11,12 P4P incentives were given to FPs in PEMs who
provided diabetes management, congestive heart failure management, and other
preventive care services to their eligible patients.11
Several countries such as the United States (US), Italy, Taiwan, Australia, the United
Kingdom (UK), and Canada introduced P4P incentives to FPs to improve diabetes
management at primary care settings.7,10,13–15 FPs in most of these countries were
rewarded with these incentives if they improved process of care measures (e.g.
prescribing laboratory tests) and for improved intermediate outcomes (e.g. controlled
patient’s glycated hemoglobin [HbA1C] levels).14,16 The aim of these incentives was to
motivate and influence the FP’s behaviour to provide a higher quality of care to their
patients.7
Existing literature that assessed the effectiveness of these incentives in improving the
provision of diabetes-related services has been mixed. Some studies found that P4P
incentives increased diabetes-related services in primary care. Vamos et al. (2011)17
assessed the association between the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) P4P
scheme and diabetes management at primary care in the UK, and observed an
improvement in the recording of diabetes-related process of care measures (e.g. if
HbA1C, cholesterol, and blood pressure were measured) and in prescribing
medications.17 Likewise, two other studies found similar findings regarding the P4P
program for diabetes care introduced in Taiwan.14,18 A longitudinal study by Chen et al.
(2010)19 examined the effectiveness of a P4P program implemented in Hawaii in a
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preferred provider organization setting, and found that patients with physicians who
participated in the P4P program were more likely to receive two HbA1C tests and one
low-density lipoprotein cholesterol test in one year compared to those without. Similar
results were observed when patients visited the P4P-participating physicians for three
consecutive years.19
Although there were studies that found the P4P incentives to increase diabetes-related
services, some studies found the effect to decline over time or have no effect. Cheng et
al. (2012)’s20 longitudinal study on the P4P program in Taiwan concluded that the P4P
program has a positive and statistically significant effect on completing the essential
examinations or tests for diabetes care. However, the magnitude of this effect decreased
over the study period.20 Similar results were found in another study in Taiwan using
diabetic patients with and without multiple chronic conditions.21 In contrast, one study
found no difference in the clinical testing for HbA1C, lipid, and eye exam comparing the
Hudson’s Health Plan which contains a P4P program for diabetes care, to other nonincentivized health care plans in New York (a state in the US).22 In Ontario, Canada,
researchers assessed the relationship between a Diabetic Management Assessment
(DMA) fee code, and quality of diabetes care measured by the frequency of retinal eye
examination, cholesterol, and HbA1C tests.8 The researchers found a gradual increase in
the proportion of diabetic patients receiving the recommended tests; however,
longitudinal results revealed that the magnitude of improvement seen after the DMA was
introduced was similar to the pre-DMA period.8,23
The plausible reason behind such mixed findings in the literature may be due to the
differences in the nature of the incentives, study design, and the institutional environment
within which P4P incentives were implemented.16,20,24 Moreover, limited attention has
been paid to unmeasured confounding. Therefore, the relationship between the P4P
incentives and provision of diabetes-related services remains unclear.
In Ontario a P4P incentive for diabetes care, named the Diabetes Management Incentive
(DMI), was introduced by the MOHLTC on April 1, 2006.13,25–27 FPs practicing in
specific PEMs were eligible to bill this incentive for their enrolled patients.25 Table 3.1
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lists the specific PEMs that were eligible for the DMI. On the other hand, FPs practicing
in the traditional FFS, FPs not participating in the specific PEMs, and non-enrolled
patients in the specific PEMs were ineligible for the DMI. However, as of April 1, 2009
all FPs were eligible to bill the DMI for their patients with diabetes regardless of their
participation and patient’s enrollment status in a PEM.13,26 In order to claim the DMI, the
FP must provide ongoing diabetes management to their patient, and complete a flow
sheet which tracks the required elements for diabetes care (e.g. track patient’s HbA1C
levels), consistent with the Diabetes Canada’s Clinical Practice Guidelines. The full set
of elements that needs to be tracked, and a sample of the flow sheet is found in Appendix
A3.1.13,25–28 The FPs claim the DMI by submitting the Q040 fee code to the MOHLTC
for their patient once per 12-month period, and its’ value is $60 per annum per
patient.25,26,29 On October 1, 2015, an additional requirement for the DMI claim was
introduced which was that, FPs must provide a minimum three K030 services to the
patient within the same 12-month period (i.e. FPs are only eligible for the P4P incentive
(DMI) if they have billed at least three K030 fee codes).27,30 The K030 is the DMA fee
code that was introduced on April 2002 for providing diabetes-related services other than
insulin therapy support to patients.8,27,31 Details regarding the DMA can be found in
Appendix A3.1. The K030 DMA can be claimed a maximum four times per patient per
12-month period at a value of $39.20 each time it is billed.8,27,31
To date, it is unknown if the introduction of DMI is associated with an increase in
diabetes-related services. Existing literature that have assessed the relationship between
P4P financial incentives for diabetes care and diabetes-related services have been
uncertain. Moreover, limitations found in the previous studies make it difficult to
generalize those findings to the DMI context in Ontario. Therefore, the objective of this
study is to examine the impact of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients diagnosed
with diabetes in Ontario. Provision of diabetes-related services will be captured through
the DMA billing code K030. This study uses patient-level longitudinal data, and
compares diabetic patients enrolled to FPs in PEMs eligible to bill DMI to those affiliated
with the traditional FFS FPs.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1

Data Sources

The data for this study were obtained from multiple Ontario healthcare administrative
databases housed at ICES. These datasets were linked using unique encoded identifiers
and analyzed at ICES. This is a longitudinal, population-based, cohort study that used
data spanning from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 (i.e. April 1st 2002 to March 31st 2009). The
study began from fiscal year 2002 as DMA was introduced then, and concluded at the
end of the 2008 fiscal year as DMI was made available to all FPs on April 1st, 2009. The
Ontario Diabetes Dataset (ODD) was used to identify adults diagnosed with diabetes
from April 1st, 1991 and onwards in Ontario.32,33 The ODD was created using the Ontario
Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) claims database, Canadian Institute for Health Information
(CIHI) Discharge Abstract Database (DAD)/Same Day Surgery (SDS) data, and
Registered Persons Database (RPDB).33 An adult (19+) diabetic patient in the ODD was
defined as those with two OHIP claims with the diagnosis recorded as diabetes, or one
OHIP fee code: K029 (Insulin Therapy Support), K030 (DMA), K045 (Diabetes
management by a specialist), K046 (Diabetes team management), and Q040 (DMI)
claim, or one diabetes-related hospital admission within two years. The ODD does not
contain individuals with gestational diabetes, and does not distinguish between type 1 and
type 2 diabetes.34 However, the majority of the individuals included in this study are
expected to have type 2 diabetes given they are diagnosed during the adulthood.34 The
ODD provides the patient’s diagnosis date, and their age at the diagnosis date.
The RPDB was another database used in this study, which provided patient-level
demographic information (e.g. age, and sex) for all individuals eligible for OHIP
coverage.8,32,33 Postal codes from RPDB and Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion
File (PCCF) were utilized to obtain census dissemination area (DA) level income
quintiles, and rural residence.35 The rural residence definition included individuals in
rural and small town (i.e. in areas with an urban area population size less than 10,000,
plus rural areas).36 The Ontario Marginalization Index was used to determine material
deprivation index,37,38 which focuses on the inability for individuals to have access to or
attain basic material needs. This dimension is composed of indicators from 2001 and
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2006, and compiled at the census DA level. It is categorized into five quintiles,37–39 and
can be used as a proxy for patient’s socioeconomic status.37,38 The Aggregated Diagnosis
Groups (ADGs) from the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) System
Version 10.0 was used to determine patient’s comorbidity.40 The ACG system allocates
the 9th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) and the 10th
revision (ICD-10) codes into one of the 32 diagnosis clusters named the ADGs. Each
disease or condition is grouped into one of the 32 ADGs based on five clinical criteria:
severity of the condition, duration of the condition, etiology of the condition, diagnostic
certainty, and speciality care involvement.40–42 Each patient can be assigned to as little as
zero and as many as 32 ADGs43; the greater the number of ADGs the more comorbid the
patient is.
The Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables and Corporate Provider Database
(CPDB) were used to identify patients enrolled to FPs practicing in PEMs, and the type
of PEM the patient and physician were enrolled to. Patients who were not enrolled to a
FP from CAPE were assigned to FPs via a virtual roster algorithm. The virtual roster
method determined the patient’s FP by identifying the responsible physician who claimed
the highest amount of OHIP billings for that patient from 18 core primary care fee codes
during the previous two years.44,45 The CPDB also provided information on FPs
practicing in Ontario such as their eligibility. The ICES Physician Database (IPDB) was
used to obtain physician’s demographic information such as their age, sex, International
Medical Graduate (IMG) status, and the year they graduated from their medical degree.
The OHIP claims database was used to examine the OHIP billings claimed by Ontario
FPs, and the details of these claims (e.g. date of service and codes for the service).

3.2.2

Study Population

The ODD was used to identify Ontario adults diagnosed with diabetes on or between
April 1st, 1991 to April 1st of each fiscal year from 2002 to 2008. In other words, patients
diagnosed with the disease on or prior to the beginning (April 1st) of that specific fiscal
year were included. This captured old and newly-diagnosed patients each fiscal year.
Patients were included if they were first diagnosed with diabetes at or between the ages
19 and 75 years. Patients were excluded from the study if they died on or before April 1st,
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2002, or had missing data for age, sex, and ICES key number (IKN). The IKN is the
patient’s unique encoded identifier used to link data across the administrative databases.
Following this, patients were further excluded if they had missing data for any of the
patient and physician-level characteristics used in this study (listed in Section 3.2.3), or
had missing data for the location of physician’s practice using Local Health Integration
Networks (LHINs: Regional administrative units in Ontario) (see Figure 3.1). Patients
with complete data were then categorized into two study groups. The first group was the
DMI eligible group which comprised of patients with a FP exposed to DMI for all three
years (2006 to 2008). The physicians of these patients had to be in the ‘Eligible for DMI’
section from Table 3.1. The second group was the DMI ineligible group which consisted
of patients who were affiliated with a FP practicing traditional FFS throughout the study
(i.e. the patient’s physician was never exposed to the DMI). The DMI eligible group is
labelled as the ‘DMI group’, and the DMI ineligible group is labelled as the ‘comparison
group’ throughout the remainder of this thesis. Patients who did not fit the criteria to be
in either study group were excluded from analysis. Overall, there were 2,760,989 patientyear observations for analysis (2,652,076 observations for the DMI group and 108,913
observations for the comparison group). This panel dataset is unbalanced in nature (i.e.
some patients were not observed or had no data for some of the years in the study).
One concern with having an unbalanced panel dataset is a potential efficiency loss from
having missing data,46 and may induce bias to the parameter estimates.47 Therefore, to
alleviate the above complications, the main analysis was conducted on the balanced panel
of the dataset (i.e. only in those who were observed each year during the study period
from fiscal years 2002 to 2008). However, the analysis using unbalanced panel data was
conducted to ascertain robustness of the conclusions. The balanced panel ended up with
1,207,157 patient-year observations for analysis. Figure 3.1 shows the process by which
the study population was selected. Table 3.2 shows the number of patients in each study
group for each fiscal year for the main analysis (i.e. balanced panel), and in the
unbalanced panel.
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3.2.3

Variables

The exposure measure in this study was whether the patient’s FP was eligible to bill the
DMI from fiscal years 2006 to 2008. Using this exposure, a dichotomous variable was
created to reflect the two study groups of patients: DMI group (took the value 1) and
comparison group (took the value 0). The outcome variable of interest was the DMA fee
codes billed (measures diabetes-related services) for each patient. This variable was also
a dichotomous variable which reflected whether or not the patient had three or more
DMA fee codes billed by their physician during each fiscal year. The quantity ‘three or
more’ was chosen because it represents effective management of diabetes. Usually
diabetic patients visit their FP every three to four months to complete the necessary
bloodwork (e.g. HbA1C blood test), discuss diabetes management, and have their
diabetes care elements tracked in a flow sheet (e.g. track their HbA1C test result). Most
diabetic patients are required to have their HbA1C measured approximately every three
months to ensure that the patient is meeting their glycemic targets based on the Diabetes
Canada’s Clinical Practice Guidelines.48 Therefore, following these guidelines, the FP
should be able to bill at least three DMA fee codes for the patient within one year. In
addition, as of October 1, 2015, the DMI can be billed only if the FP renders a minimum
three DMA services for the patient over the one-year period, thus the rationale as to why
the quantity ‘three or more’ was selected.27,30
Various patient- and physician-level characteristics were controlled in the analysis.
Patient characteristics included were age, sex, comorbidity (defined by the number of
ADGs), rural residence, duration of diabetes (measured in years), income quintiles
(ranged from quintile 1 (Q1) = lowest income to quintile 5 (Q5) = highest income), and
material deprivation (ranged from Q1 = least deprived to Q5 = most deprived). Physician
characteristics included were age, sex, IMG status (0 = Canadian Medical Graduate
(CMG), and 1 = IMG), and years since graduation (measures physician’s experience).
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3.2.4

Statistical Analysis

3.2.4.1

Main Analysis

Individual patient-level data were utilized to conduct all analyses. Descriptive statistics
were obtained for each fiscal year to describe the patient-level characteristics, and the
DMI and DMA fee code billings for the DMI and comparison groups. Descriptive
statistics were also obtained for physician-level characteristics for FPs who provided care
to patients in the DMI group, and for FPs who provided care to patients in the
comparison group. Categorical variables were described in frequencies and percentages,
while continuous variables were described using means and standard deviations. In
addition, a chi-square test and an independent sample t-test were performed to compare
the outcome measure (DMA fee codes billed) between the two study groups. The DMA
outcome variable was also treated as a continuous variable (i.e. number of DMA fee
codes billed) for the descriptive analyses, hence why a t-test was also performed. The two
tests were only performed for the 2002 and 2008 fiscal years to evaluate if differences in
the DMA billings were present between the two groups at the beginning and end of the
study period.
Multivariable linear regression models with the difference-in-difference (DID)
methodology were used to study the relationship between the DMI and diabetes-related
services (measured by DMA billings). The DID methodology is used to estimate the
effect of a policy change by comparing the difference in the outcomes between two
groups (i.e. study group that was exposed to the policy change, and a comparison group
that was not exposed), before and after the policy change was introduced.49 The DID
effect in this study was estimated using a multivariable linear regression model which
included the following variables: 1) a dichotomous variable that indicated the two study
groups (DMI group versus comparison group), 2) a pre- and post-period dichotomous
variable that reflected if the year of observation was before versus after DMI was
introduced, and 3) a variable for the interaction between the variables from 1) and 2).49,50
The estimated coefficient of the interaction variable captured the impact of DMI on the
probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician. A time
trend measure was also included in the model, and it was labeled as ‘!’. This was the
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DID unadjusted pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model (Model 1). Previous
literature in this area had explored the effectiveness of P4P incentives for diabetes care
by controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics, as they can potentially
confound this relationship.8,18,19,22 Therefore, a DID adjusted pooled OLS model (Model
2) that controlled for patient- and physician-level characteristics to account for observed
heterogeneity was used. All patient- and physician-level characteristics discussed in
Section 3.2.3 were included except for physician’s years since graduation, as it was
highly correlated with physician’s age. Patient and physician’s age-squared variables
were included. Within-clustering of patients was also used to adjust standard errors, as
patients were observed over time.
Although Model 2 reduced bias from confounding by controlling for observed
characteristics, unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity (i.e. heterogeneity due to
patient’s race, preferences) may still be present, and can potentially bias the
relationship.22,51 Assuming that the above patient-specific factors are time-invariant,
patient fixed-effects DID model adjusting for patient and physician-level characteristics
was then performed (Model 3).51,52 A fixed-effects model removes the effect of
unobserved time-invariant patient factors so that the net effect of the DMI on the
outcome can be examined. Finally, patients may have their own specific time trend as
over time patients’ behaviours can change (i.e. medical compliance, visiting their FPs on
a regular basis, etc.), and this is not accounted by the fixed-effects DID model. Therefore,
a high-dimensional fixed-effects DID model adjusting for patient and physician-level
characteristics and individual fixed-effects was used to control for the patient-specific
time trend (Model 4).52,53 In addition, a two-way clustering for within patients and
between physician levels was allowed for in this model. It is essential to cluster at the
physician-level as a FP’s behaviour and the way they deliver care would affect all
patients who received care from that specific physician in a similar manner.54
This study used linear regression models to evaluate the effect of DMI on a binary
outcome. When evaluating binary outcomes, nonlinear probability models such as logit
and probit models are commonly used.55,56 However, a linear probability model (LPM)
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can be used to estimate consistent parameter estimates. The LPM for a binary outcome
‘y’ is specified as:
" # = 1 & = () + (+ &+ + (, &, … + (. &/. + 0/ ;

where &/ is the covariates, 1 is the number of covariates, and 0/ is the error term.55–57
This linear model is interpreted as the probability that the event will occur given &/ .
Although there are a couple of disadvantages of LPM such as heteroscedasticity (can be
dealt with using robust standard errors in Stata software), and predicted probabilities, ‘#’,
may lie outside the range of zero and one57; the LPM has a number of advantages that led
to its use in this study. One of the main advantages of using the LPM is that the
interpretations of the coefficients are much easier compared to nonlinear models,
especially when there are interaction terms involved.58,59 In addition, the coefficient
estimates in a LPM can be directly interpreted as the “mean marginal effect” of the
covariate on the outcome, while extensive calculations are required to determine the
marginal effects in a logit model.60 Second, using nonlinear models becomes more
complicated when working with panel data.61 This was one of the main reasons the LPM
was used in this study, as it is less complicated to perform fixed-effects and highdimensional fixed-effects using a linear model compared to a nonlinear model. Lastly, it
has been claimed that in large samples the LPM produces similar findings as the logit and
probit models.58,62 Therefore, the LPM was used in this study to estimate the impact of
DMI on the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s
physician. However, the coefficient of the interaction variable from the LPM, and the
average derivative of the interaction variable from the logit model were compared to
illustrate that the impact of DMI on the outcome is similar between the two type of
models.59 This was done for Models 1 and 2 only, as performing the fixed-effects logit
model is very complex and high-dimensional fixed-effects logit model is not feasible. All
data analyses were performed using Stata 15.1 at ICES Western site.
The equations for the four multivariable linear regression models with the DID
methodology described above are presented below:
" #/2 = 1 & = () + (+ 345/ + (, 6789:;2 + (< 345/ ×6789:;2 + (> ! + 0/2

(1)
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" #/2 = 1 & = () + (+ 345/ + (, 6789:;2 + (< 345/ ×6789:;2 + (> ! + (? @/2 + 0/2

(2)

" #/2 = 1 & = () + (+ 345/ + (, 6789:;2 + (< 345/ ×6789:;2 + (> ! + (? @/2 + A/ + 0/2
(3)
" #/2 = 1 & = () + (+ 345/ + (, 6789:;2 + (< 345/ ×6789:;2 + (? @/2 + A/ + B/2 + 0/2
(4)

Equations (1) to (4) specify Models 1 to 4 respectively. " #/2 = 1 & is the probability of
having three or more DMA fee codes billed for patient 9 by their physician in fiscal year
C; 345/ is a dichotomous variable equals to 1 if patient 9 is in the DMI group and 0 if
patient 9 is in the comparison group; 6789:;2 is a pre- and post- dichotomous variable
equals to 0 if the year of the observation is before DMI was introduced and 1 if it was
after DMI was introduced; 345/ ×6789:;2 is the interaction variable which denotes the
DID estimate; ! is a time trend which denotes the year of observation; @/2 is the set of
observable covariates (i.e. patient and physician-level characteristics); A/ is the
unobserved individual patient fixed-effects; B/2 is the high-dimensional fixed-effects in
which the patient interacts with their own time trend; and 0/2 is the error term.

3.2.4.2

Subgroup Analysis

Subgroup analyses were also performed to examine if the impact of DMI on the DMA
fee codes billed varied among different subpopulations. The analyses were performed in
two subgroups: 1) comorbidity (those with below versus at or above median number of
ADGs at baseline), and 2) sex (males versus females). If any one of the two subgroup
analyses revealed the impact of DMI on the outcome to be statistically significant but
with a large difference in the magnitude of effect among the levels of that subgroup,
interactions were then tested in that subgroup. Using interactions is a more persuasive
approach when proving that a difference in the effect of DMI among the different levels
of that subgroup is present.63 Subgroup analysis was performed in the comorbidity
subgroup, because patients with comorbidities (or have multiple chronic conditions) will
have complex health needs, and a higher demand for healthcare services.64–66 In diabetic
patients, increase in the healthcare utilization (i.e. care from FPs, specialists, and
hospitals) is found with increasing number of comorbidities.66 Therefore, it is important
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to assess if the impact of DMI varied in this subgroup. In addition, a few studies have
found that P4P incentive schemes may not benefit patients with multiple chronic
conditions as the guidelines from these incentives focus on specific diseases and may not
be appropriate for those with a greater comorbidity.67,68 This further increases the need
for this subgroup analysis. Subgroup analysis by sex was also performed, because sexspecific differences have been noted in diabetic patients for the quality of care received,
and for their medical compliance. Women are less likely to attain the recommended
targets for diabetes (e.g. targets for HbA1C, lipids), and be compliant with the medical
recommendations.69,70 One potential reason behind this is due to behavioural factors as
one study found that women with diabetes had a higher prevalence of depression and
diabetes-related distress than men, and that lower psychological well-being was
associated with lower levels of self-care attitudes, satisfaction of treatment, and diabetes
empowerment.71,72 If women have poor medical compliance, then they will less likely
visit their FP to have their diabetes monitored and controlled. Likewise, existing
literature have found women to less likely to receive monitoring and treatment for
diabetes compared to men.69,70 Therefore, it is important to assess if the impact of DMI
on the provision of diabetes-related services differ by sex.

3.2.4.3

Sensitivity Analysis

Two sensitivity analyses were conducted to evaluate the robustness of the study findings.
First, a sensitivity analysis was performed treating the DMA outcome as a continuous
variable to check if the findings remained similar to the main results. Second, to reduce
potential selection bias that arose from only assessing patients who were part of the
balanced panel (i.e. patients who were observed each and every year during the study
period), an analysis was performed using the unbalanced panel dataset (i.e. all patients
including those without data for some of the years in the study). The unbalanced panel of
the dataset was made up of those who were in the balanced panel, those in the DMI group
who entered the dataset after April 1, 2002 (patients diagnosed with diabetes after the
study began) but on or prior to April 1, 2006 to be eligible for the DMI group, and those
from the DMI group who had no data for some of the fiscal years. Subgroup analyses
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were performed in both sensitivity analyses along the lines of the balanced panel
analysis.

3.3 Results
3.3.1

Descriptive Results

In total, there were 172,451 adult diabetic patients in Ontario who were included in this
study (15,559 patients were in the comparison group and 156,892 patients were in the
DMI group). Patient and physician characteristics for both study groups for fiscal years
2002 to 2005 (i.e. before DMI introduction) are reported in Table 3.3 and the
corresponding data for fiscal years 2006 to 2008 (i.e. after DMI introduction) are
presented in Table 3.4. On average, patients in the DMI group were slightly younger, had
fewer number of ADGs (i.e. less comorbid), and had slightly less duration of diabetes
compared to the comparison group. In addition, in the DMI group, there was a slightly
greater proportion of female patients, and patients who resided in rural areas, in lesser
deprived quintiles, and higher income quintiles compared to the comparison group. The
number of physicians providing care in each study group differed for each fiscal year,
with the number decreased from 1,191 in 2002 to 797 physicians in 2008 in the
comparison group. On average, the physicians providing care to the DMI group were
younger, had fewer years of experience, and were less likely to be IMGs. Furthermore,
there was a greater proportion of female physicians providing care in the DMI compared
to the comparison group.
As for the DMI billings (Tables 3.3 and 3.4), the proportion of patients in the DMI group
who had a DMI billed by their physician increased from 21.91% in 2006 to 27.43% in
2008. Similarly, an increase was observed in this group for the proportion of patients
with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician per year (0.63% in 2002 to
7.85% in 2008), and in the average number of DMA fee codes billed per year. The
proportions and averages for the DMA fee code billings were higher in the DMI
compared to the comparison group. In the comparison group, the proportion of patients
with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician increased from 0.39% in
2002 to 1.79% in 2008, however, it was not a steady increase throughout. The difference
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in the DMA fee codes billed between the two study groups was compared at baseline and
at final fiscal year; and a statistical significant difference was detected between the two
groups (p < 0.001) (Appendix A3.2). Figure 3.2 presents the trends in the DMA fee code
billings in the DMI and comparison groups. Figure 3.2a shows that there was a sharp
increase in the average number of DMA fee codes billed in the DMI group; and the gap
between the two groups widened following the introduction of DMI. A sharp increase
was also observed in the DMI group for the proportion of patients with three or more
DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician per year (Figure 3.2b). The difference in
this proportion between the study groups increased from 0.002 (2002) to 0.061 (2008).

3.3.2

Regression Results

The linear regression results for the estimated impact of DMI on having three or more
DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician are presented in Table 3.5. All four models
show that DMI has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of
having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician (p < 0.01). This
finding suggests that there is an increase in the provision of diabetes-related services after
the introduction of DMI. The DID unadjusted pooled OLS model (Model 1) indicates
that the effect of DMI is an increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee
codes billed by patient’s physician by 4.2 percentage points
(95% G:HI9;7HG7 9HC78JKL M5 4.0, 4.3 678G7HCKS7 6:9HCT). However, a slight
decrease in the effect size was observed after adjusting for patient- and physician-level
characteristics (Model 2), and a similar magnitude of effect as Model 2 was observed in
the fixed-effects DID model (Model 3). Lastly, the high-dimensional fixed-effects DID
model (Model 4) showed the smallest estimated effect compared to the previous models;
2.1 percentage points increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes
billed by patient’s physician (95% M5 1.5, 2.6 678G7HCKS7 6:9HCT). Since Model 4
adjusts for patient-specific time trend, individual patient fixed-effects, and observable
patient and physician-level characteristics; therefore, this model is likely to be closer to
the true effect of the DMI on the study outcome.
The average marginal effects of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by
patient’s physician were compared between Models 1 and 2 to equivalent models
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performed using a logistic regression model (Appendix A3.3). Since similar marginal
effects were obtained from the logistic and LPM regression models, the estimates from
the LPM are reliable.
Patient and physician-level characteristics in the regression models displayed certain
effects on patients having three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician (Table
3.5). Patient’s age has a positive and statistical significant effect on the probability of
having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician based on Model 2. In
Models 3 and 4 patient’s age cannot be identified, because it was correlated with the time
trend variable. However, the quadratic term for age was present, and it was positive and
statistically significant in Models 3 and 4. Females (based on Model 2), and those with
higher number of ADGs (based on all models) were significantly less likely to have three
or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician. The remaining patient-level, and all
physician-level characteristics did not have a statistically significant effect on the
outcome in the final model (Model 4).

3.3.3

Results from the Subgroup Analysis

Subgroup analyses performed across the two subgroups (comorbidity, and sex) are
presented in Table 3.6. The results for the impact of DMI on having three or more DMA
fee codes billed by patient’s physician in the subgroups were similar to the main results.
Based on the final model, the comorbidity subgroup analyses showed the effect size to be
similar in both comorbidity groups. However, subgroup analyses by sex revealed the
effect to be slightly larger in males compared to females (4:;7L 4: (< Z[\]^ =
0.023; 95% M5 0.017, 0.029; (<(a]b[\]^) = 0.018; 95% M5 0.012, 0.024). Following
this, interactions were tested to examine if there was a statistically significant difference
in the impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s
physician according to patient’s sex. Interactions were performed in Models 1 and 2 only,
because patient’s sex is a time-invariant characteristic that is constant for each patient,
thus, its effect is omitted in fixed-effects and high-dimensional fixed-effects models.
Findings from the interactions revealed that the difference in the DMI’s effect on the
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outcome between males and females is statistically significant (4:;7L 2: ( =
−0.006; 95% M5 − 0.008, −0.005).

3.3.4

Results from the Sensitivity Analysis

The first sensitivity analysis was performed assessing the impact of DMI on the outcome
treated as a continuous variable instead of a binary variable. This variable measured the
number of DMA fee codes billed for the patient in each fiscal year. Similar to the main
results, the DMI has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of DMA
fee codes billed. The second sensitivity analysis was performed using patients who were
part of the unbalanced panel dataset. In total, there were 480,517 adult diabetes patients
part of the unbalanced panel, and Table 3.2 illustrates the number of patients in each
study group for each fiscal year. Similar results were observed in the unbalanced panel as
the main results of this study. Subgroup analyses were also performed in the unbalanced
panel dataset, and the results were consistent with the results from the subgroup analyses
in the main study. For the comorbidity subgroup analysis in the unbalanced panel, the
same median number of ADGs at baseline as the main study population was used. This
was done to be consistent with the subgroup analysis performed in the main study, and
also, because the median number of ADGs at baseline could not be computed for the
unbalanced panel as not all patients were present at baseline (2002). Results for the
sensitivity analysis are not presented in this chapter, but are available upon request.

3.4 Discussion
To date, the literature assessing the impact of P4P incentives on diabetes-related services
has been mixed. Furthermore, no research has been performed assessing the effect of
DMI on diabetes-related services in Ontario. Therefore, the aim of this study was to
evaluate the impact of DMI on diabetes-related services (measured by DMA billings) in
diabetic patients in Ontario. Results from this study revealed that the proportion of
patients who had three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician increased in
both study groups, however, the increase was much smaller for the comparison group. A
large increase was also observed in the average number of DMA fee codes billed in the
DMI group in 2008 compared to 2002. The main regression results revealed that DMI
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increased the provision of diabetes-related services, and the findings were consistent
through all four DID models. However, the magnitude of the effect was much smaller in
Model 4 compared to Model 1. This was observed as Model 4 compared to Model 1
controlled for the observable patient- and physician-level characteristics, individual
patient fixed-effects, and the patient-specific time trend as these factors can potentially
affect the study relationship. The estimated magnitude of effect was an increase in the
probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician by 2.1
percentage points. As for the subgroup analyses, findings revealed the DMI’s effect was
similar across the comorbidity groups. However, there was a difference in the magnitude
of effect found between males and females, in which the effect size was slightly larger in
males. A potential reason behind this finding is that female diabetic patients are known to
have poor medical compliance, and are less likely to receive diabetes-related services
compared to males.19,69,70 The main findings of this study were based on the balanced
panel of patients. By focusing on the same patients over time, any changes seen in the
outcome after DMI was introduced can be more likely linked to the incentive; thus
having a higher internal validity. However, sensitivity analyses were performed using the
unbalanced panel of the dataset to ensure that findings from this study were robust. This
patient cohort improves the external validity of the study as it consists a larger cohort
which includes: those from the balanced panel, those in the DMI group without data for
some of the fiscal years, and those in the DMI group who were diagnosed with diabetes
after April 1, 2002 but on or prior to April 1, 2006. Findings from the unbalanced panel
were consistent with the main study results. An additional sensitivity analysis was
performed using a continuous DMA outcome, and findings were very similar to the main
study results.
The results found in this study are consistent with a number of existing studies that also
reported P4P incentives increased diabetes-related services in primary care.14,15,17,19,20
One study assessed the impact of a P4P scheme that was introduced in Australia on
quality of care, measured by whether the FP ordered a HbA1C test during a consultation
with the patient.15 The study’s findings revealed that the introduction of this scheme led
to a 20 percentage point increase in the probability of ordering a HbA1C test.15 Another
study observed that the odds of receiving at least two HbA1C tests and one lipid test were
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1.16 times greater in patients who saw a P4P-participating physician versus those who
saw a non-P4P-participating physician.19 These results underscore that P4P incentives
can influence the FP’s behaviour, and improve quality of diabetes care at primary care.7
Therefore, this in turn reflects the improvement in delivering diabetes-related services for
diabetes management such as ordering tests (i.e. HbA1C test, lipids test).9 Over time, this
will induce improvements in intermediate outcomes (e.g. cholesterol control)9,16 and
eventually in patient outcomes (e.g. avoidable hospitalizations and mortality risk).10
On the other hand, a few studies found that P4P incentives for diabetes care have no
effect on diabetes-related services,8,22 which differed from what was found in this study.
For instance, Chien et al. (2012)22 noted that there was no statistically significant
difference in the diabetes care process (e.g. lipid, HbA1C exam rates) comparing the
Hudson Health Plan’s P4P program to other non-incentivised healthcare plans in New
York. Possible reasons to why the results of the current study differed from some
literature can be due to the differences in the level of analysis (e.g. Chien et al.’s study22
used plan-level data), sample size, nature of the P4P incentive, design of the study, and
institutional setting of the study.
In this study, there was also an interesting observation which was that the proportion of
patients with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician was increasing
before DMI was introduced, and the proportions were larger in the DMI group (Figure
3.2b). This suggests that physicians providing care to patients in the DMI group were
already billing the DMA fee codes more than the physicians providing care in the
comparison group. However, once the DMI was introduced, the improvement was much
larger than the pre-incentive period, suggesting that the DMI did have a positive effect on
the outcome. The increasing trend in the DMA billings observed in the DMI group prior
to the introduction of DMI, may be due to the primary care reform which began in the
early 2000s in Ontario. The reform introduced new PEMs, in which one of the objectives
was to increase emphasis on disease prevention and chronic disease management.11
Therefore, over time more and more FPs switched from the traditional FFS into one of
the new PEMs in the DMI group, hence there was a slight increasing trend in the billing
of the DMA fee codes prior to the introduction of DMI.
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Another issue that needs to be noted is that even though there was an increase in the
proportion of patients with three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician from
2002 to 2008, and the number of patients with DMI billed from 2006 to 2008; the
numbers were not large enough. In the DMI group in 2008, only 27.43% of the patients
received DMI billings and 7.85% of the patients had three or more DMA fee codes billed
by their physician. Therefore, there is a low uptake of the DMI and DMA fee codes and
there are a couple of reasons to why this may be the case. First, the size of the incentive
and the fee code may have been too small for the physicians.8,22,52 Other P4P programs
such as the QOF in the UK pays FPs up to 25% of the physician’s income. Moreover, for
the QOF, family practices earn points based on clinical and organisational quality
indicators with more points obtained for intermediate outcome indicators.16 Points are
then converted to payments to the family practice adjusting for disease prevalence and
list size.16 Second, some physicians may be unaware of the DMI and DMA fee codes,
especially right after switching to PEMs. Third, there have been other P4P incentives
introduced around the same time period which may have affected the intake of the DMI.
Fourth, the administrator burden of completing the diabetes flow sheet may be an issue
for some practices as it is very detailed, thus, can be straining to complete for each
patient.8 Lastly, patients demand to complete the required diabetes tests may be low or
they may not visit their FP frequently enough for the FP to provide diabetes-related
services and bill the DMI and DMA fee codes.52
This study also found that females, and those with a higher comorbidity had a lower
probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by their physician. Similar to
this study, previous studies had also found females8,19 less likely to receive quality of care
or recommended tests. In addition, Kiran et al. (2012)8 observed that, those with 10 or
more ADGs (higher comorbidity) to less likely to receive all three recommended tests
(i.e. retinal eye exam, HbA1C and cholesterol test). On the other hand, contrasting results
were also found in existing literature such as Chen et al. (2010)19 and Chien et al.
(2012)22 found those with higher comorbidities to more likely receive quality or
recommended diabetes care.
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There are some strengths of the current study. This is the first study to evaluate the
impact of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients diagnosed with diabetes
comparing patients whose physicians were exposed to DMI to a comparison group. This
study also helps fill the knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of DMI using panel
data from 2002 to 2008. Using panel data is advantageous as, it gives more efficiency,
informative data, variability, less collinearity among variables, and present ways to deal
with heterogeneity.51,73 Lastly, the patient cohort in this study was derived from validated
health administrative databases such as the ODD which has a high sensitivity (86%), and
specificity (97%).32,33
There were also some limitations of this study. First, the comparison group in this study
was much smaller compared to the DMI group. This can be an issue, since in a small
group, patients with data that are outside the normal range or with extreme data
observations may skew the results. Moreover, this can result in having two study groups
that are not comparable with each other. Second, although several patient- and physicianlevel characteristics, time-invariant patient factors, and patient-specific time trend were
controlled; some selection bias may still remain. Most FPs who provided care to patients
in the DMI group were initially practicing in the traditional FFS, however, over time
these physicians switched into the PEMs voluntarily. On the other hand, FPs providing
care to the comparison group were physicians who practiced in the traditional FFS
throughout the entire study. Therefore, differences among the physicians between the two
study groups may have introduced some bias. In addition, the descriptive results revealed
that there were slight differences observed between the DMI and comparison group for
the patient- and physician-level characteristics. Therefore, patient- and physician-level
characteristics were adjusted for in the multivariable analyses to help reduce the bias.
Lastly, findings from this study may not be generalizable to other jurisdictions due to the
differences in how the P4P incentives for diabetes care is designed, or its size in Ontario
versus other jurisdictions outside of Ontario.
In terms of future research, more research is required to further explore the impact of
DMI on diabetes-related services beyond fiscal year 2008. As of April 1, 2009, all FPs
(including FPs in traditional FFS) became eligible for DMI. Therefore, future research
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can assess the effects of DMI on diabetes-related services in patients enrolled to
physicians in PEMs and in patients with FFS physicians separately. Future works could
also explore LHIN-level analysis. Research can also be performed assessing the effect of
DMI on improving intermediate outcomes of diabetes such as HbA1C and cholesterol
levels to understand if the incentive helped improve patients’ health. This study found
that DMI has improved the provision of diabetes-related services, and it would be
worthwhile to investigate the benefits to patients’ health. Finally, it is important to assess
the effect of this incentive on healthcare system costs and determine if this incentive is
cost-effective.

3.5 Conclusions
The findings from this study revealed that DMI has increased the provision of diabetesrelated services in patients diagnosed with diabetes. The estimated magnitude of effect of
DMI is an increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by
patient’s physician by at least 2 percentage points. Moreover, the effect of DMI on
having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician were similar across the
comorbidity subgroups. However, subgroup analyses by sex revealed the effect of DMI is
slightly larger in males than in females. Findings from this study are important since all
FPs are currently eligible to bill the DMI, and it may also have a positive effect on the
provision of diabetes-related services in the current population.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Physicians’ eligibility for the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI) as of
2006
Physician’s Eligibility Statusa
Eligible for DMI
Family physicians in the following PEMs
can bill the DMI for their enrolled
patients:

Ineligible for DMI
Fee-for-service (FFS) family physicians,
family physicians not in the ‘Eligible for
DMI’ section (found on the left), and nonenrolled patients receiving care from
family physicians in PEMs.

Family Health Networks, Family Health
Groups, Family Health Organizations,
Comprehensive Care Models, Group
Health Centre, St. Joseph’s Health Centre,
Primary Care Networks, Health Service
Organizations, Rural and Northern
Physician Group Agreement, and South
Eastern Ontario Academic Medical
Organization
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; PEMs, Patient Enrolment Models.
a
However, as of April 1, 2009, the DMI is expanded to cover all family physicians
practicing in Ontario.
Source: (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2006)25
Hyperlink: http://www.anl.com/MOHGUIDE/00 Diabetes Management Incentive - April
2006.pdf
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Figure 3.1: Flow chart for the selection of study population
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Table 3.2: Number of patients in each study group in the balanced and unbalanced
panels for fiscal years 2002 to 2008
Fiscal
Year

Number of patients in the balanced
panela

Number of patients in the
unbalanced panelb

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

2002

15,559

156,892

15,559

162,643

2003

15,559

156,892

15,559

321,160

2004

15,559

156,892

15,559

361,036

2005

15,559

156,892

15,559

412,363

2006

15,559

156,892

15,559

464,958

2007

15,559

156,892

15,559

464,958

2008

15,559

156,892

15,559

464,958

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive.
a
The sum of the number of patients from both study groups and for all fiscal years
combined results in the total number of patient-year observations for the balanced panel
(i.e. 1,207,157 patient-year observations).
b
The sum of the number of patients from both study groups and for all fiscal years
combined results in the total number of patient-year observations for the unbalanced
panel (i.e. 2,760,989 patient-year observations).
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Table 3.3: Patient- and physician-level characteristics by study group before DMI was introduced
Variables

2002
Comparison
group

Patient characteristics
Number of
15,559
patients
Age, mean (SD)
60.22
(11.97)
Sex, n (%)
Male
8,229
(52.89%)
Female

7,330
(47.11%)
Rural residence, n (%)
No
15,553
(99.96%)
Yes
6
(0.04%)
Number of ADGs,
mean (SD)
4.92
(2.83)
Duration of diabetes (years),
mean (SD)
5.74
(3.55)

2003

2004

2005

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

156,892

15,559

156,892

15,559

156,892

15,559

156,892

59.24
(12.61)

61.22
(11.97)

60.24
(12.61)

62.22
(11.97)

61.24
(12.61)

63.22
(11.97)

62.24
(12.61)

80,847
(51.53%)

8,229
(52.89%)

80,847
(51.53%)

8,229
(52.89%)

80,847
(51.53%)

8,229
(52.89%)

80,847
(51.53%)

76,045
(48.47%)

7,330
(47.11%)

76,045
(48.47%)

7,330
(47.11%)

76,045
(48.47%)

7,330
(47.11%)

76,045
(48.47%)

156,416
(99.70%)
476
(0.30%)

15,529
(99.81%)
30
(0.19%)

155,803
(99.31%)
1,089
(0.69%)

15,514
(99.71%)
45
(0.29%)

155,434
(99.07%)
1,458
(0.93%)

15,500
(99.62%)
59
(0.38%)

155,109
(98.86%)
1,783
(1.14%)

4.79
(2.85)

4.93
(2.85)

4.84
(2.89)

5.11
(2.90)

4.97
(2.97)

5.14
(2.95)

5.06
(3.02)

5.62
(3.58)

6.74
(3.55)

6.62
(3.58)

7.74
(3.55)

7.62
(3.58)

8.74
(3.55)

8.62
(3.58)

Material deprivation quintiles, n (%)
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Q1
(least deprived)
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
(most deprived)

2,320
(14.91%)
3,235
(20.79%)
3,490
(22.43%)
3,399
(21.85%)
3,115
(20.02%)

Income quintiles, n (%)
Q1
3,385
(lowest income)
(21.76%)
Q2
3,753
(24.12%)
Q3
3,486
(22.41%)
Q4
2,773
(17.82%)
Q5
2,162
(highest income)
(13.90%)
DMI and DMA fee code billings
Patients with DMI billeda,
n (%)
-

29,616
(18.88%)
34,255
(21.83%)
34,055
(21.71%)
30,864
(19.67%)
28,102
(17.91%)

2,405
(15.46%)
3,235
(20.79%)
3,509
(22.55%)
3,327
(21.38%)
3,083
(19.81%)

30,779
(19.62%)
34,085
(21.73%)
34,056
(21.71%)
30,266
(19.29%)
27,706
(17.66%)

2,531
(16.27%)
3,256
(20.93%)
3,445
(22.14%)
3,286
(21.12%)
3,041
(19.54%)

31,735
(20.23%)
34,196
(21.80%)
33,848
(21.57%)
29,840
(19.02%)
27,273
(17.38%)

2,592
(16.66%)
3,293
(21.16%)
3,434
(22.07%)
3,232
(20.77%)
3,008
(19.33%)

32,515
(20.72%)
34,333
(21.88%)
33,717
(21.49%)
29,486
(18.79%)
26,841
(17.11%)

30,132
(19.21%)
36,052
(22.98%)
33,419
(21.30%)
29,989
(19.11%)
27,300
(17.40%)

3,574
(22.97%)
3,943
(25.34%)
3,115
(20.02%)
2,742
(17.62%)
2,185
(14.04%)

32,592
(20.77%)
36,844
(23.48%)
31,719
(20.22%)
28,947
(18.45%)
26,790
(17.08%)

3,531
(22.69%)
3,887
(24.98%)
3,163
(20.33%)
2,776
(17.84%)
2,202
(14.15%)

32,316
(20.60%)
36,493
(23.26%)
31,877
(20.32%)
29,370
(18.72%)
26,836
(17.10%)

3,480
(22.37%)
3,883
(24.96%)
3,198
(20.55%)
2,796
(17.97%)
2,202
(14.15%)

32,024
(20.41%)
36,315
(23.15%)
32,108
(20.47%)
29,606
(18.87%)
26,839
(17.11%)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

15,478
(99.48%)
81
(0.52%)

155,414
(99.06%)
1,478
(0.94%)

15,479
(99.49%)
80
(0.51%)

154,792
(98.66%)
2,100
(1.34%)

15,476
(99.47%)
83
(0.53%)

154,211
(98.29%)
2,681
(1.71%)

Patients with DMA billed, n (%)
15,499
155,910
<3
(99.61%)
(99.37%)
60
982
≥3
(0.39%)
(0.63%)
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DMA fee codes billed,
mean (SD)
0.04
(0.27)
Physician characteristicsb
Number of
1,191
physiciansc
Age, mean (SD)
53.56
(12.15)
Sex, n (%)
Male
898
(75.40%)
Female
293
(24.60%)
Years since graduation,
mean (SD)
26.12
(12.24)
IMGs, n (%)

301
(25.27%)

0.07
(0.36)

0.04
(0.30)

0.09
(0.43)

0.05
(0.31)

0.11
(0.49)

0.05
(0.31)

0.14
(0.55)

6,525

1,088

6,408

1,012

6,315

875

5,783

49.61
(10.95)

54.17
(12.09)

50.04
(10.85)

54.82
(11.93)

50.56
(10.67)

55.83
(12.03)

51.06
(10.43)

4,343
(66.56%)
2,182
(33.44%)

817
(75.09%)
271
(24.91%)

4,235
(66.09%)
2,173
(33.91%)

750
(74.11%)
262
(25.89%)

4,166
(65.97%)
2,149
(34.03%)

640
(73.14%)
235
(25.86%)

3,774
(65.26%)
2,009
(34.74%)

22.18
(11.13)

26.76
(12.16)

22.61
(11.07)

27.47
(12.07)

23.11
(10.93)

28.44
(12.22)

23.64
(10.73)

948
(14.53%)

287
(26.38%)

946
(14.76%)

274
(27.08%)

998
(15.80%)

241
(27.54%)

960
(16.60%)

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; SD, standard deviation; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; DMA, Diabetic Management
Assessment; IMGs, International Medical Graduates.
a
DMI was introduced on April 1, 2006.
b
Physician-level characteristics for physicians who provided care to patients in the comparison group versus DMI group.
c
Based on the DMI group definition used in this study, some of the patients in the DMI group had a family physician practicing
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) prior to 2006. Therefore, some of the FFS physicians who provided care to patients in the comparison
group were the same physicians who provided care to some of the patients in the DMI group in the above fiscal years. Therefore, there
is some overlap in the number of physicians who provided care in each study group.
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Table 3.4: Patient- and physician-level characteristics by study group after DMI was introduced
Variables

Patient characteristics
Number of patients
Age, mean (SD)
Sex, n (%)
Male
Female
Rural residence, n
(%)
No
Yes
Number of ADGs,
mean (SD)

2006

2007

2008

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

15,559

156,892

15,559

156,892

15,559

156,892

64.22
(11.97)

63.24
(12.61)

65.22
(11.97)

64.24
(12.61)

66.22
(11.97)

65.24
(12.61)

8,229
(52.89%)
7,330
(47.11%)

80,847
(51.53%)
76,045
(48.47%)

8,229
(52.89%)
7,330
(47.11%)

80,847
(51.53%)
76,045
(48.47%)

8,229
(52.89%)
7,330
(47.11%)

80,847
(51.53%)
76,045
(48.47%)

15,486
(99.53%)
73
(0.47%)

154,788
(98.66%)
2,104
(1.34%)

15,467
(99.41%)
92
(0.59%)

154,536
(98.50%)
2,356
(1.50%)

15,444
(99.26%)
115
(0.74%)

154,332
(98.37%)
2,560
(1.63%)

5.18
(3.00)

5.10
(3.04)

5.25
(3.03)

5.14
(3.09)

5.37
(3.15)

5.27
(3.20)

9.62
(3.58)

10.74
(3.55)

10.62
(3.58)

11.74
(3.55)

11.62
(3.58)

33,290
(21.22%)

2,776
(17.84%)

33,863
(21.58%)

2,824
(18.15%)

34,313
(21.87%)

Duration of diabetes (years),
mean (SD)
9.74
(3.55)
Material deprivation quintiles, n (%)
Q1 (least deprived)
2,686
(17.26%)
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Q2

3,279
(21.07%)
3,414
(21.94%)
3,206
(20.61%)
2,974
(19.11%)

34,530
(22.01%)
33,469
(21.33%)
29,207
(18.62%)
26,396
(16.82%)

3,243
(20.84%)
3,429
(22.04%)
3,175
(20.41%)
2,936
(18.87%)

34,562
(22.03%)
33,274
(21.21%)
29,020
(18.50%)
26,173
(16.68%)

3,294
(21.17%)
3,364
(21.62%)
3,175
(20.41%)
2,902
(18.65%)

34,633
(22.07%)
33,160
(21.14%)
28.844
(18.38%)
25,942
(16.53%)

3,450
(22.17%)
Q2
3,854
(24.77%)
Q3
3,211
(20.64%)
Q4
2,833
(18.21%)
Q5 (highest income)
2,211
(14.21%)
DMI and DMA fee code billings
Patients with DMI billed,
n (%)
0
(0%)

31,784
(20.26%)
35,982
(22.93%)
32,314
(20.60%)
29,847
(19.02%)
26,965
(17.19%)

3,438
(22.10%)
3,825
(24.58%)
3,235
(20.79%)
2,846
(18.29%)
2,215
(14.24%)

31,703
(20.21%)
35,722
(22.77%)
32,380
(20.64%)
30,145
(19.21%)
26,942
(17.17%)

3,431
(22.05%)
3,782
(24.31%)
3,263
(20.97%)
2,872
(18.46%)
2,211
(14.21%)

31,641
(20.17%)
35,431
(22.58%)
32,543
(20.74%)
30,317
(19.32%)
26,960
(17.18%)

34,381
(21.91%)

0
(0%)

37,574
(23.95%)

0
(0%)

43,032
(27.43%)

150,660
(96.03%)
6,232
(3.97%)

15,436
(99.21%)
123
(0.79%)

147,969
(94.31%)
8,923
(5.69%)

15,280
(98.21%)
279
(1.79%)

144,576
(92.15%)
12,316
(7.85%)

Q3
Q4
Q5 (most deprived)
Income quintiles, n (%)
Q1 (lowest income)

Patients with DMA billed, n (%)
15,486
<3
(99.53%)
73
≥3
(0.47%)
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DMA fee codes billed,
mean (SD)
Physician characteristicsa
Number of physicians
Age, mean (SD)
Sex, n (%)
Male
Female
Years since graduation,
mean (SD)
IMGs, n (%)

0.05
(0.32)

0.34
(0.79)

0.08
(0.40)

0.42
(0.90)

0.11
(0.51)

0.52
(1.01)

835
56.54
(12.01)

4,800
51.16
(10.07)

802
56.88
(12.14)

5,238
51.20
(10.34)

797
57.11
(12.24)

5,600
51.48
(10.50)

609
(72.93%)
226
(27.07%)

3,044
(63.42%)
1,756
(36.58%)

584
(72.82%)
218
(27.18%)

3,279
(62.60%)
1,959
(37.40%)

574
(72.02%)
223
(27.98%)

3,465
(61.88%)
2,135
(38.12%)

29.18
(12.26)
228
(27.31%)

23.75
(10.41)
735
(15.31%)

29.52
(12.48)
212
(26.43%)

23.76
(10.71)
878
(16.76%)

29.79
(12.53)
225
(28.23%)

24.01
(10.90)
1,013
(18.09%)

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; SD, standard deviation; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; DMA, Diabetic Management
Assessment; IMGs, International Medical Graduates.
a
Physician-level characteristics for physicians who provided care to patients in the comparison group versus DMI group.
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Figure 3.2: a) Average number of DMA fee codes billed for patients by patient’s physician; b) Proportion of patients with
three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician per year
Both graphs show the trends in the DMA fee code billings from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 by study group. The arrow on the graphs
point the period when DMI was introduced.
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Table 3.5: Estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed
by patient’s physician
Variables

DMI
Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)
DMI*Period
(DID Effect)
" (time trend)

Model 1:
DID
Unadjusted
Pooled OLS

Model 2:
DID Adjusted
Pooled OLS

Model 3:
Fixed-Effects
DID

!
(95% CI)
0.007***
(0.006, 0.007)
-0.021***
(-0.023,
-0.020)

!
(95% CI)
0.002***
(0.002, 0.003)
-0.020***
(-0.022,
-0.019)

!
(95% CI)

Model 4:
Highdimensional
Fixed-Effects
DID
!
(95% CI)

-0.016***
(-0.017,
-0.014)

-0.011***
(-0.016,
-0.006)

0.042***
(0.040, 0.043)

0.040***
(0.039, 0.042)

0.040***
(0.039, 0.042)

0.021***
(0.015, 0.026)

0.008***
(0.007, 0.008)

0.008***
(0.007, 0.008)

-2.805***
(-3.197,
-2.413)

Patient characteristics
Age
Age-squared
Female
(Ref: Male)
Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)
Number of
ADGs
Duration of
diabetes (years)

0.002***
(0.001, 0.002)
-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
-0.003***
(-0.004,
-0.002)
0.003
(-0.002, 0.007)

0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

0.002***
(0.002, 0.002)

-0.003
(-0.009, 0.002)

-0.001
(-0.008, 0.006)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)

0.000**
(0.000, 0.000)

2.799***
(2.407, 3.191)

0.332
(-0.593, 1.257)

0.002**
(0.000, 0.003)

0.003***
(0.001, 0.005)

-0.000
(-0.003, 0.002)

Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))
Q2
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Q3
Q4
Q5
(most deprived)
Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
(highest income)
Physician characteristics
Age
Age-squared
Female
(Ref: Male)
IMG status
(Ref: CMG)
Constant

-15.237***
(-15.710,
-14.764)
0.021
172,451

0.001
(-0.000, 0.003)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)

0.003***
(0.001, 0.006)
0.007***
(0.005, 0.009)
0.008***
(0.005, 0.011)

-0.002
(-0.004, 0.001)
0.000
(-0.003, 0.004)
-0.000
(-0.004, 0.003)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.002)
-0.000
(-0.002, 0.001)
-0.002**
(-0.004,
-0.000)
-0.002**
(-0.004,
-0.001)

0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.006)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.006)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.003)
0.001
(-0.002, 0.003)
-0.000
(-0.003, 0.002)

0.005***
(0.003, 0.008)

-0.001
(-0.003, 0.002)

0.000**
(0.000, 0.001)
-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
0.002***
(0.001, 0.003)

0.004***
(0.004, 0.005)
-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
0.004***
(0.002, 0.007)

0.000
(-0.001, 0.001)
-0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

-0.007***
(-0.008,
-0.006)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.004)

0.002
(-0.003, 0.007)

-15.185***
(-15.718,
-14.652)
0.026
172,451

150.173***
(129.136,
171.210)
0.029
172,451

0.001
(-0.003, 0.004)

R-squared
0.528
Number of
172,451
patients
Observations
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; DID,
Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval;
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical
Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician in the two subgroups
Outcome Variable

Model 1:
DID Unadjusted Pooled
OLS
!"
(95% CI)

Model 2:
DID Adjusted Pooled
OLSa
!"
(95% CI)

Model 3:
Fixed-Effects DIDa
!"
(95% CI)

Model 4:
High-dimensional
Fixed-Effects DIDa
!"
(95% CI)

Subgroup Analysis #1: Comorbidity
(Comparing patients with below versus at or above median number of ADGs at baseline)

Three or more DMA
fee codes billed

< 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.043***
(0.041,
0.046)

≥ 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.041***
(0.039,
0.042)

< 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.042***
(0.040,
0.044)

≥ 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.039***
(0.038,
0.041)

< 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.041***
(0.039,
0.044)

≥ 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.040***
(0.038,
0.041)

< 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.022***
(0.014,
0.030)

≥ 4 ADGs
at baseline
0.020***
(0.015,
0.025)

Males

Females

Males

Females

Males

Females

Males

Females

0.045***
(0.043,
0.047)

0.038***
(0.036,
0.040)

0.044***
(0.042,
0.045)

0.037***
(0.035,
0.039)

0.043***
(0.041,
0.045)

0.037***
(0.036,
0.039)

0.023***
(0.017,
0.029)

0.018***
(0.012,
0.024)

Subgroup Analysis #2: Sex
(Comparing males versus females)
Three or more DMA
fee codes billed

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least
squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups.
a
Models 2-4 controlled for patient characteristics (age, age-squared, sex, rural residence, number of Aggregated Diagnosis Groups,
duration of diabetes, material deprivation quintiles, neighborhood income quintiles), and physician characteristics (age, age-squared,
sex, International Medical Graduate status).
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
*** p<0.01
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Note: Each of the two subgroup analyses were performed separately using Models 1-4 each. Full regression results are available upon
request.
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Appendices
Appendix A3.1: Information on the DMI and DMA
Table 3.7: Additional information on the Diabetes Management Incentive (DMI)
and Diabetic Management Assessment (DMA) fee code
Diabetes
care
Billing
Codes
DMI
(Q040)

Additional Notes

•

‘Payable to FPs providing ongoing management to a diabetic patient in
consistent with the Clinical Practice Guidelines set by Diabetes Canada
• FPs must provide documentation that tracks the following at minimum:
a. HbA1C, cholesterol, lipids, body mass index, weight, blood
pressure, and medication dosage
b. Discussion and preventive measures must be offered that includes
vascular protection, influenza and pneumococcal vaccination
c. Patient self-management support and health promotion
counselling
d. Albumin to creatinine ratio
e. Discussion and offer referral for dilated eye examinations
f. Foot and neurologic examinations
• A flow sheet or any other documentation that records all the required
elements from the most current Diabetes Canada’s Clinical Practice
Guidelines that were provided to the patient during the previous 12
months must be kept in the patient’s medical record’27
DMA
• ‘All-inclusive service paid to the most responsible physician for
(K030)
providing continuous diabetes management to the diabetic patient
• Service includes: an intermediate assessment, level 2 paediatric
assessment, or a partial assessment that focuses on the diabetic target
organ systems, counselling, and a diabetic flow sheet must be kept in
the patient’s medical record
• Flow sheet must track the following:
• HbA1C, lipids, cholesterol, urinalysis, medication dosage, blood
pressure, fundal examination, weight, body mass index, and
peripheral vascular examination
• If the above record is not kept or if the DMA is provided to the patient
the same day as any other consultation or visit by the same physician,
the DMA will be paid at no cost to the physician’27
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; FPs,
family physicians; HbA1C, glycated hemoglobin.
Source: (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2015)27
Hyperlink:http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/ohip/sob/physserv/sob_master2
0181115.pdf
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Figure 3.3: Sample diabetes patient care flow sheet from April 2006
Source: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care: Diabetes Management Incentive.25
Hyperlink: http://www.anl.com/MOHGUIDE/00 Diabetes Management Incentive - April
2006.pdf
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Appendix A3.2: DMA Fee Code Billings Compared at Baseline and Final Year
Table 3.8: DMA fee code billings compared between comparison and DMI group at baseline and final fiscal year
Variables

Patients with DMA fee codes billed, n (%)
<3
≥3
Average number of DMA fee codes billed,
mean (SD)

Comparison
group
(n = 15,559)

2002
DMI
group
(n = 156,892)

15,499
(99.61%)
60
(0.39%)

155,910
(99.37%)
982
(0.63%)

0.04 (0.27)

0.07 (0.36)

p-value

<0.001

<0.001

Comparison
group
(n = 15,559)

2008
DMI
group
(n = 156,892)

15,280
(98.21%)
279
(1.79%)

144,576
(92.15%)
12,316
(7.85%)

0.11 (0.51)

0.52 (1.01)

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; SD, standard deviation.

p-value

<0.001

<0.001
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Appendix A3.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model
Table 3.9: The estimated impact of DMI on having three or more DMA fee codes
billed by patient’s physician compared between the Linear Probability Model (LPM)
versus a Logit model
Variables

DMI
Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)
DMI*Period
(DID Effect)
" (time trend)

Model 1:
DID
Unadjusted
Pooled OLS
(LPM)

DID
Unadjusted
Pooled Logit
Model

Model 2:
DID Adjusted
Pooled OLS
(LPM)

DID Adjusted
Pooled Logit
Model

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.024***
(0.024, 0.025)
0.016***
(0.015,
0.017)

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.024***
(0.024, 0.025)
0.012***
(0.011, 0.013)

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.020***
(0.019, 0.021)
0.016***
(0.015, 0.017)

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.023***
(0.022, 0.024)
0.011***
(0.010, 0.012)

0.042***
(0.040, 0.043)

0.042***
(0.040, 0.043)

0.040***
(0.039, 0.042)

0.040***
(0.038, 0.041)

0.008***
(0.007, 0.008)

0.010***
(0.009, 0.010)

0.008***
(0.007, 0.008)

0.010***
(0.009, 0.010)

0.002***
(0.001, 0.002)
-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
-0.003***
(-0.004,
-0.002)

0.004***
(0.004, 0.005)
-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
-0.003***
(-0.004,
-0.002)

0.003
(-0.002, 0.007)

0.002
(-0.002, 0.005)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)

Patient Characteristics
Age
Age-squared
Female
(Ref: Male)
Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)
Number of
ADGs
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Duration of
diabetes (years)

0.000**
(0.000, 0.000)

0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

Q2

0.002**
(0.000, 0.003)

0.001*
(-0.000, 0.003)

Q3

0.001
(-0.000, 0.003)
0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.002)
0.003***
(0.001, 0.004)

0.003***
(0.002, 0.005)

0.003***
(0.001, 0.005)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.002)
-0.000
(-0.002, 0.001)
-0.002**
(-0.004,
-0.000)
-0.002**
(-0.004,
-0.001)

0.001
(-0.001, 0.002)
-0.000
(-0.002, 0.001)
-0.002***
(-0.004,
-0.001)
-0.003***
(-0.004,
-0.001)

0.000**
(0.000, 0.001)

0.002***
(0.001, 0.002)

-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
0.002***
(0.001, 0.003)
-0.007***
(-0.008,
-0.006)

-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
0.002***
(0.000, 0.003)
-0.008***
(-0.009,
-0.007)

Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))

Q4
Q5
(most deprived)
Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
(highest income)
Physician Characteristics
Age
Age-squared
Female
(Ref: Male)
IMG status
(Ref: CMG)

Number of
172,451
172,451
172,451
172,451
patients
Observations
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DMA, Diabetic Management Assessment; DID,
Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; LPM, Linear Probability Model;
95% CI, 95% confidence interval; Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups;
IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
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a

Average marginal effect indicates the effect of the variable on the probability of having
three or more DMA fee codes billed by the patient’s physician. The estimated coefficient
(#) in the LPM can be directly interpreted as the average marginal effect, however, this
cannot be done for the logit model. For the logit model, the average marginal effect is
calculated by first determining the derivative of the equation for the logistic regression
with respect to a specific variable of interest.57,60 Following this, the observed values in the
data were used to calculate the average marginal effect. The average marginal effect was
calculated using the margins command in Stata 15.1.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 4

4

The Impact of the Diabetes Management Incentive on
Hospitalizations and Mortality Risk in Ontario

4.1 Introduction
Diabetes is one of the most common chronic disease in the world, and was estimated to
be the seventh leading cause of death in 2016.1 In 2017, more than 2.2 million Canadians
aged 12 and older were living with diabetes.2 From this population, 965,100 individuals
were from the province of Ontario.2 The estimated direct cost of diabetes to the
healthcare system in Ontario was $1.5 billion in 2018,3 and hospitalizations account for a
large portion of this cost.4
Hospitalizations in patients with diabetes are often due to diabetes-related short-term and
long-term complications. Patients with diabetes develop a number of short-term
complications such as hypoglycemia, and complications caused from severe
hyperglycemia such as diabetic ketoacidosis and hyperosmolar hyperglycemic state.5–8
Over time, patients with diabetes develop micro- and macrovascular complications which
are complications due to damages in the small and large blood vessels respectively.7
Some of the long-term complications include retinopathy, nephropathy, neuropathy, and
circulatory complications.5,8,9 It is no wonder that patients with diabetes are more likely
to be hospitalized. In 2008/09, compared to those without diabetes, diabetic individuals
were three times more likely to be hospitalized for cardiovascular disease, 12 times more
likely to be hospitalized for an end-stage renal disease, and 20 times more likely to be
hospitalized for non-traumatic lower limb amputation.3,7 Diabetes complications do not
only lead to hospitalizations, but can also be linked with premature death.3,10
Although there is currently no cure to diabetes, effectively monitoring and managing the
disease can reduce the incidence of diabetes-related complications. Specifically, effective
diabetes management at primary care settings can reduce the risk of hospitalizations, thus
diabetes is an ambulatory care sensitive condition (ACSC).5,6,11–15 Patients who have
access to a family physician (FP) providing sufficient care will order necessary tests, and
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help patients control and manage their disease by targeting modifiable risk factors, thus,
reducing the risk of hospitalizations for acute and long-term complications.6,11,13,16,17
Effective diabetes management can also reduce the risk of hospitalization costs, and
mortality from several causes such as chronic kidney disease, stroke, and ischaemic heart
disease.16,18
In an effort to improve access to primary care and place more emphasis on chronic
disease management, Ontario introduced a primary care reform in the early 2000s. The
Ontario government developed a number of new primary care organizational and funding
models (i.e. Patient Enrolment Models (PEMs)) which physicians and patients can
voluntarily enroll in.19 Prior to the reform, FPs were paid through a fee-for-service (FFS)
basis.20 However, physicians who were practicing in the new models were reimbursed
through various blends of payments including fee-for-service, capitation (fixed payment
per patient per annum), salary, and pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives for preventive
care services and chronic disease management such as diabetes.19,21
P4P incentives are monetary rewards given to physicians in addition to their existing base
payment (i.e. FFS or capitation) for achieving specific performance targets such as
improving preventive and chronic care provided to patients.22,23 Some evidence suggests
that P4P incentives increase the services provided to diabetic patients (e.g. ordering tests
and prescribing medications), and improve intermediate outcomes (e.g. hemoglobin A1C
(HbA1C), cholesterol, blood pressure, and serum creatinine levels).24 Overtime,
improvements in the patient’s health, and reduction in hospitalization costs are
expected.11,12,25
Several countries have introduced P4P incentives to improve diabetes management at
primary care such as the United Kingdom (UK), Taiwan, Italy, and Canada.6,11,12,22,25
However, the literature on the effect of these incentives on hospitalizations and mortality
have been mixed. In England, a longitudinal study found that after the introduction of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) P4P scheme, the admission rate for ACSCs
including diabetes incentivized under this program, was lower than the rate for nonincentivized ACSCs and non-ACSCs.23 In Taiwan, two studies found that patients with
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diabetes in the Taiwan’s P4P program for diabetes had fewer hospitalizations compared
to those who were not enrolled in the program.25,26 In Hawaii, Chen et al. (2010)27 found
diabetic patients who saw a P4P-participating physician for three years consecutively
were less likely to be hospitalized compared to those who visited a non-P4P participating
physician. In Italy, Fiorentini et al. (2011)15 found P4P and Pay-for-Compliance (P4C)
incentives decreased the probability of avoidable hospitalizations for several diseases,
including diabetes in the patient population. In contrast, the Pay-for-Participation (P4Pa)
incentive had a statistically significant negative effect only when assessed in the type 2
diabetic patient subpopulation.15
A few studies found that P4P incentives for diabetes care have no effect on diabetesrelated hospitalizations. For instance, Bottle et al. (2008)28 found a nonsignificant
association between the QOF points for diabetes care and diabetes admissions in patients
under the age of 60. In the QOF, family practises earned points for patients who attained
the targets for clinical indicators.23 Bruni et al. (2009)6 found the P4C in Italy did not
have a significant effect on hyperglycemic emergency admissions in patients with type 2
diabetes. One study conducted in Canada observed that the policy change at primary care
in British Columbia (BC) in 2003 (i.e. introduced financial incentives for disease
management such as diabetes to FPs) had no significant effect on the diabetes-related
hospitalization rate.11 In contrast, one study in Taiwan found an increase in emergency
visits for diabetic hypoglycemia.29
To date, very limited literature exists on the relationship between financial incentives for
diabetes care and hospitalization costs. A study from Taiwan found that diabetic patients
in the P4P program had lower expenses for inpatient services (i.e. diabetes-related
hospitalizations) compared to those not enrolled in the program.25 Cheng et al. (2012)26
also observed similar findings for patients enrolled in the P4P program in Taiwan
consecutively for five years compared to their comparison group. Two other studies
briefly mentioned the estimated reduction in hospitalization costs that came with the
decrease in hospitalizations after QOF was introduced in UK.12,23 In contrast, one study
that examined the relationship between the quality of disease management after QOF was
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introduced, and total hospital costs for ten chronic diseases (including diabetes), found a
significant reduction in hospital costs for stroke care only.13
The literature on the effect of financial incentives for diabetes care on mortality also
produced conflicting results. Fleetcroft et al. (2010)30 estimated the potential mortality
reduction associated with the QOF P4P scheme (2004 and 2006 versions) in England.
Findings from the study revealed potential mortality reduction was seen over one year
with the 2004 version, however, no additional mortality reduction was seen with the 2006
contract. Moreover, diabetes was one of the diseases with the largest estimated mortality
reduction.30 Likewise, Lin et al. (2016)31 found that the risk of all-cause mortality was
lower in type 2 diabetic patients who were part of the P4P program in Taiwan compared
to those who were not. Conversely, two longitudinal studies that assessed the QOF
scheme found no statistical significant effect on mortality.16,17 This is contrast to
Fleetcroft et al. (2010),30 which was a cross-sectional study.
Overall, the relationship between P4P incentives for diabetes care on patient outcomes
(i.e. hospitalizations, mortality), and hospitalization costs have been mixed. The reasons
behind these mixed findings are due to the differences in the institutional setting of the
study, the design of the study, and the context of the P4P incentive.23,31 Additionally,
certain limitations from some of the existing studies such as the use of an ecological
study design, not controlling for potential confounders, and the lack of a control group
may also explain the inconsistent findings.
In Ontario, the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) introduced a P4P
incentive for diabetes management to FPs on April 1, 2006 called the Diabetes
Management Incentive (DMI).22,32–34 This incentive is a $60 annual payment per patient
provided to FPs for delivering ongoing management of diabetes to patients, and tracking
the required elements for diabetes care in accordance with the Clinical Practice
Guidelines set by Diabetes Canada (Appendix A3.1).22,32–34 To claim the DMI, the FP
must bill the Q040 code for their patient once per 12-month period.32,33,35 When DMI was
first introduced, only FPs practicing in specific PEMs were eligible to bill for their
enrolled patients (see Table 3.1 for the specific PEMs). DMI was ineligible to FPs
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practicing in the traditional FFS, FPs not practicing in the specific PEMs eligible for
DMI, and non-enrolled patients (i.e. patients not enrolled to FPs practicing in PEMs).
However, as of April 1, 2009 all FPs are eligible to bill the DMI, and regardless of the
patient’s enrollment status.22,33
As of now, it is unknown if the introduction of DMI is associated with a reduction in
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in Ontario. Moreover, findings
from existing literature cannot be applied to the DMI context due to the inconsistent
results, study limitations, and the differences in the P4P incentives’ design. Therefore, the
objective of this study is to assess the impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations,
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in patients diagnosed with diabetes in Ontario.
This will be examined comparing patients enrolled to FPs practicing in PEMs eligible for
DMI to patients affiliated with a FP practicing in the traditional FFS.

4.2 Methods
4.2.1

Data Sources

Data for this study were obtained from multiple healthcare administrative databases
housed at ICES. These datasets were linked using unique encoded identifiers and
analyzed at ICES. Overall, this data was a longitudinal population-based data that
extended from fiscal years (April 1st to March 31st of the following year) 2002 to 2008.
The Ontario Diabetes Dataset (ODD) was used to identify adult patients (19 years and
older) diagnosed with diabetes, and it contains those diagnosed from April 1, 1991 and
onwards.5,36 The ODD identified an adult diabetic patient if within two years they had at
least two Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) claims with a diabetes diagnosis, one
diabetes-related hospital admission, or one OHIP fee code: Q040 (DMI), K029 (Insulin
Therapy Support), K030 (Diabetic Management Assessment [DMA]), K045 (Diabetes
management by a specialist), and K046 (Diabetes team management) claim.5,36
Individuals with gestational diabetes are not included in the ODD, and this database does
not distinguish between type 1 and type 2 diabetes.37 Although, the majority of the
individuals included would be expected to have type 2 diabetes.37 The ODD provides
information regarding the patient’s diagnosis such as the age or date they were first
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diagnosed. The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) Discharge Abstract
Database (DAD) was used to obtain information on inpatient hospitalizations. The CIHIDAD provided patient demographic, administrative, and clinical information for hospital
discharges in Ontario.5,38 Additionally, the intensity of resources consumed by the patient
during their stay at the hospital can be determined using CIHI-DAD.38,39
The Registered Persons Database (RPDB) was used to obtain demographic information
such as age, and sex for those eligible for the Ontario’s healthcare coverage (OHIP).5,36,40
The RPDB and the Statistics Canada Postal Code Conversion File (PCCF) were used to
determine patient’s income (measured using neighbourhood income quintiles) at the
census dissemination area (DA) level, and rural residence.41 Individuals were considered
to be in rural and small town if they were in areas with an urban area population less than
10,000, and in rural areas.42 The Ontario Marginalization Index was used to determine
material deprivation, the inability for individuals and communities to access and attain
basic material needs.43–45 The Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (ADGs) from the Johns
Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) System Version 10.0 were used to measure
patient’s comorbidity.46 Each patient can have between zero and 32 ADGs47,48; and the
more ADGs they have the more comorbid they are.
Two databases, the Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables and Corporate
Provider Database (CPDB), were used to identify patients enrolled to FPs practicing in
PEMs, and identify the PEM they were enrolled to. A virtual roster method was used for
patients who were not formally enrolled to a FP from CAPE. This method linked the
patient to the FP who claimed the highest number of OHIP billings for 18 common
primary care fee codes during the previous two years.49,50 Information on the FP’s
eligibility were also obtained from the CPDB. The FP’s demographic information (i.e.
age, sex, International Medical Graduate (IMG) status, year they graduated from their
medical degree) were obtained from the ICES Physician Database (IPDB). Lastly, the
OHIP claims database provided details on the OHIP billings that were claimed for the
patient by their FPs in Ontario.
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4.2.2

Study Population

Adults diagnosed with diabetes at or between the ages 19 to 75 years from April 1st, 1991
to April 1st of each fiscal year from 2002 to 2008 were identified using the ODD. Patients
were excluded from the study if they had missing data for age, sex, or ICES key number
(IKN) for fiscal years 2002 to 2008, or died on or before April 1st, 2002. The IKN is an
unique encoded patient identifier. Patients were further excluded from the study if they
had missing data for any of the other patient- and physician-level characteristics used in
this study (listed in Section 4.2.3), or for the location of physician’s practice using Local
Health Integration Networks (LHINs). Patients were then classified into one of the two
study groups. Patients with FPs exposed to DMI for at least three years (2006 to 2008
fiscal years) were part of the DMI eligible group. The FPs must be in the ‘Eligible for
DMI’ section from Table 3.1. Conversely, patients affiliated with a FP practicing in the
traditional FFS throughout the study period were part of the DMI ineligible group (i.e.
patients’ FPs were never exposed to DMI during the study period). The DMI eligible and
DMI ineligible groups are labelled as the “DMI group” and “comparison group,”
respectively throughout the thesis. Patients who did not fit the criteria for either group
were excluded from the study. The above inclusion/exclusion criterions left the study
with 2,760,989 patient-year observations (DMI group: 2,652,076 observations;
comparison group: 108,913 observations). This dataset was an unbalanced panel which
implies that not all patients in the dataset had observations or data for all years in the
study.
A couple of issues with using an unbalanced panel data are: potential computation and
estimation issues,51 and potential efficiency loss with having missing data52 which affects
the validity of the study.53 Therefore, patients from the balanced panel (i.e. patients with
observations for every fiscal year from 2002 to 2008) were selected as the main study
population. The balanced panel has 1,207,157 patient-year observations. The unbalanced
panel data were still used to perform a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the
study findings. A flow chart depicting the process of how the study population was
selected is found on Figure 3.1, while Table 3.2 shows the number of patients in the DMI
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and comparison groups for each fiscal year for the main study population (i.e. balanced
panel) and unbalanced panel data.

4.2.3

Variables

The exposure variable of interest in this study was a dichotomous variable that indicated
whether the patient’s FP was eligible to bill the DMI during the fiscal years 2006 to 2008.
This variable took a value of 1 for patients in the DMI group and a value of 0 for those in
the comparison group. For the outcome variables of interest, there were three main types:
(1) hospitalizations for diabetes-related complications divided into two categories: (i)
short-term and (ii) long-term; (2) associated hospitalization costs for diabetes-related
complications that were: (i) short-term and (ii) long-term; and (3) Mortality Risk Score
(MRS). The hospitalization outcomes were measured by examining each fiscal year and
identifying whether or not the patient had at least one hospitalization for diabetes-related
short-term complications in that year, and also separately done for long-term
complications. This was denoted using two dichotomous variables; one for short-term
complications, and the other for long-term complications. In addition, there were two
other variables that measured the number of hospitalizations the patient had during each
year for each type respectively. Similar to Petrosyan et al. (2017)5, the diabetes-related
hospitalizations were identified by focusing on the most responsible diagnosis code
(using the 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases [ICD-10] codes) of
diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications as defined in the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s Healthcare Quality Indicator
(HCQI) Project.54–57 The hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications
included were those with a diagnosis of diabetic ketoacidosis, mixed ketoacidosis,
hyperglycemic hyperosmolar coma, or hypoglycemic or insulin coma.5,56,57 The diabetesrelated long-term complications included were circulatory complications, neurologic,
ophthalmic, renal, or multiple complications.5,56,57 Appendix A4.1 shows the specific
ICD-10 codes that coded these complications.
The hospitalization cost outcomes measured the associated costs for the patient’s
hospitalization(s) for diabetes-related (i) short-term complications, and (ii) long-term
complications for each fiscal year. Patients who were not hospitalized for diabetes-related
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short-term complications for that fiscal year took a value of zero for their cost outcome
for short-term complications; this was also similarly done for long-term complications.
Hospitalization costs were computed using the ICES costing macro, which calculated the
cost for each inpatient case by multiplying the resource intensity weight (RIW) with the
cost per weighted case (CPWC) (see Box 4.1).39 Each hospital inpatient has a RIW, the
amount of hospital resources used by that inpatient compared to an average inpatient
(RIW = 1.0000).39,58 To determine the RIW, patients are first assigned to a Case Mix
Group based on their clinical and resource utilization in the hospital, and then are
stratified into an age group under the Case Mix Group. A base RIW is already calculated
for each Case Mix Group age group, thus, for each case their RIW is adjusted based on
their comorbidity, length of stay, and interventions received. The CPWC is the unit cost
for acute inpatient hospitalizations, and is calculated by summing up the total hospital
costs for inpatient acute care in Ontario, and divided by the sum RIWs for all Ontario
cases (Box 4.1).39 All hospitalization costs were standardized to 2002 Canadian dollars.
The last outcome was the MRS which predicts patient’s risk of all-cause death within one
year. The MRS is a point-scoring system calculated for patients each fiscal year using
their age, sex, and 28 of the 32 ADG categories according to Austin & Walraven
(2011).48 To calculate the patient’s MRS, the following must be summed together:
patient’s age minus 20 years, the component for patient’s sex (i.e. if patient was a male
then they got a score of three), and the component scores for each of the ADGs the
patient had (see Box 4.2).48 The scores for each of the 28 ADGs, sex, and age used to
calculate MRS is presented in Austin & Walraven.48 The MRS ranges from negative to
positive scores, and the lower the score, the lower the patient’s risk of death is within one
year.
Variables for patient- and physician-level characteristics were also included. Patient-level
characteristics included were age, sex, rural residence, comorbidity (measured using the
number of ADGs), duration of diabetes (measured in years), income quintiles (ranged
from quintile 1 (Q1) = lowest income to quintile 5 (Q5) = highest income), and material
deprivation (ranged from Q1 = least deprived to Q5 = most deprived). The physician-
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level characteristics included were age, sex, years since graduation (measured their
experience), and IMG status (0 = Canadian Medical Graduate (CMG), and 1 = IMG).

4.2.4
4.2.4.1

Statistical Analysis
Main Analysis

Descriptive data were obtained to describe patient-level characteristics, DMI billings, and
outcome measures by study group for each fiscal year from 2002 to 2008. The continuous
variables were described using mean and standard deviations, while categorical variables
were expressed as frequencies and percentages. The number of hospitalizations for
diabetes-related short-term complications, and the associated cost outcome were focused
only in those who had been hospitalized for this complication at least once during the
study period. This was done to examine how the number of hospitalizations, and costs
changed over time in patients hospitalized for that complication. Furthermore, it ensures
us that the outcomes are focused on the same group of patients each year. A similar
approach was adopted for the number of hospitalizations, and associated cost for longterm complications. Outcome measures were compared between the DMI and
comparison group at baseline (2002) and final year (2008), using a chi-square test for the
dichotomous hospitalization variables, Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the number of
hospitalizations and hospitalization cost variables, and a t-test for MRS. This was
performed to detect if differences in the outcomes were present between the two study
groups at the beginning and end of the study period. Descriptive statistics were also
reported for physician-level characteristics of FPs of patients in the DMI group, and FPs
of patients in the comparison group.
This study used multivariable linear regression models with a difference-in-difference
(DID) approach to assess the relationship between DMI and each of the following
outcomes: diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated costs, and MRS. A natural-log
transformation was performed for the number of diabetes-related hospitalizations, and
associated costs. This transformation was applied to help alleviate the skewness found in
the residuals.59 Moreover, there was a large number of zero values for the number of
hospitalizations and cost outcomes, and the natural logarithm function of zero is
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undefined, thus, a value of one was added to all values for those variables prior to the
transformation to ensure no zero values were present.59 In addition, similar to the
descriptive statistics, analyses performed for the number of hospitalizations and cost
outcome for diabetes-related short-term complications were performed only in those
hospitalized at least once for this complication throughout the study. For the number of
hospitalizations, and the associated cost outcome for diabetes-related long-term
complications, a similar approach was used.
The DID approach computes the difference in the outcomes between the DMI and
comparison group, comparing before-and-after DMI was introduced.60,61 The regression
models used included a dichotomous variable that indicated if the patient was in the DMI
or comparison group, a pre-post binary variable that indicated if the observation was
from before DMI was introduced (2002 to 2005 fiscal years) or after DMI was introduced
(2006 to 2008 fiscal years), and a variable for the interaction between the previous two
dichotomous variables.60–62 The interaction variable presented the DID estimate (i.e. the
effect of DMI on the outcome). This model also included a variable for time trend. The
first model was the DID unadjusted pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model (Model
1). Patients in this study had repeated observations over time, thus, within-clustering of
patients was accounted for. In addition, it is essential to acknowledge that certain
observable patient- and physician-level characteristics such as age and sex can potentially
confound the study relationship. Therefore, this study assessed the effects of DMI on
each outcome controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics.6,13,15,17,31,63,64
All patient and physician characteristics mentioned in section 4.2.3, except for
physician’s years since graduation as it was correlated with physician’s age, were
included. Furthermore, both patient’s and physician’s age-squared variables were
included in this model. This model was the DID adjusted pooled OLS model (Model 2).
Although Model 2 accounted for observed heterogeneity, the concern of potential
individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity such as patient’s race or their preferences
can bias the effect of DMI on the outcomes.51,63 To reduce this bias, a DID model with
individual patient fixed-effects was used to control for any unobserved patient-specific
heterogeneity that were assumed to be time-invariant51,62 (Model 3). This model also
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controlled for patient- and physician-level characteristics, and accounted for withinclustering of patients. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that each patient has their
own specific time trend as their behaviours (i.e. medical compliance to treatments,
lifestyle modifications) can change over time. This should be accounted for to get closer
to the true effect of DMI. Therefore, a high-dimensional fixed-effects DID model
controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics, individual fixed-effects, and
the patient-specific time trend65 (Model 4) was used. This model also accounted for a
two-way clustering (i.e. within patients, and between physicians).
In the current study, the majority of the outcomes were treated as a continuous outcome,
however two of the hospitalization outcomes were binary outcomes. These two outcome
variables measured ‘whether or not the patient had at least one hospitalization’ for
diabetes-related short-term complications, and another for the diabetes-related long-term
complications in each fiscal year. Frequently, nonlinear probability models (i.e. logit,
probit models) are used to assess binary outcomes.66,67 However, a linear regression
model can also be used to assess these outcomes, and it is called the linear probability
model (LPM).66–68 In this study, a LPM was used to assess the effect of DMI on the
probability of being hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term, and long-term
complications. To show that the coefficients from the LPM are reliable, coefficients from
this model will be compared to the average marginal effects from a logit model69,70
performed for the diabetes-related short-term complication. Both quantities can be
compared as they present the average marginal effects, and the focus will be on the
interaction term (i.e. DID estimate). This comparison will be performed for Models 1 and
2 only as estimating a logit model with fixed-effects is difficult to estimate and a highdimensional fixed-effects logit model is not available.
The equations for the four multivariable linear regression models with the DID
methodology used in this study are indicated below:
$%& = #( + #* +,-% + #. /01234& + #5 +,-% ×/01234& + #7 8 + 9%&

(1)

$%& = #( + #* +,-% + #. /01234& + #5 +,-% ×/01234& + #7 8 + #: ;%& + 9%&

(2)
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$%& = #( + #* +,-% + #. /01234& + #5 +,-% ×/01234& + #7 8 + #: ;%& + <% + 9%&

(3)

$%& = #( + #* +,-% + #. /01234& + #5 +,-% ×/01234& + #: ;%& + <% + =%& + 9%&

(4)

Equations (1) to (4) specify Models 1 to 4 respectively. In the above four models, $%& is
the binary or continuous outcome variable (i.e. the probability of being hospitalized or
natural logarithm of the number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term or
long-term complications; natural logarithm of the hospitalization costs for diabetesrelated short-term or long-term complications; or MRS) for patient 2 in fiscal year >;
+,-% is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if patient 2 is in the DMI group and 0 if
patient 2 is in the comparison group; /01234& is a pre- and post- dichotomous variable
equal to 1 if the year of the observation is after DMI was introduced and 0 if it was
before; +,-% ×/01234& is the interaction variable which denotes the DID estimate; 8 is a
time trend; ;%& is the set of observable covariates (i.e. patient and physician-level
characteristics); <% is the unobserved individual patient fixed-effects; =%& is the highdimensional fixed-effects in which the patient interacts with their own time trend; and
9%& is the error term. All data analyses were performed using Stata 15.1 at the ICES
Western site.

4.2.4.2

Subgroup Analysis

Subgroup analyses were performed to examine if the impact of DMI on the study
outcomes differed among different subpopulations: 1) comorbidity (patients with below
versus at or above median number of ADGs at baseline), and 2) sex (males versus
females). Subgroup analyses were not performed for the number of hospitalizations and
cost outcomes due to the small sample size. Interactions were performed for the
respective subgroup if findings from that subgroup analysis revealed the effect of DMI on
the outcome to be statistically significant, with a large difference in the magnitude of
effect among the levels of that subgroup. Subgroup analysis by comorbidity was
performed as patients with comorbidities or multiple chronic conditions have more
complex health needs, and are likely to have poor outcomes.71–73 There is also a strong
correlation with greater number of comorbidities and increase in healthcare utilization
(e.g. FP care, hospital admissions), and it has also been linked with greater healthcare
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expenses.73,74 Some studies have also indicated that P4P incentive schemes may not
benefit patients with multiple chronic conditions as the specific-guidelines for these
incentives focus on specific diseases,75,76 or that these patients are likely to be excluded
from the P4P.77 Therefore, it is vital to assess if the impact of the DMI on the outcomes
differed based on patient’s comorbidity. Subgroup analysis by sex was also performed,
because female diabetic patients are less likely to attain the recommended targets for
diabetes, have medical compliance, have high-use of diabetes preventive care, and
receive monitoring and treatment for diabetes.78–80 In addition, they have a greater risk of
depression81–83 which is associated with increased healthcare utilization (i.e. hospital
inpatient stays, emergency department visits) and overall healthcare expenditure.83
Existing literature have found female diabetic patients to have higher hospitalization rates
compared to males,84,85 however, contrasting results have also been observed.86 The
literature have also found female diabetic patients to have a greater risk of mortality
compared to males.87 As a result, it would be worthwhile to investigate if the impact of
DMI on the study outcomes differed based on patient’s sex.

4.2.4.3

Sensitivity Analysis

A sensitivity analysis was performed to assess the robustness of the study findings. The
sensitivity analysis was performed in the unbalanced panel dataset (i.e. all patients, which
also includes those without observations for some of the years in the study) following the
main and subgroup analyses performed in the main study population (i.e. balanced
panel). This was performed to alleviate potential selection bias that was derived from
focusing only on patients who were in the balanced panel. Patients in the unbalanced
panel included those who were in the DMI group that entered the study after April 1,
2002 but on or prior to April 1, 2006, those in the DMI group without any data for some
of the fiscal years, and those in the balanced panel.

4.3 Results
4.3.1

Descriptive Results

The main study population consisted of 172,451 adult patients with diabetes from Ontario
(156,892 patients in the DMI group, and 15,559 patients in the comparison group). The
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characteristics for this patient population and for their FPs by study group are presented
in Table 3.3 for prior to the introduction of DMI, and Table 3.4 for after the introduction
of DMI. In contrast to the comparison group, patients in the DMI group were marginally
younger, had fewer years diagnosed with diabetes, and fewer number of ADGs.
Moreover, in the DMI group compared to the comparison group, there was a greater
proportion of female patients, and patients located in rural areas, in lower-deprived
quintiles, and higher income quintiles. As for the FPs, those who provided care to
patients in the DMI group were younger, less likely to be IMGs, and had fewer years of
experience. There was also a greater proportion of female FPs providing care to patients
in the DMI group versus the comparison group.
Once the DMI was introduced, the proportion of patients in the DMI group who had a
DMI billed increased from 21.91% in 2006 to 27.43% in 2008 (Table 3.4). The
descriptive statistics for the study outcomes by study group before and after DMI was
introduced are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Since the analysis for the
‘number of hospitalizations’ and ‘hospitalization costs’ were performed in a subset of the
main study population, Table 4.1 indicates the number of patients included in the analysis
for those outcomes. Analysis for all other study outcomes were performed using the
entire main study population, thus, to be more coherent, Table 4.1 will also display the
number of patients in each study group for the main study population. On average, the
proportion of patients hospitalized and the number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related
short-term and long-term complications were greater in the DMI group compared to the
comparison group. In 2008, 0.18% and 0.70% of the patients in the DMI group were
hospitalized for short-term and long-term complications respectively, while in the
comparison group it was 0.15% and 0.63%. However, there were no statistically
significant differences between the two study groups for almost all diabetes-related
hospitalization outcomes at baseline and final year of study (Appendix A4.2). A
statistical significant difference was only observed for the proportion of those
hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term complications at baseline, and it was
significant at the 10% level. In addition, in both study groups, a greater proportion of
patients were hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term than short-term complications.
The average hospitalization cost for diabetes-related short-term complications increased
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in the DMI group from $733.19 in 2002 to $1,959.91 in 2008, and was greater than the
average costs in the comparison group during fiscal years 2003 to 2008. The average
hospitalization cost for long-term complications increased in the DMI group from
$913.89 in 2002 to $3,923.89 in 2008. Increase in the hospitalization costs were also
found in the comparison group. The hospitalization costs were compared between the two
groups at baseline and final year of study, and no statistically significant differences were
detected (Appendix A4.2). The average MRS increased in both study groups throughout
the study, but was slightly lower in the DMI group than the comparison group. A
statistically significant difference was detected between the two groups for MRS at
baseline and final year (Appendix A4.2). Figures 4.1 to 4.3 presents the trends in the
diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS. These figures showed
that there were no significant changes between the two groups for the above outcomes
comparing before and after DMI was introduced.

4.3.2

Regression Results

The estimated impact of DMI on the hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term
complications (i.e. probability of being hospitalized, and the number of hospitalizations)
are presented in Table 4.4. Estimates from all four models indicate that DMI has no
statistically significant effect on the probability of being hospitalized
(Model 4: #5 = 0.000; 95% E3FG240FE0 2F>01HIJ K- − 0.001, 0.001), and on the
number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications
(Model 4: #5 = −0.005; 95% CI − 0.097, 0.086). Only results from Model 4 are
reported here since this model is the closest in estimating the true effect of DMI on the
outcomes. The average marginal effects of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized
for short-term complications from Models 1 and 2 were compared to equivalent logistic
regression models (Appendix A4.3). Both estimation methods presented similar
estimated marginal effects, thus, confirming that the estimates from the linear regression
models are reliable. As for the patient-level characteristics, patient’s age and sex
(females) had a negative effect on hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term
complications as of Model 2. Patient’s age was not identified in Models 3 and 4 as it was
correlated with the time trend variable, however, the quadratic term for age was present.
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This term was positive and statistically significant in Model 4 for the probability of being
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term complications only. In addition, the number
of ADGs increased the hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications. For
the physician-level characteristics, patients with female physicians were less likely to be
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term complications, however, there was no
statistically significant effect on the number of hospitalizations. All other patient- and
physician-level characteristics did not have a statistically significant effect in the final
model (Model 4).
The estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term
complications (i.e. probability of being hospitalized, and the number of hospitalizations)
are presented in Table 4.5. All four regression models revealed DMI to have no
statistically significant effect on the probability of being hospitalized
(Model 4: #5 = −0.000; 95% K- − 0.002, 0.001), and on the number of hospitalizations
(Model 4: #5 = −0.007; 95% K- − 0.056, 0.042) for diabetes-related long-term
complications. The patient-level characteristics revealed specific effects on the
hospitalization outcomes. Overall, the effect of patient’s age on hospitalizations for
diabetes-related long-term complications was inconsistent across models. Patient’s sex
(females) had a negative effect on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term
complications as of Model 2. In contrast, patients with greater number of ADGs had
increased hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term complications. The remaining
patient- and all physician-level characteristics did not have a statistically significant
effect in the final model.
Table 4.6 presents the impact of DMI on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related shortand long-term complications. Once again, in all four models the effect of DMI on
hospitalization costs was not statistically significant for diabetes-related short-term
(Model 4: #5 = −0.165; 95% K- − 1.193, 0.863), and long-term complications
(Model 4: #5 = −0.049; 95% K- − 0.616, 0.518). In addition, patient’s age had an
inconsistent effect on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short- and long-term
complications. Female patients (based on Model 2) displayed lower hospitalization costs,
while the number of ADGs increased the hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-
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and long-term complications in the final model. All other patient- and all physician-level
characteristics did not have a statistically significant effect in the final model.
Lastly, for the estimated impact of DMI on MRS (Table 4.7), findings from all four
models revealed that the effect of DMI on MRS was not statistically significant
(Model 4: #5 = 0.060; 95% K- − 0.103, 0.223). In addition, patient’s age (Model 2)
and its’ squared term (Models 2 to 4) had a positive effect on MRS. This implied that
patient’s age had a nonlinear relationship with MRS, and that the MRS increased at a
stronger rate as patients get older. Patients with increasing number of ADGs also had a
greater MRS. Conversely, a decreased MRS was found in female patients (based on
Model 2), patients with a longer duration of diabetes, patients in income quintiles 3
(statistically significant at 10% level) and 4 compared to the lowest income quintile, and
those in material deprivation quintiles 4 and 5 (Q5 was statistically significant at 10%
level) compared to the least deprived quintile. Furthermore, physician’s age had a
nonlinear relationship with the patient’s MRS. A reduced MRS was found in patients
whose physicians were IMGs. The remaining patient- and physician-level characteristics
did not have a statistically significant effect in the final model.

4.3.3

Results from the Subgroup Analysis

Findings from the two subgroup analyses are presented in Table 4.8. The two subgroup
analyses by comorbidity, and sex revealed that DMI had no statistically significant effect
on the probability of being hospitalized for diabetes-related short- and long-term
complications, and on the MRS in all subgroups.

4.3.4

Results from the Sensitivity Analysis

The sensitivity analysis was performed using the unbalanced panel dataset, and contained
480,517 adult patients with diabetes. Table 3.2 indicates the number of patients available
in each study group each year. Similar to the results from the main analysis, DMI had no
statistically significant effect on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs,
and MRS. Subgroup analyses were also conducted in these patients, and the results were
similar to the results from the subgroup analyses in the main study. It is important to note
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that there was a slight change in the comorbidity subgroup analysis performed in the
unbalanced panel. The patients here were compared using the exact same median number
of ADGs at baseline used in the main study. This was done, because: 1) to be consistent
with the main study, and 2) not all the patients in the unbalanced panel were present at
baseline (2002), therefore, the median number of ADGs at baseline could not be
determined in this cohort. The sensitivity analysis results are not presented in this
chapter, but are available upon request.

4.4 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to assess the impact of DMI, introduced in Ontario in
2006, on diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated hospitalization costs, and mortality
risk in patients with diabetes in Ontario. The descriptive results of this study revealed
that, although the proportion of patients hospitalized and the number of hospitalizations
for diabetes-related complications were greater in the DMI group compared to the
comparison group, there were no statistically significant differences between the two
groups for most hospitalization outcomes at baseline and final year. Additionally, more
patients were hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term compared to short-term
complications in both study groups. This finding was in contrast to Petrosyan et al.
(2017)5 as they found a higher incidence of hospitalizations for diabetes-related shortterm than long-term complications in Ontario adults with diabetes. Potential reasons for
the contrasting results are possibly due to the differences in the cohort selection, and the
difference in the study window as they observed the diabetes-related hospitalization
outcomes from 2009 to 2011. Findings from the current study also revealed that overall
there was an increase in the average hospitalization cost for diabetes-related
complications in both groups. Regarding the MRS, increase in the average MRS was
consistently observed in both groups throughout the study, however, the MRS was lower
in the DMI group.
Findings from the multivariable linear regression models with the DID approach revealed
that DMI had no effect on the probability of being hospitalized, number of
hospitalizations, or hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and long-term
complications, and on MRS. All four DID models revealed consistent findings for the
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above outcomes. Subgroup analyses performed in the two type of subgroups confirmed
that DMI had no effect on the study outcomes. Following this, a sensitivity analysis was
conducted assessing the impact of DMI on the above study outcomes using the
unbalanced panel dataset. This was done to assess the consistency of the study findings,
and since this patient cohort was much larger, therefore, testing the objectives in this
cohort can help improve the external validity of the study results. Results from this
analysis were consistent with the main study findings.
Overall, P4P incentives were introduced in several countries to improve care for chronic
conditions such as diabetes.12,23 The motivation for this type of incentive is potential
long-term benefits such as improvements in patient outcomes (i.e. hospitalizations,
mortality) and reduce hospital costs.6,11,12,16 However, findings from the current study
revealed that Ontario’s DMI did not reduce hospitalizations due to diabetes related shortterm and long-term complications, hospitalization costs, or mortality risk. There are
several potential reasons as to why this was observed. First, the low uptake of the DMI
could be a potential reason, as in 2008, only 27.43% of the patients in the DMI group had
a DMI billed. Second, based on Chapter 3 it was observed that the impact of DMI was an
increase in the probability of having three or more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s
physician in the neighbourhood of two percentage points. This is a very small impact on
the provision of diabetes-related services, and it is not large enough to translate to reduce
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk. Third, the study period was not
long enough to detect the long-term effect of the DMI on the chosen outcomes. This
study used three years of post-DMI data; and perhaps, more time is required in order to
see improvements in these outcomes. Fourth, there may be other factors outside of the
primary care settings, which may have led to the findings observed in this paper. For
instance, the ranges of specialist or multidisciplinary care the patient received, or how
they self-managed the disease at home can have an effect on the study outcomes and
these factors were not accounted for. Finally, regarding the hospitalization outcome, the
proportion of those who were hospitalized were low for both types of complications in
this study. Therefore, this may have also been a reason to why the effect of DMI on the
hospitalization outcomes was not observed. A few of the existing studies with a diabetic
patient cohort5,11,29,31 such as Petrosyan et al. (2017)5 from Ontario and Lin et al. (2016)31
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from Taiwan also had a small proportion of patients hospitalized or number of
hospitalizations in their study. However, their rates were slightly higher than what was
found in this study.
Previous published literature that have assessed the impact of P4P incentives for diabetes
care on diabetes-related hospitalizations have been mixed. Findings from the current
study were consistent with a few studies that found P4P to have no impact on
hospitalizations,6,11,28,63,88 however, a number of studies found P4P incentives for diabetes
care reduced diabetes-related hospitalizations.6,12,15,23,25–28,31,89 For instance, Lin et al.
(2016)31 found that in Taiwan, diabetic patients with full-participation in the diabetes P4P
program had a lower risk of being hospitalized for chronic diabetic complications
compared to the comparison group.
Additionally, the current study revealed that certain patient- and physician-level
characteristics had effects on patients being hospitalized for diabetes-related
complications. Patients who were older were more likely to be hospitalized for diabetesrelated short-term complications, females were less likely to be hospitalized and had
fewer diabetes-related hospitalizations, and patients with female physicians were less
likely to be hospitalized for short-term complications only. In contrast, those more
comorbid were more likely to be hospitalized and have a greater number of
hospitalizations. Similar results have been observed in a few of the previous studies,
especially in the research on the P4P schemes, regarding patient’s sex,15,31,63 age,15 and
comorbidity15,27,63 on hospitalizations that included diabetes. However, contrasting results
were also found in the literature such as, one study in Ontario found diabetic patients
with comorbidities to less likely be hospitalized for diabetes-related long-term
complications.5
Regarding the impact of P4P incentives for diabetes care on diabetes-related
hospitalization costs, there is currently a lack of literature in this area. Nevertheless,
findings from this study were consistent with the results from one study. Dusheiko et al.
(2011)13 used data from the QOF P4P scheme, and found disease management for 9
chronic diseases including diabetes were not significantly associated with reduced
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hospital costs. Only disease management for stroke care was linked with reduced hospital
costs.13 The majority of the other studies found P4P was associated with a reduction in
hospitalization costs, with two studies briefly mentioning the estimated reduction in costs
due to the reduction in hospitalizations.12,23,25,26 Interestingly, Cheng et al. (2012)26 found
compared to the comparison group (i.e. those who had never been enrolled in P4P),
hospitalization costs were significantly lower only in diabetic patients who stayed in the
P4P program throughout the study (i.e. 2005 to 2009). The current study also found
certain patient characteristics were associated with the hospitalization costs. For instance,
female patients had lower hospitalization costs for both types of complications while
those with a higher comorbidity had greater hospitalization costs.
Existing literature on the impact of P4P incentives for diabetes on mortality have also
been limited and inconsistent. Similar to this study, both Ryan et al. (2016)16 and
Kontopantelis et al. (2015)17 found the QOF P4P scheme16, and the primary care
performance for the quality indicators included in the QOF17 had no statistically
significant effect on population-mortality. On the contrary, Fleetcroft et al. (2010)30
found the QOF scheme (2004 version) reduced mortality. Another study that assessed the
P4P program in Taiwan found the risk of mortality to be lower in diabetic patients
participating in this program compared to their comparison group.31 Regarding the
patient- and physician-level characteristics, similar to the current study, Lin et al.
(2016)31 also found that the risk of all-cause mortality was higher in male diabetic
patients. Counterintuitively, the current study also found that MRS was lower in patients
who were in higher deprivation quintiles compared to those who were least deprived.
This finding was found in the final two models, while Model 2 found MRS higher in
patients who were in higher deprivation quintiles compared to those who were least
deprived. The opposing findings that were observed can be due to the lack of variation in
the data as there were only two years of census data (2001 and 2006 census years) for the
material deprivation measure.44 This study also revealed that patients who are older, and
those who are more comorbid had a greater MRS, while, those with longer duration of
diabetes, from income quintiles 3 and 4 compared to the lowest income quintile, and with
physicians who are IMGs had a lower MRS.
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In this study, the MRS was used to measure the risk of mortality instead of using actual
deaths, because the score provided more information regarding the patient’s risk of death.
A surviving patient may have a high MRS which indicates that even though the patient is
alive their risk of death is high, and such information cannot be obtained when analyzing
actual deaths. In addition, diabetes is often not reported as the primary cause of death,
and instead the cause is reported to be due to its’ related complications.7 As a result,
analysis of death data due to diabetes can lead to underestimating the deaths caused by
diabetes. This is one of the reasons to why MRS is used as an outcome in this study.
Finally, the mortality trends in diabetic patients in Ontario from 1996 to 2009 have
shown that the mortality rate has decreased in this patient population, and this is most
likely due to the improved treatments, screenings, and management of diabetes.90
Therefore, it is possible that there might not have been a lot of actual patient deaths in
this study if this data were used, and it would be difficult to assess the true relationship
between DMI and mortality risk in diabetic patients.
There are a number of strengths of this study. First, this is the first study to assess the
impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs,
and mortality risk in patients with diabetes in Ontario. Second, panel data spanning from
fiscal years 2002 to 2008 was used to assess the impact of DMI in this study. An
advantage of using panel data is using statistical methods to control for unobserved
patient heterogeneity, thus being able to capture the effects of the policy change that
cannot be detected in pure cross-sectional data.51,91 Third, the diabetic patient cohort was
derived from validated health administrative databases.5,36 Finally, a comparison group
was used to assess the impact of DMI on the study outcomes.
Nevertheless, there were also some limitations of this study. First, the time period of the
study was not sufficiently long enough to see the effect of DMI on hospitalizations,
associated costs, and mortality risk in diabetic patients. Second, the comparison group
was much smaller compared to the DMI group in this study, and this can result in having
two study groups that are not similar with each other. Third, potential selection bias may
be an issue in this study. The majority of the FPs who provided care to patients in the
DMI group were initially practicing in the traditional FFS and switched into PEMs
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voluntarily. However, FPs who provided care to patients in the comparison group
practiced in the traditional FFS throughout the study period. Therefore, differences in the
physicians’ performance or their unobserved characteristics between the two study
groups could have introduced some bias. Fourth, in the past, the performance of the MRS
was assessed only in the general adult population in Ontario, and not in disease-specific
cohorts.48 Therefore, it is unclear how well this score predicts the risk of mortality in
diabetic patients. Finally, the diabetes-related hospitalizations in this study were
identified based on the most responsible diagnosis code for the patient’s stay at the
hospital, therefore, hospitalizations that instead had diabetes-related short-term or longterm complications as the secondary diagnosis would have been missed out in this study.
Furthermore, hospitalizations included in this study were acute inpatient hospitalizations
from the CIHI DAD database where the patient had at least one overnight stay.
Therefore, same-day surgeries or procedures for diabetes would also have not been
captured.
Future research can build on what was performed in this paper by investigating the
effects of the DMI on the patient outcomes and hospitalization costs beyond the fiscal
year 2008. This analysis can be performed in patients enrolled to physicians in PEMs and
patients affiliated with traditional FFS physicians separately. Outside of DMI, there are a
number of other P4P incentives introduced in Ontario (e.g. Heart Failure Management
incentive), thus, exploring the effectiveness of these incentives in improving patient
outcomes and costs can help us gain more knowledge on the effectiveness of Ontario’s
P4P incentives. Furthermore, future research can identify which P4P incentives have
produced large benefits to the population and the healthcare system, so features from that
scheme can be used to revise other P4P incentives.

4.5 Conclusions
The effectiveness of P4P incentives for diabetes care in improving patient outcomes, and
hospitalization costs are mostly inconsistent in the existing literature. This study uses data
from healthcare administrative databases to assess the effect of DMI on diabetes-related
hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in patients diagnosed with
diabetes in Ontario. Using four multivariable linear DID regression models comparing
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patients in the DMI group to those in the comparison group, this study demonstrates that
DMI has no significant impact on hospitalizations or associated costs for diabetes-related
short-term and long-term complications, and on MRS. Similar findings were observed in
all subgroups. Therefore, these results suggest that the introduction of DMI was not
effective in reducing diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality
risk in diabetic patients in Ontario.
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4.6 Tables and Figures

Box 4.1: Methods used to calculate the diabetes-related hospitalization costs
Note: RIW is the resource intensity weight for the specific patient; CPWC is the cost per
weighted case for inpatient acute care for Ontario cases. The first formula shows how the
hospitalization cost was calculated for a specific patient while the second formula shows
how the cost per weighted case was calculated.
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Box 4.2: Method used to calculate the MRS
Note: MRS is the Mortality Risk Score for the specific patient; ADGs is the Aggregated
Diagnosis Groups the specific patient had. The formula in the top indicates the MRS
calculation as per Austin & Walraven (2011).48
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Table 4.1: The number of patients hospitalized for diabetes-related complications and the total number of patients from the
main study population (i.e. Balanced panel)
Fiscal
Year

Total number of patientsc

Number of patients for diabetesrelated short-term complicationsa

Number of patients for diabetesrelated long-term complicationsb

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

Comparison
group

DMI
group

2002

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

2003

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

2004

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

2005

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

2006

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

2007

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

2008

93

1,147

338

4,152

15,559

156,892

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive.
a
The number of patients in each study group for diabetes-related short-term complications are patients who were hospitalized at least
once for this complication throughout the study. This is a subset of patients from the main study population. Descriptive statistics and
multivariable regression analyses performed for the ‘number of hospitalizations’, and ‘hospitalization costs’ outcomes for this
complication were performed in those patients.
b
The number of patients in each study group for diabetes-related long-term complications are patients who were hospitalized at least
once for this complication throughout the study. This is a subset of patients from the main study population. Descriptive statistics and
multivariable regression analyses performed for the ‘number of hospitalizations’, and ‘hospitalization costs’ outcomes for this
complication were performed in those patients.
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c

The number of patients in each study group in the main study population. Descriptive statistics and multivariable regression analyses
for all other outcome variables (i.e. the two binary diabetes-related hospitalization variables, and Mortality Risk Score) were
performed in those patients.
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Table 4.2: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS by study group before DMI was introduced
Variables

2002
Comparison
group

DMI
group

2003
Comparison
group

Number of
15,559
156,892
15,559
patients
Diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs
Short-term complications
Patients hospitalized,
n (%)
20
191
14
(0.13%)
(0.12%)
(0.09%)
Number of hospitalizationsa
21
237
a
Hospitalization costs ($ CAD),
mean (SD)
898.69
733.19
(2,138.15)
(2,925.45)
Long-term complications
Patients hospitalized,
n (%)
29
406
(0.19%)
(0.26%)
Number of hospitalizationsb
35
490
b
Hospitalization costs ($ CAD),
mean (SD)
569.01
913.89
(2,475.65)
(4,119.48)

DMI
group

2004
Comparison
group

DMI
group

2005
Comparison
DMI
group
group

156,892

15,559

156,892

15,559

156,892

191
(0.12%)

18
(0.12%)

218
(0.14%)

19
(0.12%)

218
(0.14%)

17

229

24

263

20

278

675.76
(1,900.60)

760.51
(2,495.49)

813.42
(2,009.62)

942.26
(3,412.89)

829.68
(2,025.76)

978.17
(2,840.83)

39
(0.25%)

459
(0.29%)

42
(0.27%)

585
(0.37%)

51
(0.33%)

679
(0.43%)

49

542

45

678

57

809

1,742.87
(7,264.44)

1,284.43
(6,392.21)

1,761.20
(11,153.79)

1,591.11
(6,232.89)

1,424.14
(4,501.63)

1,902.25
(6,619.33)
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Mortality risk
MRS,
45.09
44.03
46.26
45.24
47.71
46.63
49.02
mean (SD)
(14.94)
(15.56)
(15.01)
(15.71)
(15.21)
(15.98)
(15.43)
MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; $ CAD, Canadian dollars; SD, standard deviation.
a
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.
b
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.

47.96
(16.25)
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Table 4.3: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS by study group after DMI was introduced
Variables

2006
Comparison
group

DMI
group

Number of
15,559
156,892
patients
Diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs
Short-term complications
Patients hospitalized,
n (%)
12
211
(0.08%)
(0.13%)
a
Number of hospitalizations
13
258
a
Hospitalization costs ($ CAD),
mean (SD)
937.81
1,114.16
(3,626.66)
(3,463.04)
Long-term complications
Patients hospitalized,
n (%)
75
904
(0.48%)
(0.58%)
Number of hospitalizationsb
83
1,078
b
Hospitalization costs ($ CAD),
mean (SD)
2,375.30
2,816.62
(6,749.92)
(9,203.06)
Mortality risk

2007
Comparison
group

DMI
group

2008
Comparison
group

DMI
group

15,559

156,892

15,559

156,892

20
(0.13%)

240
(0.15%)

23
(0.15%)

278
(0.18%)

21

302

30

329

1,147.29
(3,174.23)

1,594.18
(7,647.11)

1,631.44
(4,149.05)

1,959.91
(7,477.28)

81
(0.52%)

1,028
(0.66%)

98
(0.63%)

1,095
(0.70%)

97

1,218

111

1,280

2,671.33
(8,899.13)

3,257.52
(12,489.18)

4,108.91
(11,801.96)

3,923.89
(15,677.26)
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MRS,
50.23
49.22
51.67
50.63
53.15
52.11
mean (SD)
(15.76)
(16.50)
(16.08)
(16.85)
(16.60)
(17.28)
MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; $ CAD, Canadian dollars; SD, standard deviation.
a
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.
b
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: a) and b) Average number of hospitalizations for diabetes-related shortterm and long-term complications respectively in patients; c) and d) Proportion of
patients hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications
respectively
The four graphs show the trends in the diabetes-related hospitalizations for fiscal years
2002 to 2008 by study group. The arrow on the graphs point to the period when DMI was
introduced.
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Figure 4.2: a) and b) Average hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications respectively in
patients
Both graphs show the trends in the diabetes-related hospitalization costs from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 by study group. The arrow on
the graphs point to the period when DMI was introduced.

146

Figure 4.3: Average Mortality Risk Score (MRS) in patients
The above graph shows the trends in the MRS from fiscal years 2002 to 2008 by study
group. The arrow on the graph points to the period when DMI was introduced.
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Table 4.4: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term complications
Variables

DMI

Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)

Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
DID Unadjusted Pooled
DID Adjusted Pooled
Fixed-Effects DID
OLS
OLS
!
!
!
(95% CI)
(95% CI)
(95% CI)
Probability
Number of
Probability
Number of
Probability
Number of
of being
hospitalizatof being
hospitalizatof being
hospitalizathospitalized ionsa (Log- hospitalized ionsa (Log- hospitalized ionsa (Logtransformed)
transformed)
transformed)
0.000
-0.006
0.000
-0.003
(-0.000,
(-0.037,
(-0.000,
(-0.033,
0.000)
0.025)
0.000)
0.026)

Model 4:
High-dimensional FixedEffects DID
!
(95% CI)
Probability
Number of
of being
hospitalizathospitalized ionsa (Logtransformed)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

-0.036
(-0.089,
0.017)

-0.000*
(-0.001,
0.000)

-0.019
(-0.064,
0.026)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

-0.005
(-0.052,
0.041)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

-0.008
(-0.097,
0.081)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.021
(-0.031,
0.072)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.008
(-0.036,
0.051)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

-0.000
(-0.043,
0.043)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.005
(-0.097,
0.086)

0.000***
(0.000,
0.000)
Patient Characteristics
Age

0.012***
(0.005,
0.018)

-0.000**
(-0.000,
-0.000)

0.010***
(0.003,
0.016)

-0.037
(-0.133,
0.059)

-1.978
(-10.759,
6.803)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)

-0.007***
(-0.010,
-0.003)

DMI*Period
(DID Effect)

" (time trend)
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Age-squared

0.000***
(0.000,
0.000)

0.000***
(0.000,
0.000)

Female
(Ref: Male)

-0.000***
(-0.001,
-0.000)

-0.039***
(-0.053,
-0.025)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
0.001***
(0.001,
0.001)

Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)

Number of
ADGs
Duration of diabetes
(years)

Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))
Q2
Q3

Q4

Q5 (most

-0.000**
(-0.000,
-0.000)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000**
(0.000,
0.000)

0.001
(-0.001,
0.003)

-0.021
(-0.085,
0.043)
0.036***
(0.033,
0.038)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.002)
0.001***
(0.001,
0.001)

-0.001
(-0.080,
0.077)
0.052***
(0.050,
0.055)

0.000
(-0.002,
0.003)
0.001***
(0.001,
0.001)

0.025
(-0.083,
0.133)
0.054***
(0.051,
0.057)

0.000***
(0.000,
0.000)

-0.003***
(-0.005,
-0.001)

0.038
(-0.058,
0.134)

1.978
(-6.799,
10.755)

0.006
(-0.100,
0.112)

0.546
(-9.104,
10.195)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.004
(-0.016,
0.025)
0.001
(-0.022,
0.023)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

-0.006
(-0.049,
0.037)
0.014
(-0.031,
0.059)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.010
(-0.047,
0.067)
0.009
(-0.050,
0.068)

0.000**
(0.000,
0.001)
0.001***

0.013
(-0.012,
0.037)
0.016

0.001
(-0.000,
0.001)
0.000

0.021
(-0.032,
0.075)
-0.010

0.000
(-0.001,
0.002)
-0.000

0.034
(-0.030,
0.098)
-0.013
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deprived)
(0.000,
0.001)

(-0.013,
0.046)

(-0.001,
0.001)

(-0.067,
0.048)

(-0.002,
0.001)

(-0.088,
0.063)

Q2

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.021,
0.021)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.005
(-0.028,
0.038)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.008
(-0.033,
0.049)

Q3

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.025*
(-0.001,
0.051)
0.022
(-0.005,
0.049)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.022
(-0.019,
0.063)
0.048*
(-0.000,
0.096)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.023
(-0.027,
0.074)
0.013
(-0.045,
0.070)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.021
(-0.009,
0.052)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.005
(-0.047,
0.058)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.023
(-0.086,
0.040)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.002
(-0.004,
0.007)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.005
(-0.005,
0.014)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.006
(-0.010,
0.021)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

-0.000

-0.006

-0.001***

-0.009

-0.001***

-0.033

Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))

Q4

Q5 (highest
income)
Physician Characteristics
Age

Age-squared

Female
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(Ref: Male)

(-0.000,
0.000)

(-0.021,
0.010)

(-0.001,
-0.000)

(-0.048,
0.031)

(-0.002,
-0.000)

(-0.092,
0.027)

IMG status
(Ref: CMG)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.000)

-0.005
(-0.024,
0.014)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.010
(-0.033,
0.053)

0.001
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.022
(-0.041,
0.084)

Constant
R-squared
Number of
patients
Observations

-0.219***
(-0.342,
-0.096)
0.000
172,451

-23.495***
(-36.861,
-10.130)
0.003
1,240

0.165**
(0.030,
0.299)
0.006
172,451

-18.898***
(-31.758,
-6.039)
0.188
1,240

2.004
(-3.149,
7.158)
0.004
172,451

82.995
(-286.844,
452.835)
0.250
1,240

0.411
172,451

0.503
1,240

1,207,157

8,680

1,207,157

8,680

1,207,157

8,680

1,207,157

8,680

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval;
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
a
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition,
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.5: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalizations for diabetes-related long-term complications
Variables

Model 1:
DID Unadjusted Pooled
OLS
!
(95% CI)

Model 2:
DID Adjusted Pooled
OLS
!
(95% CI)

Probability of
being
hospitalized

Number of
hospitalizationsa (Logtransformed)

Probability
of being
hospitalized

Number of
hospitalizationsa (Logtransformed)

0.001***
(0.000,
0.001)
0.001*
(-0.000,
0.002)

0.008
(-0.006,
0.022)
0.039***
(0.010,
0.068)

0.001***
(0.001,
0.002)
0.001**
(0.000,
0.002)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
0.001***
" (time trend)
(0.000,
0.001)
Patient Characteristics
Age

-0.012
(-0.039,
0.016)
0.017***
(0.014,
0.020)

DMI

Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)
DMI*Period
(DID Effect)

Age-squared

Model 3:
Fixed-Effects DID
!
(95% CI)

Model 4:
High-dimensional FixedEffects DID
!
(95% CI)

Probability
of being
hospitalized

Number of
hospitalizationsa (Logtransformed)

Probability
of being
hospitalized

Number of
hospitalizationsa (Logtransformed)

0.013*
(-0.001,
0.028)
0.039***
(0.014,
0.065)

0.001
(-0.000,
0.002)

0.037***
(0.010,
0.064)

0.001
(-0.001,
0.003)

0.036
(-0.013,
0.085)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)

-0.007
(-0.032,
0.017)
0.007***
(0.004,
0.010)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)
0.093
(-0.086,
0.272)

-0.005
(-0.029,
0.019)
0.911
(-3.902,
5.724)

-0.000
(-0.002,
0.001)

-0.007
(-0.056,
0.042)

-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
0.000

0.000
(-0.002,
0.003)
-0.000

0.000***

0.000***

0.000

0.001
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(0.000,
0.000)

(0.000,
0.000)

(-0.000,
0.000)

(-0.001,
0.002)

0.011
(-0.013,
0.035)

0.004***
(0.001,
0.006)

0.049*
(-0.004,
0.102)

0.001
(-0.003,
0.005)

0.034
(-0.042,
0.110)

0.003***
(0.003,
0.003)

0.029***
(0.028,
0.030)

0.003***
(0.003,
0.003)

0.044***
(0.043,
0.045)

0.003***
(0.003,
0.003)

0.046***
(0.045,
0.048)

0.001***
(0.001,
0.001)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.094
(-0.273,
0.085)

-0.923
(-5.734,
3.887)

-0.094
(-0.292,
0.103)

-1.465
(-6.779,
3.850)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

-0.003
(-0.013,
0.006)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.004
(-0.020,
0.027)

-0.000
(-0.002,
0.001)

0.000
(-0.033,
0.033)

Q3

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

-0.003
(-0.014,
0.008)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.007
(-0.032,
0.018)

0.001
(-0.001,
0.003)

0.008
(-0.027,
0.043)

Q4

0.001***
(0.000,
0.001)

-0.000
(-0.012,
0.011)

-0.001
(-0.002,
0.001)

-0.010
(-0.035,
0.016)

-0.000
(-0.002,
0.001)

-0.013
(-0.050,
0.024)

Female
(Ref: Male)
Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)

Number of
ADGs
Duration of diabetes
(years)

Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))
Q2

(-0.000,
0.000)

(-0.000,
0.000)

-0.003***
(-0.003,
-0.003)

-0.020***
(-0.026,
-0.015)

0.003***
(0.001,
0.004)
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Q5 (most
deprived)

0.001***
(0.001,
0.002)

0.002
(-0.012,
0.017)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.004
(-0.032,
0.024)

0.000
(-0.002,
0.002)

0.002
(-0.039,
0.043)

-0.000*
(-0.001,
0.000)

0.009*
(-0.000,
0.018)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.010
(-0.006,
0.026)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.003
(-0.019,
0.024)

Q3

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

0.012*
(-0.001,
0.024)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.013
(-0.007,
0.033)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.007
(-0.020,
0.033)

Q4

-0.001***
(-0.002,
-0.000)

0.010
(-0.002,
0.023)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.020*
(-0.003,
0.042)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.011
(-0.019,
0.040)

Q5 (highest
income)

-0.001***
(-0.002,
-0.001)

0.006
(-0.008,
0.019)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.004
(-0.022,
0.030)

-0.001
(-0.002,
0.001)

-0.013
(-0.048,
0.022)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.000*
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

-0.002*
(-0.005,
0.000)
0.000*
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.011***
(-0.018,
-0.004)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.004
(-0.010,
0.001)
0.000*
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.002
(-0.024,
0.021)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.000
(-0.002,
0.001)

-0.006
(-0.016,
0.003)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.002
(-0.034,
0.038)

Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))
Q2

Physician Characteristics
Age

Age-squared

Female
(Ref: Male)
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IMG status
(Ref: CMG)
Constant

-0.001***
(-0.002,
-0.001)

0.001
(-0.006,
0.008)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.009
(-0.014,
0.031)

0.001
(-0.001,
0.002)

0.023
(-0.013,
0.059)

-1.194***
(-1.414,
-0.974)

-33.985***
(-40.479,
-27.492)

0.761***
(0.531,
0.991)

-14.333***
(-20.580,
-8.086)

-5.034
(-14.659,
4.590)

-49.935
(-311.540,
211.670)

R-squared

0.001

0.024

0.017

0.161

0.012

0.218

0.369

0.398

Number of
patients

172,451

4,490

172,451

4,490

172,451

4,490

172,451

4,490

Observations
1,207,157
31,430
1,207,157
31,430
1,207,157
31,430
1,207,157
31,430
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval;
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
a
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition,
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.6: Estimated impact of DMI on hospitalization costs for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications
Variables

Model 1:
DID Unadjusted Pooled
OLS
!
(95% CI)

Model 2:
DID Adjusted Pooled
OLS
!
(95% CI)

Short-terma
(Logtransformed)

Long-termb
(Logtransformed)

Short-terma
(Logtransformed)

Long-termb
(Logtransformed)

DMI

-0.102
(-0.409,
0.205)

0.082
(-0.078,
0.242)

-0.065
(-0.359,
0.229)

0.144*
(-0.022,
0.310)

Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)

-0.389
(-0.965,
0.187)

0.454***
(0.123,
0.784)

-0.202
(-0.690,
0.286)

0.239
(-0.318,
0.796)

-0.140
(-0.454,
0.174)

0.138***
(0.067,
0.209)

0.212***
(0.174,
0.249)

DMI*Period
(DID Effect)

" (time trend)

Patient Characteristics
Age

Age-squared

Model 3:
Fixed-Effects DID
!
(95% CI)

Model 4:
High-dimensional FixedEffects DID
!
(95% CI)

Short-terma
(Logtransformed)

Long-termb
(Logtransformed)

Short-terma
(Logtransformed)

Long-termb
(Logtransformed)

0.460***
(0.165,
0.755)

-0.031
(-0.534,
0.473)

0.453***
(0.146,
0.759)

0.039
(-0.965,
1.043)

0.406
(-0.161,
0.973)

0.100
(-0.368,
0.569)

-0.090
(-0.368,
0.188)

0.011
(-0.446,
0.469)

-0.060
(-0.334,
0.214)

-0.165
(-1.193,
0.863)

-0.049
(-0.616,
0.518)

0.109***
(0.043,
0.175)

0.097***
(0.061,
0.132)

-32.701
(-128.006,
62.604)

-1.036
(-57.136,
55.064)

-0.057***
(-0.088,
-0.026)

0.016
(-0.005,
0.036)

0.000**

-0.000*

0.000

0.002***

0.015

0.008
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(-0.001,
0.001)

(0.001,
0.002)

(-0.006,
0.036)

(-0.005,
0.020)

0.112
(-0.159,
0.383)

-0.010
(-0.873,
0.854)

0.576**
(0.010,
1.143)

0.319
(-0.854,
1.492)

0.385
(-0.445,
1.214)

0.374***
(0.353,
0.395)

0.339***
(0.329,
0.349)

0.577***
(0.554,
0.599)

0.514***
(0.502,
0.527)

0.598***
(0.571,
0.625)

0.544***
(0.528,
0.559)

-0.033***
(-0.052,
-0.014)

-0.002
(-0.012,
0.007)

32.659
(-62.603,
127.920)

0.860
(-55.215,
56.935)

13.211
(-90.877,
117.299)

-6.318
(-68.165,
55.529)

0.052
(-0.148,
0.253)

-0.051
(-0.160,
0.057)

-0.060
(-0.504,
0.383)

-0.008
(-0.269,
0.253)

0.047
(-0.565,
0.659)

-0.037
(-0.421,
0.348)

Q3

-0.000
(-0.217,
0.216)

-0.043
(-0.162,
0.077)

0.088
(-0.376,
0.551)

-0.041
(-0.321,
0.239)

-0.022
(-0.652,
0.608)

0.141
(-0.270,
0.552)

Q4

0.142
(-0.102,
0.386)

-0.041
(-0.167,
0.085)

0.238
(-0.290,
0.766)

-0.120
(-0.408,
0.168)

0.276
(-0.385,
0.938)

-0.141
(-0.561,
0.279)

Female
(Ref: Male)
Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)

Number of
ADGs
Duration of diabetes
(years)

Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))
Q2

(0.000,
0.001)

(-0.000,
0.000)

-0.356***
(-0.485,
-0.227)

-0.227***
(-0.287,
-0.167)

-0.234
(-0.879,
0.410)
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Q5 (most
deprived)

0.118
(-0.163,
0.399)

-0.023
(-0.167,
0.121)

-0.117
(-0.718,
0.485)

-0.042
(-0.360,
0.275)

-0.204
(-0.978,
0.570)

0.080
(-0.390,
0.551)

0.003
(-0.207,
0.213)

0.083*
(-0.014,
0.180)

0.025
(-0.321,
0.372)

0.099
(-0.082,
0.279)

0.032
(-0.409,
0.472)

0.036
(-0.210,
0.282)

0.244*
(-0.009,
0.498)
0.209
(-0.057,
0.475)

0.085
(-0.031,
0.200)
0.076
(-0.055,
0.206)

0.188
(-0.250,
0.626)
0.390
(-0.096,
0.877)

0.093
(-0.128,
0.314)
0.204
(-0.048,
0.455)

0.181
(-0.360,
0.723)
-0.058
(-0.647,
0.531)

0.063
(-0.246,
0.371)
0.128
(-0.215,
0.471)

0.184
(-0.108,
0.476)

0.020
(-0.124,
0.165)

-0.003
(-0.538,
0.532)

0.004
(-0.292,
0.300)

-0.279
(-0.955,
0.396)

-0.202
(-0.607,
0.203)

0.030
(-0.025,
0.086)

-0.017
(-0.045,
0.011)

0.062
(-0.039,
0.162)

-0.041
(-0.101,
0.020)

0.079
(-0.082,
0.240)

-0.051
(-0.156,
0.055)

Age-squared

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

-0.001
(-0.001,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

-0.001
(-0.002,
0.001)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

Female
(Ref: Male)

-0.042
(-0.190,
0.105)

-0.116***
(-0.194,
-0.037)

-0.175
(-0.568,
0.218)

-0.024
(-0.277,
0.230)

-0.416
(-1.006,
0.173)

-0.007
(-0.418,
0.404)

Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))
Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5 (highest
income)
Physician Characteristics
Age
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IMG status
(Ref: CMG)
Constant

R-squared
Number of
patients

-0.032
(-0.212,
0.147)

-0.002
(-0.082,
0.078)

0.108
(-0.371,
0.586)

0.111
(-0.143,
0.365)

-275.611***
(-417.578,
-133.645)

-423.127***
(-497.756,
-348.499)

-218.310***
(-350.524,
-86.097)

-195.143***
(-266.321,
-123.966)

1,372.792
(-2,641.304,
5,386.888)

50.005
(-2,999.308,
3,099.317)

0.004
1,240

0.027
4,490

0.189
1,240

0.164
4,490

0.264
1,240

0.226
4,490

0.237
(-0.486,
0.960)

0.291
(-0.129,
0.711)

0.469
1,240

0.390
4,490

Observations
8,680
31,430
8,680
31,430
8,680
31,430
8,680
31,430
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval;
Ref, Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate; CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
a
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition,
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.
b
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1. In addition,
this outcome has been natural-log transformed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.7: Estimated impact of DMI on MRS
Variables

Model 1:
DID
Unadjusted
Pooled OLS

Model 2:
DID
Adjusted
Pooled OLS

Model 3:
Fixed-Effects
DID

!
(95% CI)
-1.054***
(-1.290, -0.818)

!
(95% CI)
0.196***
(0.117, 0.274)

!
(95% CI)

Model 4:
Highdimensional
Fixed-Effects
DID
!
(95% CI)

Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)
DMI*Period
(DID Effect)

-0.077
(-0.176, 0.022)

0.004
(-0.080,
0.087)

-0.010
(-0.096,
0.077)

-0.145*
(-0.305,
0.014)

0.024
(-0.074, 0.121)
1.355***
(1.343, 1.366)

0.033
(-0.048,
0.115)
-0.896
(-14.992,
13.201)

0.060
(-0.103,
0.223)

" (time trend)

0.036
(-0.045,
0.118)
0.116***
(0.105, 0.128)

0.004***
(0.004, 0.005)

0.020***
(0.016, 0.024)

0.839***
(0.668, 1.010)

0.313***
(0.109, 0.516)

1.614***
(1.607, 1.622)

1.551***
(1.543, 1.558)

0.204
(-0.074,
0.481)
1.519***
(1.508, 1.529)

0.031***
(0.026, 0.037)

1.571
(-12.520,
15.662)

-17.730**
(-34.057,
-1.404)

DMI

Patient Characteristics
Age
Age-squared
Female
(Ref: Male)
Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)
Number of ADGs
Duration of diabetes
(years)
Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))

0.839***
(0.827, 0.852)
0.002***
(0.002, 0.002)
-4.198***
(-4.241,
-4.156)
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Q2

-0.037
(-0.099,
0.025)
0.089**
(0.021, 0.158)

-0.088**
(-0.173,
-0.002)
-0.073
(-0.165,
0.020)

-0.019
(-0.134,
0.095)
-0.039
(-0.161,
0.083)

Q4

0.109***
(0.033, 0.185)

-0.187***
(-0.289,
-0.084)

-0.145**
(-0.284,
-0.006)

Q5
(most deprived)

0.289***
(0.199, 0.378)

-0.200***
(-0.319,
-0.082)

-0.145*
(-0.301,
0.010)

Q2

-0.127***
(-0.191,
-0.063)

-0.086**
(-0.153,
-0.020)

-0.066
(-0.150,
0.018)

Q3

-0.204***
(-0.277,
-0.132)

-0.088**
(-0.167,
-0.010)

-0.096*
(-0.195,
0.003)

Q4

-0.256***
(-0.335,
-0.177)

-0.069
(-0.156,
0.019)

-0.111**
(-0.220,
-0.001)

Q5
(highest income)

-0.335***
(-0.422,
-0.248)

-0.083
(-0.183,
0.017)

-0.096
(-0.224,
0.031)

-0.016*
(-0.034,
0.001)
0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

0.026**
(0.005, 0.046)

0.045***
(0.012, 0.078)
-0.000**
(-0.001,
-0.000)
-0.028
(-0.140,
0.084)
-0.294***
(-0.413,
-0.174)

Q3

Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))

Physician Characteristics
Age

Age-squared

Female
(Ref: Male)

-0.120***
(-0.169,
-0.071)

-0.000*
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.042
(-0.125,
0.040)

IMG status
(Ref: CMG)

-0.587***
(-0.637,
-0.537)

-0.303***
(-0.388,
-0.219)

-250.712***

64.462

Constant

-2,667.129***
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R-squared

(-2,690.107,
-2,644.151)

(-273.577,
-227.846)

(-692.529,
821.452)

0.027

0.834

0.396

0.927

Number of
172,451
172,451
172,451
172,451
patients
Observations
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DID, Difference-indifference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; Ref,
Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate;
CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

162

Table 4.8: Estimated impact of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized for diabetes-related complications, and on MRS in
the two subgroups
Outcome Variables

Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 3:
DID Unadjusted Pooled
DID Adjusted Pooled
Fixed-Effects DIDa
OLS
OLSa
!"
!"
!"
(95% CI)
(95% CI)
(95% CI)
Subgroup Analysis #1: Comorbidity
(Comparing patients with below versus at or above median number of ADGs at baseline)
< 4 ADGs ≥ 4 ADGs < 4 ADGs ≥ 4 ADGs < 4 ADGs ≥ 4 ADGs
at baseline at baseline at baseline at baseline at baseline at baseline
Hospitalized for short-term complications
(Binary)
-0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
(-0.001,
(-0.000,
(-0.001,
(-0.000,
(-0.001,
(-0.000,
0.000)
0.001)
0.000)
0.001)
0.001)
0.001)
Hospitalized for long-term complications
(Binary)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
(-0.001,
(-0.001,
(-0.001,
(-0.001,
(-0.001,
(-0.001,
0.001)
0.001)
0.001)
0.001)
0.001)
0.002)
MRS
0.049
-0.014
-0.019
0.085
-0.009
0.072
(-0.098,
(-0.142,
(-0.138,
(-0.023,
(-0.128,
(-0.036,
0.197)
0.113)
0.099)
0.194)
0.110)
0.180)
Subgroup Analysis #2: Sex
(Comparing males versus females)
Males
Females
Males
Females
Males
Females

Model 4:
High-dimensional
Fixed-Effects DIDa
!"
(95% CI)

< 4 ADGs
at baseline

≥ 4 ADGs
at baseline

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.002)

-0.001
(-0.003,
0.001)
0.054
(-0.177,
0.284)

0.000
(-0.002,
0.002)
0.054
(-0.157,
0.264)

Males

Females
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Hospitalized for short-term complications
(Binary)
0.001*
-0.000
(-0.000,
(-0.001,
0.001)
0.000)

0.001**
(0.000,
0.001)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.002)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

Hospitalized for long-term complications
(Binary)
-0.000
0.001
(-0.001,
(-0.000,
0.001)
0.002)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.001
(-0.000,
0.002)

-0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

0.001
(-0.000,
0.002)

-0.001
(-0.004,
0.001)

0.001
(-0.001,
0.003)

0.050
(-0.062,
0.161)

0.019
(-0.099,
0.138)

0.048
(-0.064,
0.159)

0.019
(-0.100,
0.137)

0.181
(-0.035,
0.396)

-0.079
(-0.290,
0.132)

MRS

0.038
(-0.097,
0.174)

0.014
(-0.126,
0.154)

DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary least squares; 95%
CI, 95% confidence interval; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups.
a
Models 2-4 controlled for patient characteristics (age, age-squared, sex, rural residence, number of Aggregated Diagnosis Groups,
duration of diabetes, material deprivation, neighborhood income quintiles), and physician characteristics (age, age-squared, sex,
International Medical Graduate status).
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Each of the two subgroup analyses were performed separately using Models 1-4 each. Full regression results are available upon
request.
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Appendices
Appendix A4.1: ICD-10 Codes for Diabetes-related Hospitalizations
Table 4.9: The ICD-10 codes for hospitalizations for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications
Diabetes-related complications
Diabetes-related short-term complications

Diabetes-related long-term complications

ICD-10 codes
E10.0, E10.1, E10.11, E10.12, E11.0,
E11.1, E11.11, E11.12, E13.0, E13.1,
E13.11, E13.12, E14.0, E14.1, E14.11,
E14.12

E10.2, E10.3, E10.4, E10.5, E10.6, E10.7,
E11.2, E11.3, E11.4, E11.5, E11.6, E11.7,
E13.2, E13.3, E13.4, E13.5, E13.6, E13.7,
E14.2, E14.3, E14.4, E14.5, E14.6, E14.7

ICD-10, 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases
Source: Petrosyan et al., 20175; OECD, 200856; OECD, 200957

Description of complications included
Type 1, type 2, other specified, or
unspecified diabetes mellitus with:
Hyperglycemic hyperosmolar coma,
hypoglycemic coma, insulin coma,
ketoacidosis, or mixed ketoacidosis
Type 1, type 2, other specified, or
unspecified diabetes mellitus with:
Renal, ophthalmic, neurologic,
circulatory, or multiple complications
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Appendix A4.2: Hospitalizations, Hospitalization Costs, and MRS Compared at Baseline and Final Year
Table 4.10: Diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and MRS compared between comparison and DMI group at
baseline and final fiscal year
Variables
Comparison
group
(n = 15,559)

2002
DMI
group
(n = 156,892)

Comparison
group
(n = 15,559)

2008
DMI
group
(n = 156,892)

0.27

15,536
(99.85%)
23
(0.15%)
58,266

156,614
(99.82%)
278
(0.18%)
711,154

0.20

58,002.5

711,417.5

15,461
(99.37%)
98
(0.63%)

155,797
(99.30%)
1,095
(0.70%)

777,405

9,304,890

p-value

p-value

Diabetes-related hospitalizations and hospitalization costs
Short-term complications
Patients hospitalized, n (%)
0
1
Number of hospitalizationsa*, Rank sum
Hospitalization costsa* ($ CAD),
Rank sum
Long-term complications
Patients hospitalized, n (%)
0
1
Number of hospitalizationsb*, Rank sum

15,539
(99.87%)
20
(0.13%)
60,115.5

156,701
(99.88%)
191
(0.12%)
709,304.5

60,487

708,933

15,530
(99.81%)
29
(0.19)

156,486
(99.74%)
406
(0.26%)

750,181

9,332,114

0.82

0.09

0.45

0.40

0.82
0.91

0.33

0.30
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Hospitalization costsb* ($ CAD),
Rank sum
Mortality risk
MRS, mean (SD)

749,544.5

9,332,750.5

0.42

779,059.5

9,303,235.5

45.09
44.03
<0.001
53.15
52.11
(14.94)
(15.56)
(16.60)
(17.28)
MRS, Mortality Risk Score; DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; $ CAD, Canadian dollars; SD, standard deviation
a
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related short-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.
b
Only assessed in patients hospitalized at least once for diabetes-related long-term complications as indicated in Table 4.1.
* Wilcoxon Rank sum test was used to assess if the medians for the variables differed between the two groups.

0.26

<0.001
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Appendix A4.3: Linear Probability Model versus Logit Model
Table 4.11: The estimated impact of DMI on the probability of being hospitalized for
diabetes-related short-term complications compared between the Linear Probability
Model (LPM) versus a Logit model
Variables

DMI

Period
(Ref: Pre-DMI
period)
DMI*Period
(DID Effect)

" (time trend)

Model 1:
DID
Unadjusted
Pooled OLS
(LPM)

DID
Unadjusted
Pooled Logit
Model

Model 2:
DID
Adjusted
Pooled OLS
(LPM)

DID Adjusted
Pooled Logit
Model

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.000*
(-0.000, 0.001)

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.000*
(-0.000,
0.001)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)
-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

Average
Marginal
Effecta
(95% CI)
0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.001)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.001)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.001)

0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

0.000***
(0.000,
0.000)

-0.000**
(-0.000,
-0.000)

-0.000**
(-0.000,
-0.000)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.001)
0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

-0.000***
(-0.000,
-0.000)
0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

-0.000***
(-0.001,
-0.000)

-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.000)

0.000
(-0.001,
0.001)

-0.000
(-0.001, 0.000)

-0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

Patient Characteristics
Age
Age-squared

Female
(Ref: Male)
Rural residence
(Ref: Urban)

-0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)
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Number of ADGs

0.001***
(0.001, 0.001)

0.000***
(0.000, 0.001)

0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

0.000***
(0.000, 0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.001)

Q3

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.001)

Q4

0.000**
(0.000, 0.001)

0.000*
(-0.000, 0.001)

Q5
(most deprived)

0.001***
(0.000, 0.001)

0.001**
(0.000, 0.001)

Q2

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

Q3

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.001)

Q4

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

Q5
(highest income)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

-0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)

0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

Duration of diabetes
(years)
Material deprivation quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (least deprived))
Q2

Income quintiles
(Ref: Q1 (lowest income))

Physician Characteristics
Age

Age-squared
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Female
(Ref: Male)
IMG status
(Ref: CMG)
Number of
patients

172,451

172,451

-0.000
(-0.000,
0.000)
-0.001***
(-0.001,
-0.000)

-0.000
(-0.000, 0.000)

172,451

172,451

-0.000***
(-0.001,
-0.000)

Observations
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
1,207,157
DMI, Diabetes Management Incentive; DID, Difference-in-difference; OLS, Ordinary
least squares; LPM, Linear Probability Model; 95% CI, 95% confidence interval; Ref,
Reference; ADGs, Aggregated Diagnosis Groups; IMG, International Medical Graduate;
CMG, Canadian Medical Graduate.
a
Average marginal effect indicates the effect of the variable on the probability of being
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term complications. The estimated coefficient (#) in
the LPM can be directly interpreted as the average marginal effect, however, this cannot be
done for the logit model. For the logit model, the average marginal effect is calculated by
first determining the derivative of the equation for the logistic regression with respect to a
specific variable of interest given by the model.68,70 Following this, the observed values in
the data were used to calculate the average marginal effect. The average marginal effect
was calculated using the margins command in Stata 15.1.
Robust 95% CI in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 5

5

Conclusions and Future Research

5.1 Summary and Conclusions
Diabetes management provided at primary care is key in improving the health of diabetic
patients. Effective disease management provided by family physicians (FPs) can
potentially reduce the risk of hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality.1–3
Therefore, financial incentives (i.e. pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives) for FPs were
introduced in several countries to improve management of diabetes at primary care.
Previous literature found that financial incentives tend to increase diabetes-related
services provided to patients4–7; however, some studies report otherwise.8,9 To date, the
impact of these incentives on hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality is
unclear. Furthermore, it is unknown if the introduction of the Diabetes Management
Incentive (DMI), introduced in Ontario, is associated with increased diabetes-related
services and decreased diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated costs, and mortality
risk in diabetic patients. Therefore, in this thesis, a literature review was first conducted
examining the impact of financial incentives for diabetes care on diabetes-related
hospitalizations, diabetes-related hospitalization costs, and mortality to understand and
summarize the results of the previous literature. Following this, the impact of DMI on
diabetes-related services, diabetes-related hospitalizations, associated hospitalization
costs, and mortality risk was examined in patients diagnosed with diabetes in Ontario.
This was assessed by comparing patients enrolled to FPs eligible for DMI to patients who
were affiliated with a FP practicing in the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model (not
eligible for DMI).
In Chapter 2, a literature review assessing the impact of financial incentives for diabetes
care on diabetes-related hospitalizations, hospitalization costs, and mortality was
performed. This review found that existing studies evaluating this relationship had
inconsistent findings. The majority of the studies found the incentives were associated
with reduced hospitalizations, nevertheless, a handful of studies also found that there was
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no effect, and one study found an increase in emergency visits for diabetes. Findings
were inconsistent for diabetes-related hospitalization costs and mortality as well. In
addition, there was a high degree of heterogeneity found among the included studies in
terms of their study population, study setting, study design, nature of the financial
incentives, and the outcomes measured.
In Chapter 3, the impact of the DMI on diabetes-related services in patients with diabetes
in Ontario was examined. The diabetes-related services were measured using the Diabetic
Management Assessment (DMA) fee code, which is billed by FPs for providing diabetesrelated services to their diabetic patients.9–11 This outcome measure was defined as a
dichotomous variable which measured whether or not the patient had three or more DMA
fee codes billed by their physician during each fiscal year. Results from this chapter
suggested that the introduction of DMI increased the provision of diabetes-related
services in Ontario. The effect of DMI is an increase in the probability of having three or
more DMA fee codes billed by patient’s physician by 2.1 percentage points, after
controlling for patient- and physician-level characteristics, patient fixed-effects, and
patient-specific time trend. Subgroup analyses were also performed and findings revealed
that the effect of DMI on diabetes-related services to be similar across the comorbidity
groups, however, the effect of DMI was slightly larger in males than in females.
In Chapter 4, the impact of DMI on diabetes-related hospitalizations, diabetes-related
hospitalization costs, and mortality risk in diabetic patients in Ontario was examined. The
hospitalizations and associated costs were categorized into two categories: (i) diabetesrelated short-term complications, and (ii) diabetes-related long-term complications. The
diagnosis codes that identified each type of complication were based on the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Healthcare Quality Indicator
(HCQI) Project.12–16 The hospitalization costs were calculated using the ICES costing
macro discussed in Chapter 4, and the mortality risk was measured using the Mortality
Risk Score (MRS), which estimated the patient’s risk of all-cause death within one year.
The MRS was computed using the algorithm proposed by Austin & Walraven (2011).17
Results from this analysis revealed that DMI had no statistically significant effect on
hospitalization and hospitalization cost for diabetes-related short-term and long-term
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complications, and on MRS. Patient- and physician-level characteristics, individual
fixed-effects, and patient-specific time trend were controlled for. Subgroup analyses by
comorbidity, and sex were also performed to explore the impact of DMI on some of the
outcomes. Findings showed that DMI has no effect on the probability of being
hospitalized for diabetes-related short-term and long-term complications, and on MRS in
all subgroups.
Overall, the introduction of DMI was associated with an increase in the provision of
diabetes-related services in Ontario, however, it had no effect on the patient outcomes
(measured by hospitalizations, and the risk of mortality), and hospitalization costs. There
are some possible explanations as to why DMI had no effect on these outcomes in this
study. First, the study period is not sufficiently long enough. It is possible that a longer
period post-DMI may be required to see improvements in these long-term patient
outcomes and cost savings. Second, although DMI was associated with an increase in the
provision of diabetes-related services, the magnitude of this effect was actually very
small. Therefore, no effects were observed on the patient outcomes and hospitalization
costs. Third, the low uptake of DMI as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 may be another
possible explanation. This implies that not a lot of patients were getting the complete
diabetes management during the study period. Finally, there are other factors outside of
the primary care settings, such as the ranges of specialist and multidisciplinary care the
patient received, patient’s self-management of the disease at home and if they were
referred to or had access to diabetes education centres, could have affected the outcomes
but were not accounted for in this paper.
Findings from this study are relevant to policy makers as it informs them the effect of the
DMI on the diabetes-related services provided, patient outcomes, and hospitalization
costs. As for the policy implications, a suggestion would be that the policy makers should
not scrap the DMI. Although no improvements were observed in the diabetes-related
hospitalizations, associated hospitalization costs, and the mortality risk; the DMI did
increase the provision of diabetes-related services in diabetic patients. If DMI is
scrapped, it may affect the severe diabetic patients who are in high need of the diabetesrelated services, and would compromise their health. Instead, further research is required
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to understand the potential benefits of this incentive. The impact of this incentive on
other patient-relevant outcomes (e.g. quality of life, patient satisfaction with care, user
experience, lifestyle changes) is unknown. Therefore, additional research should be
performed to gain a better understanding of the DMI, and to determine what areas in the
DMI needs to be focused on to observe improvements in patients’ health and healthcare
system costs.

5.2 Future Research
Future research can further investigate the impact of DMI through several ways. The
impact of this incentive on diabetes-related services, hospitalizations, hospitalization
costs, and mortality risk were only examined until March 2009 in this study; therefore,
future studies can investigate the impacts on patient outcomes and costs beyond 2009.
Through this, the study period post-DMI will be much longer, and improvements in the
patient outcomes and hospitalization costs, if any, can be more likely seen. Additionally,
future research in this area should keep note that all FPs were eligible to bill the DMI
(including FPs practicing in the traditional FFS) as of April 1, 2009.18,19 Second, future
research can also explore the effect of DMI on patients’ lifestyle changes, satisfaction
with care, quality of life, and treatment compliance. Third, it is also important to assess if
there are any potential harms associated with the implementation of DMI such as any
health disparities in the patient population, if certain groups of patients are being avoided,
or if it affects FPs’ motivations to provide care that is incentivized instead of the best care
to address the patients’ needs. Future research can also explore the effectiveness of other
P4P incentives outside of the DMI (e.g. Heart Failure Management incentive, incentives
for cancer screening) in Ontario. Similar methodologies from this study can be used to
understand the effectiveness of these incentives in improving patient’s health and/or
healthcare system costs. On the whole, further research in the area of DMI and P4P
incentives can educate us more about the impact of these incentives, and assist with
revising the DMI to improve its desired outcomes.
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